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**The evolution of political party systems in Indonesia:  
1900 to 1937**

Imawan, Riswandha, Ph.D.

Northern Illinois University, 1989

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NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY

THE EVOLUTION OF POLITICAL PARTY SYSTEMS IN INDONESIA:  
1900 TO 1987

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL  
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS  
FOR THE DEGREE  
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY


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
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AUGUST 1989

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## GLOSSARY

- Abangan. A concept introduced by Clifford Geertz to describe a cultural orientation of the Indonesian based on Javanese-Hinduism.
- BAKIN. The Army's Intelligence Agency set-up in 1966. Formally its purpose was to prevent communism in Indonesia.
- BKS. The civil-military cooperative bodies created by the Army between 1957 and 1958 as their preparation to become involved in politics.
- DWI FUNGSI. The Army's Dual Function doctrine promulgated by Colonel Nasution in September 1958. With this doctrine, the Indonesian Army claimed to have social as well as military obligations which gave them a path to become involved in politics.
- GOLKAR. The New Order's electoral machine established by the Army in 1964.
- Gotong Royong. The Indonesian way of mutual help cooperation.
- Guided Democracy. The democracy with leadership introduced by President Sukarno in 1958 to replace the Parliamentary Democracy.
- KOKARMENDAGRI. The Home Government Functional Staff corps established in 1970. Its purpose was to secure votes for GOLKAR in the 1971 general election.
- KONSEPSI. The political "conception" introduced by President Sukarno on February 21, 1957, as a complement of Guided Democracy.
- KOPKAMTIB. The Operation Commands for the Restoration of Security and Orde established in 1967 to weed-out the communists following the 1965 coup.

KORPRI. The Corps of Civil Servants of the Indonesian Republic formed in 1971. This institution is the expansion of KOKARMENDAGRI to include all civil servants.

NASAKOM. The Indonesian acronym for Nationalism, Communism, and Religions. This was an alternative ideology for the Indonesian proposed by President Sukarno in 1963.

National Council. An institution formed by President Sukarno as the complement of Guided Democracy. Membership in the National Council was based on functional representation.

PDI. The Indonesian Democratic Party established on January 10, 1973. This is a composite party composed of PNI, MURBA, PARKINDO, KATHOLIK, and IPKI.

PPP. The Unity Development Party, also known as the Islamic party, formed on February 13, 1973. This composite party consists of NU, PARMUSI, PSII, and PERTI.

Priyayi. Literally means the Javanese aristocrat. In this dissertation, priyayi is used to refer to an economic class in Indonesian society as the term priyayi used by Geertz.

SUPERSEMAR. The Letter of 11 March 1966. This letter marked the transformation of power from President Sukarno to General Suharto.

Volksraad. The People's Assembly. The first parliament established by the Dutch in 1908.

CHAPTER I  
LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter presents introductory information on the scope of study, the problem, and the expected results of this study. This chapter outlines the impact of modernization on the evolution of the party and the party systems in Indonesia during the period of 1900 to 1987. A typology of the party systems is introduced for analyzing the Indonesian party systems. A more detailed analysis of the evolution of party and party systems offered in Chapter I is presented in the subsequent chapters.

Why Study the Evolution of  
the Party System in Indonesia?

Previous studies of the political parties in Indonesia used two different approaches. One approach focused on the activities of parties during a general election and its aftermath. The concentration was on the preparation of parties, the voting turn-out, and the vote gained by each party.<sup>1</sup> Another approach focused on the evolution of a

---

<sup>1</sup>Herbert Feith, The Indonesian Election of 1955 (Ithaca, NY.: Cornell University Press, 1957); Kenneth Ward, The 1971 Election in Indonesia: an East Java Case

particular party. The focus centered on factors conducive to the development and the decline of a party.<sup>2</sup> Both approaches tended to view parties as dependent or determined by the political system. This study, in contrast, stresses interaction between the parties and their environment.

Parties were determined by basic national circumstances, but also by voting behavior and electoral representation.

Since the inception of the first five-year development plan (REPELITA) in 1969, Indonesia has undergone rapid modernization. Yet, only a few studies have carefully examined the relationship between parties and their environment and how they shaped the Indonesia political system. An outstanding work in this area was conducted by Herbert Feith whose study ended in 1962 and thus needs

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Study (Clayton, Australia: Monash University Press, 1973); Donald Hindley, The Communist Party of Indonesia 1951-1963 (Berkeley, CA.: University of California Press, 1964); William Liddle, Political Modernization in Modern Indonesia (New Haven, CT.: Yale University Press, monograph series no. 19, 1973).

<sup>2</sup>Howard Federspiel, Persatuan Islam: Islamic Reform in Twentieth Century Indonesia (Ithaca, NY.: Cornell University Press, 1970); Kenneth Ward, The Foundation of Partai Muslimin Indonesia (Ithaca, NY.: Cornell University Press, 1970); Eliseo Rocamora, "Political Participation and the Party System: The PNI Example," in William Liddle, Political Participation, 1973; Julian Boileau, GOLKAR Functional Group Politics in Indonesia (Jakarta, Indonesia: Center for Strategic International Studies, 1984); David Reeve, GOLKAR of Indonesia: an alternative to the party system (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1985); Rex Mortimer, Indonesian Communism Under Sukarno: Ideology and Politics 1959-1965 (Ithaca, NY.: Cornell University Press, 1974).

updating.<sup>3</sup>

This study does not, however, examine every variable that may affect the political system. Only the variables thought to directly influence the political system will be examined.

The questions in this study are:

1. How has the organizational structure of the Indonesian political party system evolved over time?
2. What roles or functions have the political parties performed within the Indonesian political system, and how have these roles and functions changed over time?
3. What factors are responsible for the changing nature of the Indonesian party system?
4. How has the structural and functional evolution of the party system influenced the behavior of the Indonesian electorates with regard to level of participation and the partisan conflict?
5. What effect, if any, has the structural and functional evolution of the party system had on partisan and interest conflict, and economic change in Indonesia?

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<sup>3</sup>Herbert Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia (Ithaca, NY.: Cornell University Press, 1962).

## Framework of Analysis

### Modernization and Political Participation

Historically, parties are the product of a democratic movement, and a democratic movement is the product of modernization. In the early twentieth century, parties became a universal phenomenon and were not always the result of a democratic movement. Even in authoritarian countries, such as the USSR and China, a political party exists. However, modernization is believed to be the main impetus of social change leading to changes in political life and the emergence of parties.

Modernity<sup>4</sup> is usually considered an antonym of

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<sup>4</sup>Following Samuel Huntington, "The Change to Change," Comparative Politics, April 1971, 284, modernization is viewed as a general concept to refer to a complex of interrelated changes, including changes in mass or individual psychology, social relationships, and economic conditions. Consequently, the precise meaning of "modernization" depends on which aspect of modernization we are interested in. In this study, our interest is in how people respond to a changing environment. A society is said to modernize if it gives appropriate responses to a changing environment. Therefore, the term "modernization" in this study can be loosely defined as the increase in people's adaptability to their changing environment. See also, Myron Weiner, Modernization: The Dynamics of Growth (New York, NY.: Basic Books, 1966), 3-4; Joseph Gusfield, "Tradition and Modernity: Misplaced Polarities in the Study of Social Change," in Claude Welch, Jr., ed., Political Modernization (Belmont, CA.: Wadsworth Publishing Company, Inc., 1971), 47-62; Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, CT.: Yale University Press, 1968), 8-11.

tradition.<sup>5</sup> In the early 1960's, modernization was seen as a linear and irreversible process. The occurrence of modernization was thought to be accompanied by the fading of traditional values.<sup>6</sup> This idea was contested by other theoreticians who postulated, instead, a process of change in which modernity and tradition were not mutually exclusive but rather continued to exist in admixtures unique to each society. In some cases, traditional values have strengthened modern institutions.<sup>7</sup>

Modernization is a complex phenomenon. The process brings about "social and psychological changes that alter both traditional patterns of behavior and an individual's perception."<sup>8</sup> A person's perception is based on a belief system, and the belief system is the reflection of norms

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<sup>5</sup>For an excellent discussion on the contrast of modern versus traditional societies, consult Frank Sutton, "Social Theory and Comparative Politics," in Harry Eckstein and David Apter, eds.: Comparative Politics: A Reader (Glencoe, NY.: Free Press, 1963).

<sup>6</sup>Myron Weiner, Modernization: The Dynamic of Growth (New York, NY.: Basic Books Inc., 1966); Cyril Black, The Dynamics of Modernization (New York, NY.: Harper and Row, 1966).

<sup>7</sup>Samuel Huntington, "The Change to Change," Comparative Politics, April 1971; Leonard Binder, "The Crises of Political Development," Leonard Binder, ed., Crises and Sequences in Political Development (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 1971).

<sup>8</sup>Claude Welch, Jr., "The Comparative Study of Political Modernization," in Claude Welch, Jr., ed., Political Modernization: A Reader in Comparative Political Change (Belmont, CA.: Wordsworth Publishing Company Inc., 1971), 5.

held by the society.<sup>9</sup> Changing norms can mean changing values and beliefs which later affect an individual's attitude.

The growing importance of universalistic, specific, and achievement norms in modern societies is thought to stimulate people to participate more in these than in traditional societies.<sup>10</sup> New associations develop along with what Karl Deutsch called "Social Mobilization," which he defines as:

changes of residence, of occupation, of social setting, of face-to-face associates, of institutions, roles and ways of acting, of experiences and expectations, and finally the personal memories, habits and needs, including the need for new patterns of group affiliation and new images of personal identity.<sup>11</sup>

Social mobilization opens the possibility of political mobilization in the form of potential and actual involve-

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<sup>9</sup>Martin Fishbein and Icek Ajzen, Belief, Attitude, Intention and Behavior (Philippines: Addison-Wesley Publishers Co., 1975), 15, 13-16.

<sup>10</sup>This hypothesis was mentioned by Daniel Lerner in The Passing of Traditional Society (Glencoe, IL.: Free Press, 1958), 50-51. He postulates three sequential factors for political participation: urbanization, literacy, and media development. Urbanization correlates positively with urbanity, increased literacy, more media exposures, and high per capita income, which in turn stimulates people to participate in politics, particularly to vote in an election. See also Huntington, Political Order, 88-89.

<sup>11</sup>Karl Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," in Claude Welch, Jr., Political Modernization, 153.



ment in mass politics, higher voting participation, and a growing host of organizations.<sup>12</sup> The most important effect of political mobilization is political participation.<sup>13</sup> Political participation is the outcome of various mental states and personal behavior, such as consuming political information and expressing opinions.<sup>14</sup> It is fair to speculate that information and an ability to express an opinion are unequally distributed, therefore, political participation may take various forms and occur in varying degrees.

During modernization, old loyalties to kin and traditional leaders are broken down and replaced by new loyalties. More importantly, there is a tremendous growth of aspirations among people newly freed from the constraints of a traditional society. Often the aspirations of the people expand at a greater rate than the ability of the system to satisfy them. This, eventually, may help to foment social conflict. Thus, modernization produces an

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<sup>12</sup>Ibid., 154, 165 passim.

<sup>13</sup>political participation is defined as "those actions of private citizens by which they seek to influence or to support government and politics." It includes not only active roles that people pursue in order to influence political outcomes but also ceremonial and support activities. See Lester Milbrath and M.L. Goel, Political Participation (Chicago, IL.: Rand McNally, 1977), 2.

<sup>14</sup>Myron Weiner, "Political Participation: Crisis of the Political Process," in Leonard Binder, ed., Crisis and Sequences, 161-164.

expansion of political participation which is often destabilizing and counterproductive to development efforts.

Consequently, political development<sup>15</sup> is invariably viewed by rulers of traditional societies as an unaffordable luxury. Priority is usually given to the maintenance of stability so that national economic development can continue unhindered. In order to control the demands for participation unleashed by modernization, most ruling elites will move to restrain or control participation in various ways. This applies particularly to countries that are fragmented by many diverse ethnic, religious and social divisions and which lack strong, effective political institutions. The elites fear that their developing nation will be torn apart over traditional, communal differences that become articulated in assertive new groups. In reaction to these threats, leaders of developing countries cite such factors as the need for building national unity and maintaining stability to justify reduction or restriction of political participation and a prevention of

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<sup>15</sup>In this study, we use the term "political development" as "a set of related political system, process, and policy changes that have been, or are, taking place within the larger context of socioeconomic modernization." Political development reflects "changes in the existing structure and culture of the political system" because "they [a society] are unable to cope with the problem or challenge without further structural differentiation and cultural secularization." See Gabriel Almond and Bingham Powell, Jr., Comparative Politics, 2d ed. (Boston, MA.: Little, Brown and Company, 1978), 20-23, 359 passim.

representation for certain groups within the political system. This can, however, produce additional tensions and an outbreak of violence among groups that are excluded from participation, which in turn leads to the justification of an traditional authoritarian measures, resulting in a vicious circle.

### The Political Party and the Party Systems

The earlier discussion suggests that modernization encourages voluntary associations to form as people discover new threats and opportunities amidst social change. These tendencies produce interest groups, political movements, and political parties.<sup>16</sup> Often the parties were based on social cleavages which deepened potential conflict among elements in the society.<sup>17</sup> A main concern of a regime becomes how to prevent a society from being fractionalized and how to manage conflicts that may occur.<sup>18</sup> Despite their potentiality to deepen conflict, the parties help to minimize the amount of conflict in the

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<sup>16</sup>Ibid., 74-80; Weiner, "Political Participation," 181.

<sup>17</sup>Alvin Robushka and Kenneth Shepsle, "Political Entrepreneurship and Pattern of Democratic Sustainibility in Plural Society," RACE, vol. 11, April 1971, 462-463.

<sup>18</sup>E.E. Schattsneider, The Semisovereign People (New York, NY.: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960), 67-71.

society. From this point of view, parties become the principal means of managing conflict.

The term "political party" is extremely difficult to define because it can refer to so many different kinds of entities. Indeed, there is no definition on which political scientists all agree. The works of two prominent students of political parties, Leon Epstein and Giovanni Sartori, will be utilized here.

A party is "any group, however loosely organized, seeking to elect governmental office holders under a given label."<sup>19</sup> Epstein stresses two functions of political parties in Western political systems: structuring voting choice and conducting the government. This dissertation uses these functions as the indicators of party roles in Indonesia. However, a modification to the application of these functions must be made, because, as Epstein argues, parties could perform these functions in a competitive system. The problem is, most developing nations, such as Indonesia, do not have fully competitive parties that structure voting choices in the manner suggested by Epstein. A more promising approach to study the functions of political parties in developing countries is provided by Sartori who asserts that "a political party is any group

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<sup>19</sup>Leon Epstein, Political Parties in Western Democracies, 2d printing (Princeton, NJ.: Transaction Books, 1982), 9.

that presents at elections (free or non-free), and is capable of placing through elections, candidates for public offices."<sup>20</sup> Sartori's definition, although similar to Epstein's in many respects, displays two significant differences. First, for Sartori, the extent of competition for electorates in the electoral process is less important than the fact that parties are functional to political systems. Second, Sartori adds to his definition a set of "counting rules," that is a method to screen out minor parties which do not receive enough electoral support to participate in government.

Both Epstein and Sartori recognize two important roles of parties. First, parties have their roots in social fragmentation. Parties may sharpen the divisions and polarize society. Alternatively, parties may help to make conflict manageable. They do this by continually aggregating people's interests, and doing so not only at election time. Second, modern political parties function as vehicles of mass political participation. Even where elections are only support rituals, parties are still relevant. Rulers who will not permit their power to be contested may have to maintain one party if others are to be excluded. In this situation, the party naturally lends

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<sup>20</sup>Giovanni Sartori, Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis, vol. I (New York, NY.: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 63.

itself to other forms of mass organizing and mobilization.<sup>21</sup>

With regard to the position of parties vis-a-vis the larger political system, Sartori has offered the following patterns:

1. the party that remains external to, and uninvolved with the sphere of government, the ambassador party, so to speak;
2. the party that operates within the ambit of government but does not govern;
3. the party that actually governs, that takes on the governing and governmental functions.<sup>22</sup>

In relation to the impact of modernization on a society discussed early, the position of political parties in the political system depends on the response of a society to the changing social and political environment. The response will help the society to develop their party system.

At the first stage of modernization, elements of the society tend to develop several parties. The parties help the society to organize the people's will, but also they make the people stands against each other which potentially promulgate conflicts. To minimize conflict and to facili-

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<sup>21</sup>Samuel Huntington and Joane Nelson, No Easy Choice (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1976); Samuel Huntington and Clarence Moore, Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society (New York, NY.: Basic Books Inc., 1970).

<sup>22</sup>Sartori, Parties, 19.

tate the continuation of modernization process, a political regime tends to reduce the number of political parties. Hence, the party system in a developing nation tended to evolve from a polarized to a hegemonic party system.

Sartori indicates that the polarized pluralism party system exists in extremely fragmented societies. About five or six parties exist, based on very distinct and deep cleavages. Their potential to govern depends on their "coalition use," and the system tends also to develop a bipolar structure, government coalition, and opposition coalition. Among these groups, however, there is an ideological distance. Opposition is not "on issues" but "on principles." As a result, the level of consensus is low, and the legitimacy of the political system is widely questioned. Polarized pluralism, then, promotes an unstable political system, such as in Chile (1970-1973) and Italy (1948-1972).

The unstable political situation in pluralized system often erupted in the form of regional rebellions and social unrest. In this situation, in order to restore social order, one political power emerges, which is not always a political party. In modernizing society, the Army seems to be the best alternative to regulate conflicts as the

consequence of social economic change.<sup>23</sup> However, once the Army gets involved in politics, they tend to dominate it.<sup>24</sup> In the name of social order, the Army is inclined to reduce the number of parties, and create one hegemonic party.

In a hegemonic party system, parties are permitted to exist, but as second class, licensed parties, for they are not permitted to compete with the hegemonic party on "antagonistic terms and on legal basis."<sup>25</sup> There are two types of hegemonic party: the ideological-hegemonic and the pragmatic-hegemonic party systems. In the ideological-hegemonic system, the second class parties or satellite parties are represented in the government but do not participate with fullrights. In the pragmatic-hegemonic system, the peripheral parties have full rights to participate in politics. The hegemonic party is so inclusive and aggregative that the small parties are unable to challenge its domination.

Hence, to conclude this section, a modernizing society tends to switch from a pluralized party system at the first stage of modernization, to a hegemonic party

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<sup>23</sup>Eric Nordlinger, Soldiers in Politics: Military Coup and Government (Englewood Cliffs, NJ.: Prentice Hall Inc., 1977), 149-155.

<sup>24</sup>S.E. Finner, The Man on the Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics (New York, NY.: Frederick A. Prager, 1962), 7.

<sup>25</sup>Ibid., 230.



system at the later period.

Social Mobilization, Regime Evolution,  
and the Evolution of Political Parties in Indonesia

The penetration of Western ideas into Indonesian society began about the 16th century. However, political parties were not known until the 1900's, when a group of Indonesians studied in Europe. These people were influenced by ideologies developed there and, after they accomplished their study, the students brought back and cultivated those ideas in the Indonesian society. The impact was that old social cleavages were altered, creating political tension among Indonesian groups. Traditional Indonesian thinking that power is concentrated in one hand (i.e, the King) in an undifferentiated society, was challenged by the Western ideas of decentralized power and economic class antagonism.<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>26</sup>An excellent work on the Indonesian traditional ideas (i.e, the Javanese ideas) was conducted by Sumarsaid Moertono, State and Statecraft in Old Java (Ithaca, NY.: Cornell University Press, 1974). The discussion of how the Indonesian parties were built under traditional and Western influences can be found in Herbert Feith and Lance Castle, ed., Indonesian Political Thinking: 1945-1965 (Ithaca, NY.: Cornell University Press, 1970). These influences affected not only parties but also associational groups. These groups' importance was growing, at least since 1957 thenceforth, which resulted in corporatist policies by successive regimes. See Dwight King; Interest Groups and Political Linkage in Indonesia 1800-1965 (DeKalb, IL.: Northern Illinois University, Center for Southeast Asian

To discuss the impact of modernization to the evolution of Indonesian politics, this study divides the discussion into four periods:

1. The Pre-independence era: 1908-1945
2. The Early Independence era: 1945-1957
3. The Sukarno Guided Democracy era: 1957-1966
4. The New Order's era:
  - a. The early period: 1966-1971
  - b. The late period: 1971-1987.

#### The Pre-independence era: 1900-1945

The precursor to the development of political parties in Indonesia began in 1899 when C.Th. van Deventer published his article, "Honour of Debt." The article accused the Netherlands of draining wealth from Indonesia and called on the Netherlands to allocate funds to promote Indonesian welfare. With the support of Christian and Social Democratic parties in the Netherlands' parliament, van Deventer's article helped to bring about the Ethical Policy in 1901.

The Ethical Policy increased the number of educated Indonesians. The Dutch incorporated these people into their administration. However, the presence of some Indonesians in the Netherlands East Indies (the NEI)

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Studies, no. 20, 1982); Dwight King, Social Mobilization, Associational Life, Interest Intermediation and Political Cleavage in Indonesia (Chicago, IL.: University of Chicago, Ph.D. diss., 1978).

government was more for the purpose of symbolic legitimation than for power sharing. The Dutch used the Indonesians as the communicator between the state and the people. It was a one way communication from the state to the people, because the Dutch denied the Indonesian's political rights. This situation did not satisfy the educated Indonesians who demanded active role in government.

The opportunity for the Indonesians to get involved in government was opened by the establishment of the people's assembly (Volksraad) in 1906. All groups in the NEI were supposed to be represented in the Volksraad. The Dutch were to compete in an election, while the representatives of the Indonesian interest groups were appointed. This stimulated the Indonesians to establish as many groups as they could to ensure more representatives in the Volksraad, especially when the NEI government proposed to increase the number of Indonesian representatives in 1922. But the emergence of these groups sharpened the ethnic and religious sentiments of the Indonesians. During this period, the rivalry between the orthodox Moslems (known as the santri group) and the nominal Moslems (known as the abangan group) began.<sup>27</sup>

In the early 1930's, the NEI suspended all parties,

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<sup>27</sup>The concepts of santri, abangan, priyayi come from Clifford Geertz, The Religion of Java (Glencoe, IL.: Free Press, 1960).

due not only to their aggressiveness in pursuing Indonesian independence, but more importantly because the Netherlands faced a great economic depression in Europe. By banning parties, the Dutch hoped to protect the export oriented economy from a political disturbance. They may have feared that party might use economic deterioration as weapons against the Dutch.

The Japanese took control of Indonesia from the Dutch in 1940. They forced all social organizations (including parties) to support the Japanese military goal, i.e., to win the Pacific War in World War II. In addition, the Japanese introduced the military superiority over the civilian bureaucracy, which later greatly influence the Indonesian political system.

#### The Early Independence era: 1945-1957

In the first years after the Indonesian independence in August 1945, the government faced a problem of integrating segments of Indonesian society. Given the pluralistic nature of the Indonesian society, various ethnic groups scattered in isolated islands, and parties based on communal sentiments could have negative effects on attempts to build Indonesian unity. The remedy was to use President Sukarno's concept of a vanguard party (partai pelopor) introduced in 1926. But this effort was seriously threat-

ened by the Dutch who accused the Indonesian leaders of intending to build an authoritarian regime.

To deflect this concern, the government promulgated a decree on November 3, 1945, which stimulated the emergence of parties to compete in the January 1946 election.

However, the planned elections were postponed for nine years. They were finally held in September and December 1955.

As parties began to be active in politics, party ideologies reinforced existing social cleavages. They sharpened the distinction between "in-group" versus "out-group" solidarity. At the national level, twenty-nine parties and individuals competed in the 1955 election, although only four parties emerged as major contenders.<sup>28</sup> None of the four obtained a majority of votes. The Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI) gained 22.3 percent; the Consultative Council of Indonesian Moslems (MASYUMI) gained 20.9 percent; the Islamic Preachers Association (NU) gained 18.4 percent; and the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) gained 16.4 percent. Although coalition governments were formed, they were highly tenuous, resulting in a high level

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<sup>28</sup>The actual number of contenders in the 1955 election was 172 parties and individuals. However, only twenty-nine of them competed at the national level while most of them existed only in one region, such as the Young Communist Group (ACOMA) in Madura, and La Oda Effendi in South Sulawesi. See Kepartaian Parlementaria di Indonesia, Departemen Penerangan, 1957.

of political instability.

During the 1945-1957 period, Indonesia was governed by weak and short-lived coalition governments which tended to aggravate all conflicts.<sup>29</sup> Coalition cabinets were short-lived, and none was able to accomplish its programs.

The important environmental characteristic of this era was the continuation of the Dutch control on the economy. The 1945 proclamation brought political independence, while matters related to economic independence were to be settled gradually under a policy known as "Indonesianisasi." But Indonesianisasi intensified the conflict between the regions and the central government due to an unbalanced distribution of economic resources between Java and the other islands. The parties became the de facto government of several regions. Several regional rebellions erupted, most notably the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia (PRRI) and the Inclusive Struggle (PERMESTA). The rebellions gave the Army reasons to become actively involved in politics.<sup>30</sup>

The conflict between the army officers and the civilian politicians could be traced back in 1949, during

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<sup>29</sup>Donald Hindley, "Aliran and the Fall of the Old Order," *INDONESIA*, no. 9, April 1970.

<sup>30</sup>Abdul Haris Nasution, 17 Oktober 1952 Dalam Proses Mencari Posisi TNI Dalam Kehidupan Bernegara (Bandung: The Hague van Hove, 1960); Abdul Haris Nasution, Kekaryaan ABRI (Jakarta: Seruling Masa, 1971).

the second Dutch military attack, when the politicians broke their earlier commitment to resist and surrendered to the Dutch. The conflict culminated in 1952 when the army officers accused the politicians of intervening in military affairs because the Wilopo cabinet proposed to cut the military budget and to replace Colonel Nasution as the Army Chief of Staff without consulting the senior army officers.<sup>31</sup>

Regional rebellions forced Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo to resign on March 24, 1957. President Sukarno took over political control and declared Martial Law. The law suspended parliamentary democracy, and further opened the door to Army involvement in political life.

#### Sukarno's Guided Democracy era: 1957-1966

The Martial Law reduced the role of parties and, at the same time, opened the way for President Sukarno and army officers to become directly involved in politics. By the 1945 constitution, the President and the Army were excluded from the political arena. The President was held inviolable and above the political arena. The Army was seen as the organ of the state which was managed by civilian politicians. But, both parties felt that the

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<sup>31</sup>Ulf Sundhausen, The Road to Power (Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: Oxford University Press, 1982), 79-88.

civilian politician mismanaged the country and brought the nation to the brink of civil war.

The follow-up of the Martial Law was the inception of the guided democracy, and the introduction of the Army Dual Function doctrine. The guided democracy, or the democracy with leadership,<sup>32</sup> was introduced in 1958. The complementary of the guided democracy were a mutual help cabinet (gotong royong cabinet) and a National Council. Parties played no function because membership in these institutions was based on functional representation, not party representation.

The other follow-up of the Martial Law was the announcement of the Army's Dual Function doctrine (known as Dwi Fungsi) by Colonel Nasution in November 1957. The Indonesian Army would neither play a leading role in politics as those in Latin America countries, nor withdraw from politics as in Western democratic countries. Based on this doctrine, the Army sponsored the foundation of several civilian-military cooperative bodies (Badan Kerja Sama Sipil Militer, BKS). Beside providing a direct contact with the people, the BKS could be used by the Army as the means to put the Army officers in both gotong royong cabinet and the National Council as functional representatives.

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<sup>32</sup>Feith and Castles, Political Thinking, 81-83.



Sukarno and the Army were the two leading actors in the guided democracy. The Army was in a stronger position than Sukarno, because it had direct contact with the masses through the BKS, while the President had none. Increasingly, Sukarno relied on the PKI and its mass organizations for support to counterbalance the army. Sukarno used PKI because the re-election in several areas in 1957 showed that the PKI emerged as the most popular party in Indonesia. Guided democracy, therefore, produced a balance of power politics. The army on the right was confronted with the communists (PKI) on the left, while Sukarno himself stood in the middle to balance both political powers.

None of the three main actors in the guided democracy paid attention to the national economy; attention was focused on how to restructure Indonesian politics after the parliamentary democracy terminated. Inflation increased more than 650 percent in 1964 and 986 percent in 1965.<sup>33</sup> Two important reasons for this were the rejection by President Sukarno of economic assistance from Western countries, especially from the U.S.A., and his expensive campaigns to liberate West Irian and to crush Malaysia.

This balance of power politics collapsed when the PKI

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<sup>33</sup>Bruce Glassburner, "Indonesia's New Economic Policy and Its Sociopolitical Implications," in Karl Jackson and Lucian Pye, ed., Political Power and Communication in Indonesia (Berkeley, CA.: University of California Press, 1978), 138.

was involved in an attempted coup in 1965. The aftermath of the coup was the prohibition of Marxism/Communism in Indonesia in 1966, and the resignation of Sukarno from the Presidency. A new government, called the New Order, was set up and led by General Suharto.

#### The New Order's era: 1966 - 1987

General Suharto's New Order government, hereafter referred to as the New Order, put political stabilization as its top of priority. In the view of the New Order leaders, the primary cause of the political instability were too many parties, diverse ideologies, and the absence of a major party to generate support for a government. Consequently, political parties became the primary targets for manipulation and restructuring.

In addition to economic problems, the New Order was also confronted with a problem of political legitimacy, having attained their power through force. Constitutionalism was embraced. Since articles 27 and 28 of the 1945 Constitution guaranteed political expression, the Army had to permit some parties to exist and compete in a general election. However, the Army launched a series of "special operations" to reduce the functions and the roles of parties in Indonesian politics.

In the two years prior to the 1971 election, the New

Order built its own electoral vehicle, GOLKAR, a party that had been established by the army in 1964. To give GOLKAR a secure vote in the upcoming election, the New Order introduced the "monoloyalty concept"<sup>34</sup> and "floating mass"<sup>35</sup> in 1969. In 1973, the New Order forced nine parties to fuse into two composite parties. One was the Unity for Development Party consisting of "religious"-"islamic"-"santri" group; another one was the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI) composed of the "secularist"-"nationalist"-"non-islamic" group. GOLKAR stood aside these two streams, claiming a distinctly different ideology, Pancasila.

Due to the different background of each element of the composite parties, neither the PPP nor the PDI has been able to challenge the GOLKAR domination at the national level. Table 1 shows that GOLKAR won a majority of votes in four successive elections.

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<sup>34</sup>Monoloyalty is an idea introduced by the government prior to the 1971 election. The idea stipulated that civil servants should cut-off their political affiliation, and join the Indonesian Civil Servant Association (KORPRI) under GOLKAR's aegis.

<sup>35</sup>Floating Mass is also an idea introduced by the New Order regime prior to the 1971 election. This idea held that villagers should be immunized from political activities, and put directly under GOLKAR, which never formally admitted being a political party.

TABLE 1  
 THE RESULTS OF THE INDONESIAN ELECTIONS  
 1971 TO 1987  
 (in percentage)

	1971	1977	1982	1987
Voting turn-out	93.41	90.93	91.52	91.32
GOLKAR	65.56	64.44	67.22	73.17
PPP	26.11	27.50	26.11	15.97
NU	(16.11)			
PSII	( 2.78)			
PARMUSI	( 6.67)			
PERTI	( .56)			
PDI	8.33	8.06	6.67	10.87
PNI	(5.56)			
KATHOLIK	( .83)			
PARKINDO	(1.94)			
MURBA	(0.00)			
IPKI	(0.00)			

Source: Indonesian Election Institute, various issues.

The New Order has successfully stabilized the Indonesian economy and stimulated economic growth. The regime recruited well trained Western economic technocrats, invited foreign investors, and gave priority to export production. Indonesia has been integrated into the international market. However, this strategy of economic development has resulted in considerable economic inequality.

The government launched the first five-year development program (REPELITA) in 1969 and Indonesia now is implementing the fourth REPELITA. The average annual growth in the real Gross Domestic Product was 4.8 between 1967-1973 and 5.5 between 1974-1981. Commodity exports of oil, rubber, and timber have increased. Inflation fell from 636 percent in 1966 to seven percent in 1981.<sup>36</sup>

The Indonesian experience under the New Order reflects a contrast between political and economic development. Liberalization occurred in economic policy, but it was accompanied by the emasculation of the political parties. The party system increasingly appeared to resemble an ideological-hegemonic party system.

Having sketched the evolution of Indonesian poli-

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<sup>36</sup>Malcolm Gillis, Episodes in Indonesian Economic Growth (Mexico: Paper presented at Conference on the World Economic Growth, sponsored by the Institute for Contemporary Studies, 28-30 April 1983).

tics, we need to introduce the models of Indonesian politics proposed by specialists on the subject. The models will help us to highlight important phenomena which significantly affected the development of a party system in each period mentioned above.

### Models of Indonesian Politics

A crucial problem in a democratic system is ensuring governmental stability. Social homogeneity and political consensus within society are two factors that strongly influence a stable government. A plural society with deep social divisions and political differences is often the cause of instability and the breakdown of democracy. In developing nations, the implementation of democracy has competed with maintaining political stability and national unity for economic development. Leaders sometimes choose to delay citizens' desire for participation (i.e., democracy) while their nation is undergoing economic development. But the question might be asked, instead of opposing participation for the sake of political stability, is it not possible to have both at the same time?

In 1977, Arend Lijphart introduced a model of "consociational democracy," according to which a society is conceptualized as having several segments, each segment keeping and maintaining its primordial norms and values.

But at the elite level, the elites of each segment work together or cooperate.<sup>37</sup> There are two important aspects of the consociational democracy model: segmental cleavages and the political cooperation of the segmental elites. In Lijphart's model, political parties, which organizationally articulate the social cleavages, are the principal means to channel demands as well as to provide a basis of legitimation for the government.<sup>38</sup> In a consociational democracy, a coalition government, where parties have mutual veto, is formed. Therefore, in a consociational democracy there is a multi-balance of power.<sup>39</sup>

In his observation, Lijphart argues that the Indonesian democracy based on "musyawarah" (the Indonesian method of coming to an agreement not through majority decision but a search for something like the Quaker sense of meaning) and "mufakat" (the principle of unanimity built through discussion rather than voting) is congruent with a consociational democracy.<sup>40</sup>

The Consociational Democracy model is used to explain Indonesian politics in the period of 1945 to 1966.

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<sup>37</sup>Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies (New Haven, CT.: Yale University Press, 1977), 5.

<sup>38</sup>Ibid., 63, 83.

<sup>39</sup>Ibid., 25, 55.

<sup>40</sup>Ibid., 167.

Due to a changing political environment in the New Order era, i.e., the emergence of the Army as the sole political power, another model is needed. Several alternative models exist in the literature on Indonesian politics with regard to the parties and the political system in the New Order era. Most notably are works by Jackson,<sup>41</sup> King,<sup>42</sup> Crouch,<sup>43</sup> and Liddle.<sup>44</sup>

This study employs the Bureaucratic Authoritarian Regime, hereafter referred to the BAR, developed by Dwight King. In the BAR, political participation is not totally abused, but regulated through a limited pluralism by using repression, cooptation, and typically a network of state corporatism in an attempt to control opposition to the

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<sup>41</sup>Karl Jackson, "Bureaucratic Polity: A Theoretical Framework for the Analysis of Power and Communication in Indonesia," in Jackson and Pye, Political Power, 1978.

<sup>42</sup>Dwight King, "Indonesia's New Order as Bureaucratic Polity, a Neo-patrimonial Regime or a Bureaucratic Authoritarian Regime: What differences does it make?" in Ben Anderson and Audrey Kahin, ed., Interpreting Indonesia Politics (Ithaca, NY.: Cornell University Press, 1982). This article first appeared at the Association for Asian Study conference held in 1979.

<sup>43</sup>Harold Crouch, "Patrimonialism and Military Rule in Indonesia," in Atul Kohli, ed., The State and Development in Third World (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 1986).

<sup>44</sup>William Liddle, "Soeharto's Indonesia: Personal Rule and Political Institutions," Pacific Affairs, vol. 58, number 1, Spring 1985.



regime.<sup>45</sup> Limited pluralism is a method to reduce the involvement of political leaders in decision making process. Only leaders who are willing to cooperate with the regime could participate. These leaders are selected mostly from state corporatist structures, i.e., mass organizations initiated by the state, for the purpose of political legitimation. Thus, the political system provides little opportunity for opposition groups to participate in government.

The limited pluralism and the state corporatism in the BAR, has made the parties vulnerable to exclusionary politics in policy making, because the state corporatists have replaced them as the principal tools of expressing the people's demand. But the parties are valuable in inclusionary politics because the BAR needs them to mobilize the mass in implementing policies.<sup>46</sup> Party representatives are

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<sup>45</sup>Ibid., 111-115. There are two types of corporatism: social and state corporatism. In social corporatism, the people actively establish associational groups. In state corporatism, the state takes the initiative to build the groups. The main difference between these types of corporatisms is in their purposes. The social corporatism is use to convey the people's demand to the government, while in the state corporatism the purpose is to mobilize the people for a political legitimation. In a pluralistic society, such as the Indonesian, the use of state corporatism is the best strategy to subdue political tension during modernization. Reginald Harrison, Pluralism and Corporatism: The Political Evolution of Modern Democracies, (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1980), 16, 77, 183 passim.

<sup>46</sup>Ibid., 116.

gradually forced to stay-out of the political system, but they must be ready to respond to the regime's call for political support. Hence, although the regime administered general elections, the purpose of the elections is more to test the regime's political legitimation than to bring significant changes in the government's composition.<sup>47</sup> The BAR, therefore, predicts the decline of the democratic functions of parties, i.e., structuring votes and conducting government.

#### Variables Identification

This study is concerned with a party's governing potential, or its coalition potential which is manifested in a party's electoral strength and its strength in seats in parliament.<sup>48</sup> But, the above discussion has indicated that governmental intervention largely determined the Indonesian party system. This dissertation treats governmental intervention as an independent variable, and examines the effect of governmental intervention on the dependent variables. As the dependent variables, this dissertation uses voting turnout, one party domination, the ability of parties to conduct government, economic develop-

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<sup>47</sup>Donald Emmerson, "Invisible Indonesia," Foreign Affairs, vol. 66, no. 2, Winter 1987.

<sup>48</sup>Sartori, Parties and Party System, 122.

ment, and pro-government partisanship.

This study assumes reciprocal influences between the political party and the social and political environment. At one time, the party may influence the environment, and at another time the environment affects the party. To follow this logic, the position of independent and dependent variables are interchangeable from one time to another. The independent variable may influence the dependent variables, but in return, the dependent variables may influence the independent variable.

#### Governmental Intervention

Governmental intervention is defined as direct or indirect action taken by the executive to regulate the life of the parties or the party system. In the current practice of politics, the executive body is superior to the legislative body. For example, the executive can directly and unilaterally influence the general election through (election) regulations. The inception of "monoloyalty" and "floating mass" policies were two obvious examples of direct governmental intervention.<sup>49</sup> Control over news-

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<sup>49</sup>Prior to the 1971 election, Indonesian civil servants were free to join any political party. Eventually, most of them were affiliated with the PNI. Parties had branches down to the village level. The strongest and the largest parties which operated in rural areas were the NU and the PKI. These parties, PNI, NU and PKI, were the

papers owned by the parties, particularly since 1971, the requirement of government approval of party "elected" leadership and the party dependence on government financial subsidy, are all examples of indirect governmental intervention. However the latter two types of intervention are hard to operationalize since both are classified confidential.

#### Voting Turn-out

Voting turnout is defined as the proportion of registered voters who cast ballots, and is used synonymously with the term "voting rate".

Indonesia's electorates have shown a relatively high and stable voting turn-out in successive elections. During the New Order period, the electorate was mobilized to provide symbolic legitimation for the regime.

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champions of three political streams in Indonesia: Nationalism (inspired by the Javanese-Hinduism), Islam, and Communism. The inception of the "Monoloyalty" and "Floating Mass" policies helped to emasculate those parties. The Monoloyalty policy prohibited civil servants from memberships in any political party except GOLKAR, the New Order's party, and the Floating Mass policy prohibited parties from organizing at the village level. Thus, the government actively and directly steered the people to affiliate only to the government's own party, GOLKAR.

### Party Domination

Party domination is defined as inequality among parties in amount of electoral support. Under a Bureaucratic Authoritarian Regime, inequality may be desired in order to maintain political stability by creating one party to dominate politics. In Indonesia this has been done through the use of repression by the state apparatus (i.e., the army) and by increasing votes gained by GOLKAR so that the other parties are unable to oppose the government. The more intense the repression and the intervention, the more developed is the one party domination.

Our theoretical framework suggests that under either a bureaucratic-authoritarian regime or consociational democracy corporatism may develop. Concertation, an institutionalized consultation between interest organizations and government,<sup>50</sup> may replace the parties in the decision making process. But corporatism may create social unrest leading to political instability, since the basis of a proportional representation in a government is no longer on traditional ideological lines but according to an economic function.

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<sup>50</sup>Harrison, Pluralism, 64.

### Party Conduct of Government

Parties may govern in one political system in very different ways and to different degrees than they do in others. It is not clear that political parties always perform the function.<sup>51</sup> The governing function can be defined as the involvement of party leaders in the decision making process. The involvement may take two forms: in the executive branch and in the legislative branch. In a democratic political system, parties should have representatives in the legislative body. In the executive branch, one party usually has a controlling position vis-a-vis other parties.

Initially, Indonesian parties were involved in the conduct of government. Since the inception of the "monoloyalty concept" in 1969, however, parties' role in governing has been reduced. The Indonesian bureaucracy has increasingly consisted of GOLKAR members. However, some party representation in legislative bodies has been maintained to ensure political legitimation for the New Order.

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<sup>51</sup>Epstein, Political Parties, 315.

### Pro-government Partisanship

In democratic societies, the governing party is the party which successfully gains the most votes in an election. The percentage of votes needed to govern may vary depending on the type of party system. If the governing party gained a majority, or a percentage larger than the accumulated percentage of the other parties, then the party system resembles a hegemonic party. But when a governing party has obtained only a plurality of the vote, a polarized pluralism system may be indicated.

According to the traditional norms in Indonesian society, a leader should be followed without question; consequently, parties seek to be associated with popular leaders and government programs. In the 1955 election, the PNI associated with the figure of President Sukarno which helped the party to emerge as one of the four major. One can expect, therefore, that governmental intervention is associated with the increase of pro-government partisanship.

### Economic Development

In the previous sections we observed that the consolidation of the one party state in Indonesia has depended largely on the ability of the regime to depoliti-

cize the masses and to maintain people's allegiance through distribution of material benefits. Increasing the economic pie has benefitted the upper stratum of the population and provided incentives for people to join GOLKAR.

### Thesis and Propositions

The principal thesis for this study is that governmental intervention is the principal determinant in explaining the evolution of party systems in Indonesia.

This thesis can be broken down into several propositions:

1. The political party system in Indonesia has evolved from an atomized structure in the early twentieth century, to a system of polarized pluralism in the period immediately following independence, and finally to a hegemonic system in the 1970's and 1980's.
2. The party functions of conducting government declined between 1949 to 1958.
  - 2.a. Between 1949 and 1958, the functions of parties were the structuring of the electorates and conducting government.
  - 2.b. Between 1949 and 1958, the parties were unable to express and aggregate the demands of various groups in Indonesia, which resulted in their inability to govern effectively.
  - 2.c. After 1958, parties in Indonesia were still



involved in structuring voting choices and conducting government, but they were closely controlled by the government.

3. Between 1958 and 1965, the government increasingly intervened to modify and to constrain the functions of the parties.

4. After the 1971 election, the government was able to gradually eliminate parties' functions by keeping the votes for the PPP and the PDI in a general election at a low level.

4.a. The development of a pro-government partisanship in Indonesia politics began in 1971.


4.b. Governmental intervention in Indonesia continues to increase voting turn-out.

4.c. The changes in the party system are significantly associated with the changes in the partisan composition of the electorates.

5. The intensification of governmental intervention in party politics in 1971 is positively associated with increasing corporatization of interest politics, decreasing levels of partisan conflict, and rising levels of economic growth.

### Organization of the Study

Chapter I outlined the theoretical framework, delineated propositions, and sets out a model to help explain the evolution of party system in Indonesia. Chapter II traces the emergence of party and party system during the period of 1900's to 1955. Chapter III discusses the impact of social fragmentation to the stability of government during 1955 to 1966. Chapter IV represents the qualitative evidence of the modification of party systems in Indonesia. The discussion concentrates on the New Order's period: 1966 to 1987. Chapter V intends to present quantitative evidence of the development of monolithic polity in Indonesia. The concluding chapter, Chapter VI, summarizes the findings reported in Chapters II, III, IV, and V and discusses some implications of these findings.



## CHAPTER II

### THE EMERGENCE AND ROLE OF PARTIES: 1900-1955

The intention of this chapter is to trace the growth and role of interest groups, especially political parties in Indonesia from 1900 to 1955.<sup>1</sup> The purposes are to draw how the organizational structure of the Indonesian political system has evolved over time; and to identify factors determinant to the evolution of party systems in Indonesia. Accordingly, this chapter provides support for two propositions of this study: (1) the political party system in Indonesia has evolved from an atomized structure in the early twentieth century to a system of polarized pluralism in the period immediately following independence; and (2) the party function to conduct government declined between 1949 to 1958. The discussion in this chapter concentrates

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<sup>1</sup>Gabriel Almond and Bingham Powell, Jr., Comparative Politics (Boston, MA.: Little and Brown Co., 1978), 170-175. According to Almond and Powell, interest groups can be classified into four. An "Anomic group" refers to an "unorganized mob and riots with spontaneous expressions of grievance or protest." A "Nonassociational" group refers to "race, language, religion, region, occupation, or perhaps kinship and lineage." An "Institutional group" refers to "political parties, corporations, legislatures, armies, bureaucracies, and churches." "Associational groups" refer to structures "which are designed specifically to represent the goals of particular groups."

on the two functions of political party, i.e., structuring the vote and conducting the government.

The performance of these two functions are dependent on and related to environments, including a political culture. In Indonesian politics, it is almost impossible to talk about the performance of the two functions of political parties without relating them to the Indonesian political culture, which has been heavily influenced by the ethnic Javanese culture. Therefore, we shall begin with an analysis of the political aspects of the Javanese culture.

#### The Political Aspects of Javanese Culture

Currently Indonesia has about 163 million people composed of 250 ethnic groups and thirty-five languages scattered in 13,667 islands. One may ask, what makes the island of Java so special in Indonesian politics? Sixty percent of the Indonesian people live on Java. The Javanese are the largest group in Indonesia. Historically, Majapahit, an old Javanese kingdom, succeeded in bringing most of the Indonesian islands under its domain and in spreading the Javanese ideas among other ethnic groups. Economically, Java is the most developed island in the archipelago, due mainly to the Dutch economic penetration beginning in 1602. The Dutch, as well as the British and the Japanese, managed the archipelago from Java which

caused the island to be of strategic importance. Consequently, most Indonesian interest groups established their headquarters on Java. This enabled them to capture Dutch attention and to share opinions among elites of ethnic groups.<sup>2</sup> Understandably, most Indonesian interest groups' leadership was dominated by the Javanese, or by leaders from other ethnic groups who "tended to adapt with the Javanese culture."<sup>3</sup>

Javanese political ideas derived from the elitist teachings in Hinduism, which included a sharp distinction between the ruler and the ruled, and the concentration of power. The Ruler was unchallengeable by the people, or the Ruled, which put the people on the periphery of the political system.<sup>4</sup> In the thirteenth century, the elitism of Hinduism was confronted by the Islamic egalitarianism. Spreading the Islamic faith while at the same time keeping social order, the Islamic preachers used persuasion instead

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<sup>2</sup>Deliar Noer, The Modernist Moslem Movement in Indonesia: 1900-1942 (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1973), 301.

<sup>3</sup>Ann Ruth Willner, 1970, cited in Dwight King, Social Mobilization, Associational Life, Interest Intermediation, and Political Cleavage in Indonesia (Chicago, IL.: University of Chicago, Ph.D diss., August 1978), 282.

<sup>4</sup>Benedict R.O'G Anderson, "The Idea of Power in Javanese Culture," in Claire Holt, ed., Culture and Politics in Indonesia (Ithaca, NY.: Cornell University Press, 1972), 50-51.

of force against the Hindu tradition.<sup>5</sup> Later, in the 19th century, the Islam-Hindu coexistence became problematic when a different interpretation of Islamic teachings spread, leading to a schism among the Islamic community.

In Javanese thinking, concentration of power is essential. The evidence of power is a man's "ability to concentrate: to focus his own personal power, to absorb power from the outside, and to concentrate within himself apparently antagonistic opposites."<sup>6</sup> This notion has been used as the primary reason to accept a leader in the Indonesian society, and it affected the foundation and the support of parties as well. Also, this notion has great impact in Indonesian politics because every ruler tries to establish a new dynasty in which he accommodates as many antagonistic opposites as possible for the purpose of political legitimation. Consequently, conflict is always

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<sup>5</sup>Ibid., 57-59. A good example is the use of wayang kulit (shadow puppet) by Sunan Kalijaga, one of the nine pioneers of Islamic preachers in Java. The characters of wayang and the description of the social order have their roots in Hinduism. Since the 13th century, the Islamic faith colonized the story which eventually conveyed the superiority of Islam. The most powerful character in the wayang play is Yudistira, the King of Amarta. He is unbeatable not because he has deadly weapons, but because a sacred words called serat kalimasada which synonymous with kalimat syahadat, the Koranic confession of faith.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid., 13.

immanent and has the potential to erupt.<sup>7</sup> To prevent this, the urge of oneness was supplemented by the concepts of kekeluargaan (family principles), gotong royong (mutual help), and eventually by Indonesian nationalism.<sup>8</sup>

Stimulants for the Growth of  
Indonesian Interest Groups

The Ethical Policy

The Dutch came to Indonesia in 1577 for the purposes of trade and ended-up with a monopoly. In 1602 they founded the East Indies Company, known as the VOC, which became the instrument of the Dutch of both the economic and political domination. Thereafter, for three hundred and forty years, the Dutch milked the Netherlands East Indies (NEI, the former name of Indonesia). Political parties were non-existent. The Dutch incorporated traditional leaders, Sultans and the Regents (Bupatis), into their administration. Although officially the Sultan and the Bupatis had autonomy, in practice they had no power in

<sup>7</sup>Soemarsaid Mcertono, State and Statecraft in Old Java: A Study of the Later Mataram Period, 16th to 19th century (Ithaca, NY.: Cornell University Press, 1968), 40-57.

<sup>8</sup>A good review on the relationship of these three concepts can be found in David Reeve, GOLKAR of Indonesia: an alternative to the party system (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1985), ch. I.



decision making. The pattern of communication between the state and the people was one-way: the people were the communicants while the Sultans and the Bupatis were the communicators.

Between 1811 to 1816 the British took over the NEI from the Dutch. Despite the brevity of this British administration, they successfully planted "a new system of monetary land tax and more direct administrative control."<sup>9</sup> It was a centralized government in which the Sultans and the Bupatis had no autonomy. After the Dutch regained control over the NEI, they continued the British pattern and followed their basic principle: "... to keep regulation as indirect as possible and ... as profitable as possible for the Netherlands."<sup>10</sup>

In 1820's the Dutch needed a tremendous amount of money to cover both its war expenses against Belgium in Europe and to finance their administration in NEI. To meet this need, the Dutch introduced the forced cultivation system (hereafter referred to as Cultuur Stelsel) in 1830. This economic system was a mix of socialist and liberal principles. The government required farmers to cultivate compulsory crops for a period of time and also invited

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<sup>9</sup>Robert van Neil, The Emergence of the Modern Indonesian Elite (Bandung: W. van Hoeve Ltd., 1960), 5.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid.

large private plantation enterprise to become partners in carrying-out the policy. Gradually, private business and commercial interests became politically active and eventually critical to the implementation of the Dutch policy.

In 1848, the King of the Netherlands lost his personal control of colonial affairs to the States General. With the inception of the Constitutional Ordinance of 1854, the Governor General of NEI was placed in a dominant position. The ordinance gave special privileges to the Governor General in order to intervene in NEI politics. Article 48 of the Ordinance empowered the Governor-General, independently of the courts, to expel persons considered dangerous to the maintenance of law and order. Or, if they were natives of the Colony, to banish them to a specified place in the archipelago. The unlimited control of political affairs in the hands of the Governor General was completed in article 111, which stated that all political associations in the Colony were forbidden.

As the result of political maneuvers depicted above, politics and economics seemed to go in different directions, however, they were mutually supportive. Politics concentrated on power, while the NEI economy reflected liberalism. A combination of centralized government and the continuing importance of Dutch private business in the policy making process made it difficult to separate politi-

cal authority from economic power. But this combination eventually led to corruption among officials and the collapse of Cultuur Stelsel in 1860.

Cultuur Stelsel was replaced by "the Liberal Policy" in 1870, following the victory of the Liberals over the Socialists in the Netherland's parliament in 1860.

Although the term 'liberal' was used, it did not mean greater political rights for the natives of NEI, because the 1854 ordinance was still in effect.

Under the Liberal Policy (1870-1900) controls apparently eased somewhat. Freemasonry experienced accelerated growth after 1870. However, associations or meetings deemed by the authorities to be political in character or dangerous for public order were prohibited. Public meetings of any kind were forbidden unless prior notice was given and agreement obtained from the local administrative officer. Officers and employees of the police had freedom of admission to any approved meetings.<sup>11</sup>

Often, the Governor General used the 1854 ordinance to protect private business interests. Cultuur Stelsel might have collapsed but the practice of exploiting the NEI continued. This led to crop failure and famine in several places in Java, and sparked dissension among the Dutch policy makers.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>11</sup>King, Interest Groups, 51.

<sup>12</sup>van Neil, Emergence, 32.

Demands to stabilize the NEI economy arose. In 1874, the Anti-Revolutionary party in the Netherlands launched the issue of "moral obligation" of the Dutch to restore the living conditions of the NEI people. In 1888, an open letter in a local newspaper in Semarang, De Locomotief, appealed for "local autonomy and improved conditions for the indigenous people of the East Indies."<sup>13</sup> The criticism culminated in 1889 when van Deventer published his famous article on "The Honor of Debt." His views were supported by the Social Democratic Party in the Netherlands' Parliament in 1901, which forced the Queen of the Netherlands to recognize the "ethical obligation and moral responsibility to the people of the East Indies."<sup>14</sup> The Queen's recognition marked the switch from the Liberal Policy to the "Ethical Policy."

The Ethical policy was a welfare program to provide social and developmental projects. It aimed to stimulate the NEI economy and to guide the people to modernization. The goal of the Ethical policy reflected a minimum consensus between the Dutch and the NEI people:

The greatest advantage of the Ethical policy, however, was its ability to inspire Hollanders toward a more glorious colonial future in Java while also opening

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<sup>13</sup>Ibid., 8.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid., 32.

the way for Indonesians to share in the glory of their own future.<sup>15</sup>

The Ethical Policy effects on education were pronounced. Table 2 shows that the number of Indonesians graduated from primary and secondary levels of Dutch education increased substantially. The number of graduates from primary schools was far greater than the number of high-school graduates indicating that the Dutch tried to implement the Ethical Policy without at the same time jeopardizing its power due to the increasing numbers of graduates of higher education. The admission of native Indonesians to high-schools, known as HBS, was exceedingly stringent. Thus, for example, out of 808 primary school graduates in 1890, only four graduated from high school five years later.

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<sup>15</sup>Ibid., 9.

Table 2  
 THE INDONESIAN GRADUATES FROM  
 EUROPEAN SCHOOLS: 1890-1905

Level of Education	Years	Total	The Indonesians	
			Number	%
Primary	1890	12,377	808	6.53
	1895	14,010	1,135	8.10
	1900	15,462	1,545	9.99
	1905	19,355	3,725	19.25
High School	1890	359	5	1.39
	1895	565	4	.71
	1900	566	13	2.30
	1905	729	36	4.94

Source: Calculated from Bernhard Dahm, History of Indonesia in the Twentieth Century, 1971, 17-18, tables II and III.

The Dutch were afraid of too much education for the Indonesians, because it could produce self-consciousness and raise expectations.<sup>16</sup> Initially, the Indonesians were satisfied with clerical positions in the Dutch colonial administration. But, demands for equality increased.

The selection of Indonesians for administrative positions was based on heredity (noble families), class (upper), and graduate of European schools. The Indonesians in the Dutch administration did not well represent the needs of the masses because they graduated from European schools which ensured that they shared Dutch norms and values in the Dutch administration, an organ of the state. Their Dutch administrative appointments made them ineffective as channels of the people's demands to the state. Cultural norms were conducive to the bureaucrats standing

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<sup>16</sup>If Table 2 is compared with the percentage of Indonesian graduates from various levels of European schools in the period of 1915 to 1939, it is no accident that Indonesian nationalism arose in the later period. The calculation can be summarized as follows:

Statistics	! Primary ! Schools	! Junior ! Schools	! Senior ! Schools	! College
Mean	48.85	34.85	19.15	30.98
Range	20.50	44.40	22.00	49.40
Maximum	55.00	51.00	29.10	49.40
Minimum	34.50	6.60	7.10	0

These figures were calculated from A.K Pringgodigdo, Sejarah Pergerakan Rakyat Indonesia (Jakarta: Dian Rakyat, 1984), xii.

against the people.

The young Indonesian priyayi began his official career as a mantri, an office which might involve secretarial or police duties at the local level. Then assuming all went well he would become a sten wedana (subdistrict head), wedana (district head), and finally bupatih or Regent who headed an area known as a Regency.<sup>17</sup>

The Dutch allowed the existence of traditional administration but attached "assistants" to the traditional hierarchy. This made it possible for the Dutch to control every level of traditional authority as well as to monitor mass activities. Since the Dutch "assistants" had a higher education than the traditional leaders, they tended to govern indirectly.<sup>18</sup> By composing the traditional rulers within the Dutch administration, the authority of traditional rulers was given a modern basis.<sup>19</sup> The Ethical policy, therefore, sharpened the elite-mass distinction known in the Javanese culture.

Although the Indonesians were allowed to participate in public administration, the Dutch facilitated the Chinese to dominate the NEI economy. This policy had developed a

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<sup>17</sup>Ibid., 26.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid., 11.

<sup>19</sup>W.F. Wertheim, "Indonesian Society in Transition: The Changing Status System," in Andre Beteille, Social Inequality (Baltimore, MD.: Penguin Books, 1969), 198-199.



pyramidal structure of the color-caste system. The Dutch occupied the top of the hierarchy with a control on politics and the modern economic sector; the Chinese monopolized domestic trade; and the indigenous people supplied labor and occupied the bottom of the hierarchy, except for a small group of clerical workers in Dutch offices. Combined with the pattern of exclusive residency, where members of each race resided in one area, the social structure strengthened in-group solidarity and sparked the feeling of class-antagonism.

Yet, the Ethical policy made it possible for some Indonesian youths to study abroad, mostly in Europe and the Middle-east. Undoubtedly they contacted new ideas developed there on the eve of the 19th century. When they returned, they tried to implement the new ideas which complicated political life in the NEI. Three influential ideologies that were brought to the NEI were Socialism and Communism, Nationalism, and Reformist-Islam.<sup>20</sup>

#### The Volksraad

In 1903, the Dutch announced a Decentralization Law to establish local councils. The councils would be filled

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<sup>20</sup>Jeanne Mintz, Mohammed, Marx, and Marhaen: the root of Indonesian Socialism (London: Pall Mall Press, 1965).

by representatives of the "color castes."<sup>21</sup> The Law was followed by the establishment of a national council, the people's council (hereafter referred to as Volksraad), with a similar basis of representation found in the local councils.

The formulation of the Volksraad in 1913 stimulated the growth of institutional interest groups in Indonesia.<sup>22</sup> Originally, the Dutch proposed only fifteen members in Volksraad, "...five should be European officials, five European private industrialists, three Indonesians, and two foreign orientals."<sup>23</sup> These members would be appointed by the Crown of the Netherlands based on the Governor-General nomination. The original idea was challenged by Eurasian politicians who argued that the appointment was against the basic idea that the councilmen should be the peoples' representatives. In response, the Dutch promulgated a Compromise Law in December 1916 that stated some members of the Volksraad should be elected, and some would be appointed by the Governor-General. Franchise was limited to "a

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<sup>21</sup>King, Interest Group, 21. The term "color caste" was introduced by Wertheim to describe the pattern of social stratification in NEI. It referred to distinctive occupational and residency characteristics of three dominant groups in NEI: the Dutch, the Chinese, the Indonesian.

<sup>22</sup>Pringgodigdo, Sejarah, 16.

<sup>23</sup>Dahm, History, 46.

small group whose noble descent, education, or property raised them high above the "masses."<sup>24</sup> In order to fill the elected seats in Volksraad, the government announced a law in 1917 encouraging the NEI people to create political associations at the national level.

Concern arose on the issue of the political status of the Volksraad. The council was designed to serve as the parliament for the NEI. In practice, the council served as a "rubber-stamp" of executive policies. Governor-General Idenburg's speech before the inauguration of the Volksraad on May 18, 1918, warned the councilmen not to get involved in budget preparation and other political issues which were privileges of the executive. Some councilmen reacted strongly to the speech and demanded full parliament status for the Volksraad. Most notably were the "Tjokroaminoto motion" and "Djajadiningrat motion" in November 1918; both demanded that all councilmen be elected by the people and full legislative power be given to the Volksraad. By December 1918, Governor-General Idenburg agreed to set-up a committee for political reform.

The out-come of the political reform committee was a new constitution introduced in 1925. The constitution recognized the right of political associations including holding meetings and it made mention of the freedom of the

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<sup>24</sup>Ibid., 169.

press. But, numerous restrictive regulations in the penal codes made it impossible for the people to exercise the above right fully. Moreover, in practice, the generality of these regulations gave them flexibility so that they could be interpreted arbitrarily by the authorities concerned. Under Governor General de Jounge's administration (1931-1936), for example, the government used its power to harass non-cooperative parties.

On the day of the meeting, the police inspect members' cards so carefully that several hours are consumed in the process; occasionally also the speaker is summoned by the authorities at the very hour set for the meeting. The police, moreover, have the right to attend all meetings and to dissolve them whenever they consider the public safety to be jeopardized. They are extra-ordinarily zealous in performing this function.<sup>25</sup>

The issue of elected membership might not have succeeded, but the Tjokroaminoto and Djajadiningrat motions clearly affected the government policy. Table 3 shows that in the last period of the Volksraad, 1927 to 1931, the government tried to give the impression that the Volksraad was a parliament by increasing the proportion of elected members.

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<sup>25</sup>Noer, Modernist, 206.

TABLE 3  
THE VOLKSRAAD COMPOSITION 1918 TO 1931

Years	Total Members	Elected Members	Appointed Members
1918-1921	38	19	19
1921-1924	48	24	24
1924-1927	48	24	24
1927-1931	60	37	23

Source: Pringgodigdo, Sejarah Pergerakan Rakyat Indonesia, 1984, 81-83.

Representation in the Volksraad was based on political associations. Some representatives were elected, others were appointed by the government. It might be argued that one group was more genuinely represented than another if it had more elected than appointed representatives in the parliament. In the period of 1918 to 1931, the highest ratio of elected to appointed members occurred in the European parties, 2.16:1. It was followed by native Indonesian groups who had a ratio of 1.18:1. The Eurasian parties ranked third with a ratio of 1.14:1. The lowest ratio was the Chinese groups who had a ratio of 1:3.

Although the Indonesian ratio was not too impressive, Indonesians were the largest group in the Volksraad. Table 4 shows that there were more Indonesians than other color-caste representatives in the Volksraad.

TABLE 4  
THE INDONESIAN FACTOR IN THE VOLKSRAAD  
1918 - 1931

Period	Overall	Indonesian			Others		
		Total	El.	Ap.	Total	El.	Ap.
1918-1921	38	15	10	5	23	9	14
1921-1924	48	22	12	10	26	12	14
1924-1927	48	21	13	8	27	12	14
1927-1931	60	25	19	6	35	18	17

Note: Others include: the European, the Eurasian, and the Chinese.

El. stands for elected representatives.

Ap. stands for appointed representatives.

Source: Pringgodigdo, Sejarah, 1984, 82-83.

The Volksraad was intended to facilitate cooperation between elites of the color-caste in the NEI. It resembled the model of "Consociational Democracy." In this model, "a society has several segments, each segment keeps and maintains its primordial norms and values, but at the elite level, the elites of each segment are working together, or cooperating."<sup>26</sup> Each elite leader is assumed to channel the group's demands, therefore he has to maintain communication with his people. Among the Volksraad representatives, the Dutch and the Chinese were able to communicate effectively because these groups were more cohesive than the Indonesian and the Eurasian groups. The elite representatives in the Volksraad were able to cooperate, but they produced no major political decision due to the intensity of government intervention. However, the Volksraad provided a good political training institution for Indonesians.<sup>27</sup>

Among the color-caste group, the Indonesians were the least cohesive. The Dutch and the Chinese groups were relatively more cohesive because religiously they were based on Christianity and Confucianism respectively, and economically they constructed the upper and middle class.

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<sup>26</sup>Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies (New Haven, CT.: Yale University Press, 1977), 5.

<sup>27</sup>Dahm, History, 48-50 passim.

But there was more religious and class variation among the Indonesians. For instance, Islam penetrated Javanese tradition as early as the thirteenth century. Some members of the nobility and middle-class accepted Islam for political reasons.<sup>28</sup> Islam was used to legitimize traditional aristocracy, but underneath the practice of Javanese-Hinduism and mysticism remained. As Harry Benda points out,

Only in those parts of Indonesia which had been least affected by Hindu civilization in past centuries - such as Aceh and Minangkabau regions in Sumatra and Banten in West Java - did Islam almost from the outset profoundly affect the religions, social and political consciousness of its adherents. Thus it is in these regions that the new faith has manifested itself in a purer, less conciliatory and at times even aggressive form. In the greater parts of Java, on the other hand Islam had been forced to adopt itself to centuries of old traditions, mostly indigenous, partly Hindu-Buddhist, and [in] the process to lose much of its doctrinal rigidity.<sup>29</sup>

An excellent example of the mixture of Islam and the Javanese-Hinduism is the adoption of an Islamic name by every Javanese king, such as the shepherd of the God (Khalifatullah). The adoption did not symbolize that Islam

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<sup>28</sup>Anderson, "The Concept," 36-37.

<sup>29</sup>Harry Benda, The Crescent and the Rising Sun: Indonesian Islam Under the Japanese Occupation 1942-1945 (Bandung: van Hoeve, 1958), 12.



had replaced the Javanese-Hinduism,<sup>30</sup> rather the purpose was for political legitimation. A formal acceptance of Islamic teachings while continuing the practice of Javanese-Hinduism by most of the Indonesians, makes Indonesian politics unique.

The uniqueness of this Indonesian social and political affiliation has been described by Geertz, who introduced the social stream or the aliran concept.<sup>31</sup> Religiously, Indonesians can be divided into abangan, nominal Moslems or people who mix Islamic teachings with animism, and santri or devout Moslems who follow an Islamic tradition which is more universal in its outlook. Economically, within these two categories there are the upper- and the middle-economic class which Geertz categorizes as the priyayi group. For these reasons, other scholars have argued that the abangan - santri religious division cuts across the priyayi - non-priyayi economic division because priyayi and non-priyayi could be either abangan or santri religiously.

This cross-cutting affiliation became important after the formulation of the Volksraad. To some degree, the

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<sup>30</sup>Kuntowijoyo, "Religion, State and Social Formation in Indonesia," Southeast Asian Journal of Social Science (Singapore: Singapore University Press, vol. 15, no. 1, 1987), 7-10.

<sup>31</sup>Clifford Geertz, Religion of Java (Glencoe, IL.: Free Press, 1960).

affiliation was complicated further by ethnic identity. For example, while there were santri parties on the island of Sumatra, Java and Kalimantan, their ethnic identity as Javanese or Sumatrans made communication difficult.<sup>32</sup> As a result, Indonesian political associations experienced more schisms than the European and Chinese political associations.

The Proliferation of Parties  
in Indonesia: 1900 to 1942

The Dutch Parties

Van Deventer's article in 1899 suggested a new approach in how the Dutch should manage the NEI. The principle message of the article was that the NEI government should not deny all indigenous demands and should establish channels for communication between the people and the state. Political parties were such and should be allowed to operate in the NEI.

Two kinds of reactions occurred among Dutch parliamentarians. One was rejection and a desire for continued assertion of Dutch superiority. But the other was accept-

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<sup>32</sup>Leo Suryadinata, "Indonesian Nationalism and the Pre-war Youth Movement: A Reexamination," Journal of Southeast Asian Studies (Singapore: Singapore University Press, vol. 9, no. 1, March 1978), 99-114.

ance and an appeal for the Netherlands' government to alleviate some encumbrances of the indigenous people. The first type of reaction was organizationally expressed in the Indische Bond (IB) in 1899, consisting mostly of Dutch descendants. The second reaction was expressed in Insulinde in 1907, consisting mostly of Eurasians, that is, a person of mixed race who decided on a permanent residence in the NEI. Both organizations failed to draw support from the indigenous people because IB and Insulinde were not prepared to cut their ties with the mother country which made the indigenous people suspect their goodwill. However, these organizations had representatives in the Voiksraad.

The failure of IB and Insulinde awakened Douwes Dekker to form an organization in which the Eurasians did not depend on the Europeans but on the Indonesians. For Dekker, the Ethical Policy was to prepare the colony for self-government. The logical consequence was independence. Dekker proposed an Indische nationalism for whomever bore witness to the fact that Indonesia was their homeland.

In 1910, Dekker travelled to Europe in search of help to realize his ideas. He returned to Indonesia in 1911 and published articles in two newspapers, Het Tijdschrift and De Express, which called for the "legal equality of all races, equal pay for equal work and separation from the

Netherlands."<sup>33</sup> His articles attracted educated Indonesians who, in turn, conveyed the message to the people. Dekker formed Indische Partij (IP) on September 6, 1912, and managed a public tour of Java in December of the same year. The tour was a success. With the help of Tjipto Mangunkusumo, Suardi Suryaningrat, and Abdul Muis, three prominent leaders of Budi Utomo, IP was able to attract 5,000 members by December 1912. By March 1913, 7,300 people had joined IP throughout 30 branches and 1,500 of the members were Indonesians.

On March 13, 1913, Dekker submitted an application to Governor General Idenburg for a legal recognition of IP as a political party. The application was turned-down on March 31, 1913, because Dekker's activities were considered hostile to the government, and after that, the IP was declared illegal. Its leaders, Dekker, Tjipto and Suardi were expelled to the Netherlands in August 1913. There they met Indonesian students who later formed the Indonesian Union (Persatuan Indonesia, PI).

The IP case indicated that there were limits to the Dutch government's Ethical Policy. The logical consequence of the policy, as articulated by Dekker, was rejected. While the policy established the Volksraad, parties were not able to express the peoples' real demands, and thus

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<sup>33</sup>Dahm, History, 34.

failed to effectively link the state with the people.

Dekker returned to the NEI in 1918. To mobilize support and to secure representation for his views in Volksraad, Dekker founded Indo-European Verbond (IEP) in 1919, later known as the National Indische Partij (NIP).<sup>34</sup>

The Indias Social Democratic Organization (Indische Sociaal Democratische Vereniging, ISDV) was another Dutch party founded by Hendrik Sneevliet in 1914. ISDV served as the lengthening hand of the Action Social Democratic Party (Sociaal Democratische Arbeiders Partij, SDAP), a Marxist party in the Netherlands, to spread communism in Indonesia. ISDV was not an independent party, because its policy and strategy derived from SDAP leaders, including the strategy to cooperate with well-established local parties.

ISDV gained little support because the Europeans were unsympathetic to Marxism and the Indonesians were already involved in other groups, such as the Noble Endeavor (Budi Utomo, BU) and the Islamic Traders Association (Sarekat Dagang Islam, SDI), which later became the Islamic Association (Sarekat Islam, SI). By interpreting the SI's program of anti-colonialism as being congruent with the communist's class struggle, some ISDV members joined in a common cause with SI in 1916. Two of the members, Semaun and Dharsono, reached important positions in the SI hierarchy. In this

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<sup>34</sup>vlekke, 1945, cited in King, Interest Groups, 34.

way, the ISDV spread its ideas under the cover of an Islamic party.<sup>35</sup> ISDV members who were inserted into SI held dual memberships. SI leaders insisted upon them respecting Islamic teachings instead of communism, but they refused. Their campaign and rebellion in 1917 created factionalism within SI members. This forced SI leaders to conduct a disciplinary action in 1921. In 1923, ISDV leaders declared the party no longer affiliated with SDAP, and they formed an independent party called the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). Prior to that date, the NEI government never considered the ISDV a separate organization. Therefore, the party had no representatives in the Volksraad. However, ISDV had great influence on Indonesians.

Two other parties were the Christian Ethical Party (Christelijke Ethische Partij, CEP) and the Indies Catholic Party (Indische Katholieke Partij, IKP). The CEP was founded in 1917 and was renamed the Christelijke Staatskundige Partij (CSP) in 1930. These two parties had difficulty communicating with the people because both advocated Christianity as the state religion, which was not popular to most of the people who were Moslems.

Among the four Dutch parties discussed in this

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<sup>35</sup>Ruth McVey, The Rise of Indonesian Communism (Ithaca, NY.: Cornell University Press, 1965), 7-32.

section, only the Indische Partij (IP) was able to generate direct support from the people. It was due primarily to the willingness of the IP leader, Douwes Dekker, to adopt the Indonesian name Setya Budhi; and some of the IP leaders were Indonesians. CEP and IKP were not acceptable to the Indonesians because these parties affiliated with the Dutch, despite the fact that some Indonesians were in CEP and IKP leadership roles. Although the ISDV affiliated with the Dutch, the party was able to generate support from the people. They did it indirectly through SI.

#### The Chinese Parties

Chinese associations emerged about mid-18th century, and played a functional role in the Dutch economic system.<sup>36</sup> The associations provided their members with charity and mutual aid, protection against rival societies and non-Chinese communities.<sup>37</sup> With their entrepreneurial skill, the Chinese easily occupied the middle positions in the Dutch economy.

Two distinguished Chinese interest groups were the

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<sup>36</sup>George McT. Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia (Ithaca, NY.: Cornell University Press, 1952), 6-10.

<sup>37</sup>Leo Suryadinata, Peranakan Chinese Parties in Java 1917-1942 (Singapore: Singapore University Press, revised edition, 1981), 5.

Pan Chinese Educational Association (Tiong Hoa Hwee Koan, THHK) founded in 1900, and the Chambers Association (Siang Hwee) founded in 1908. Both operated in urban areas, enjoyed economic privileges given by the Dutch, and were allowed to form Dutch-Chinese schools. These factors made most Chinese reluctant to assimilate politically with the Indonesians.<sup>38</sup> As a result, they were often in direct confrontation with the Indonesian groups.

Inspired by Chiang Kay-sek's Kuomintang victory in China, the Chinese in Indonesia founded the Chinese Peranakan Party (Chung Hua-Hui, CHH) in 1928.<sup>39</sup> Although the CHH was founded after the inauguration of the Volksraad, representatives from CHH were appointed in 1924 to 1927. During the 1927 to 1931 period, the CHH had one elected and one appointed representative in the Volksraad.

There is no indication that the Chinese organizations opened their membership to other ethnic groups, such as the indigenous people. THHK, Siang Hwee, and CHH were exclusive groups which protected Chinese interests and channeled

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<sup>38</sup>For detailed explanations about different groups of Chinese associations, consult Mary Somers, Peranakan Chinese Politics in Indonesia (Ithaca, NY.: Cornell University Press, Interim report series, Modern Indonesian Project, 1964), 4-7; King, Interest Groups, 67.

<sup>39</sup>Peranakan Chinese were Indies-born and generally had indigenous blood from the female line. Most of them did not speak Chinese but communicated in the native language. See Leo Suryadinata, The Chinese Minority in Indonesia (Singapore: Chopemen, 1978), 2.



Chinese demands to the government. Apparently their demands caught the government's attention, for instance, when the government punished the SDI due to its boycott of Chinese batik traders in 1912. Chinese middle-class demands were considered more important than Indonesian lower class interests.

The Chinese groups could not generate broad support for three reasons. First, they remained Chinese citizens. This gave an impression to the indigenous that the Chinese wanted to stay apart from Indonesian society and refused to accept local customs and to work with local people. Second, the theological contradictions between Confucianism and Islam made the Chinese unacceptable to the majority of Indonesians.<sup>40</sup> Third, the privileges given the Chinese by the Dutch created an image that the Chinese were more loyal to the Netherlands than to the Indonesian independence movement.<sup>41</sup> For these reasons it was difficult for an ethnic minority, the Chinese, to form a political party capable of communicating with and expressing the will of the Indonesian people.

The Indonesians also neglected to cooperate with the Chinese and forced them to establish exclusive groups. For example, the Chinese were excluded from joining the nation-

<sup>40</sup>Noer, Modernist, 33-63; Suryadinata, Peranakan, 75.

<sup>41</sup>Ibid., 65-66; Somers, Peranakan, 47-52.

alist party, PNI. An attempt was made by Liem Koen Hian and Ko Kwat Tiong, the leaders of the Indonesian Chinese Party (Partai Tionghoa Indonesia, PTI) founded in 1932, to convince the PNI leaders that peranakan Chinese "should become Indonesier in the political sense" because the Indies nation shall include "...all [who] considered the Indies their motherland and actively helped to develop it."<sup>42</sup> It was possible that the Indonesian rejection of the Chinese helped to make the Dutch sympathetic to the Chinese groups and interested in giving them special privileges.

#### The Indonesian Parties

There has been a controversy over classification of Indonesian parties. After independence, the Indonesian government classified parties in three groups based on ideology: Nationalist, Islamic and Communist. However, this classification is problematic. For example, almost every party in the 1908 to 1955 period adopted Nationalism as a part of their ideology. A more useful classification is non-Islamic based and Islamic based parties. This classification enables us to put the communist party, PKI, in the same category as the nationalist party, the PNI, since

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<sup>42</sup>Suryadinata, Peranakan, 69.

both parties claimed nationalism as part of their ideology.

### The Non-Islamic Parties

The first group was the Indias Association (Indische Vereniging, IV) formed by Sutan Kesajangan, a West Sumatran, and Raden Noto Suroto, a Javanese nobleman, in the Netherlands in 1908. It was intended to provide communication among Indonesian students studying abroad. IV became a political group after the exile of IP leaders joined it in 1913. IV cooperated with the Chinese Student Association and some were sympathetic to Dutch organizations in forming a federation called the Indonische Verband van Studeerenden in 1917.<sup>43</sup> In 1922, it was renamed Indonische Vereniging and published a magazine called the Indigenous Hindia (Hindia Putera).

Fractionalism occurred due to different perceptions of the Indonesian Nationalism. The Indonesian students claimed that only the indigenous could be considered Indonesian. The Chinese and the Dutch sympathizers argued that whoever was born in Indonesia and bore witness that Indonesia was their motherland should also be considered

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<sup>43</sup>John Ingleson, Perhimpunan Indonesia and the Indonesian Nationalist Movement: 1923-1928 (Clayton, Australia: Monash University, Monash paper on Southeast Asia, no. 4, 1975), 1-2. According to Ingleson, it was since 1917 that the name "Indonesia" was officially used as the name of an organization.

Indonesian. This different perception had forced the Indonesian element in Indonische Vereniging to form the Indonesian Association (Perhimpunan Indonesia, PI) in 1924. PI kept its headquarters in the Netherlands in order to better attract international attention to the nationalist movement.<sup>44</sup>

When the students returned, some of them joined cultural and secular groups such as Budi Utomo and the PNI; some joined religious groups such as Sarekat Islam; and some were lured by Communist radicalism and joined the PKI.

The Nobel Endeavor (Budi Utomo, hereafter BU) was founded on May 20, 1908. It began during a tour in 1906 to 1907 conducted by Mas Ngabehi Wahidin Sudirohusodo, a medical doctor and member of the Javanese lower priyayi. His aim was to generate scholarships for the Indonesians. When he met Tjipto Mangunkusumo, also a medical doctor, they founded an organization for medical doctors and persons of the priyayi background. BU was a coalition of low-class priyayi and medical students. Sutomo, a student of STOVIA, the Dutch medical school in Jakarta, was elected President.

The selection of STOVIA and the appointment of Sutomo was a tactic for attracting members. In STOVIA, there were students from other islands in Indonesia, a fertile ground

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<sup>44</sup>Pringgodigdo, Sejarah, 55-56.

for BU to spread its ideas quickly. An important, perhaps initially unintended, effect of BU activities was to create a national brotherhood. Upon their return home from STOVIA, the students formed Jong Java, Jong Sumatran Bond, Jong Pasundan, Jong Ambon, and Jong Minahasa in the 1910's.<sup>45</sup> BU leaders successfully convinced members of the Javanese nobility to join the organization. By October 1908, BU had attracted 1,200 members and 10,000 in 1912. In territories where the Sultan and the Bupati accepted BU, often everybody under their authority followed. Since the Sultans and the Bupatis had been incorporated in the Dutch administration, this pattern of recruitment pleased the Dutch, because they could indirectly control BU activities.<sup>46</sup>

In 1909, the student element was expelled from BU, leaving the leadership of the organization in the hands of nobility. What the students wanted to create was an Indische nationalism. The goal of BU was redefined in vaguer terms: "progress for East Indies." The terminology reflected Dutch interference in BU.

The government intervention to the BU occurred during the World War I in 1914. The Dutch government sought

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<sup>45</sup>Akira Nagazuni, The Origin and the Earlier Years of the Budi Utomo: 1908-1918 (Ithaca, NY.: Cornell University Press, Ph.D diss., 1967), 35-44.

<sup>46</sup>Ibid., 6; Kahin, Nationalism, 65.

support in defending the Netherlands and the government persuaded the BU leaders to provide such support. BU was the first organization to support the Dutch call for compulsory military training for the indigenous people in preparation for the war. On July 25, 1916, BU joined a special committee for mass mobilization called Indie Werbaar.<sup>47</sup> The BU support to the Dutch policy had weakened the people support to the organization.

Another indicator of BU weakness to structure the vote was the fact that BU paid little attention to economic problems. The primary goal of BU, education, was important in the long term; but people were suffering from economic deterioration. To meet the people's immediate demands was not the first priority. BU was inoffensive to the government because this organization did not touch sensitive demands such as economic and political equality. Also the acceptance of the Dutch educational system by the BU leaders confused people as to the course of the organization. These weaknesses reduced the BU's credibility and gave room for the development of contending groups such as the Sarekat Islam and MUHAMMADIYAH, an Islamic Social Organization.<sup>48</sup>

Many Indonesians began to oppose the BU activities.

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<sup>47</sup>Pringgodigdo, Sejarah, 2.

<sup>48</sup>Ibid., 73-75.

In response, the BU restated its support for parliamentary government in 1917. This support was moderate in order not to jeopardize the chances of some Indonesians joining the Dutch administration in 1921.<sup>49</sup> To show the people that the BU aspired to be a channel of the people's aspirations, the BU appealed to the formation of branches at the village level. BU succeeded and was able to keep its representative in the Volksraad.

When the Dutch declared an increase in the size of the Volksraad members on October 16, 1927, the BU quickly redefined its scope from great Java (Jawa Raya) to great Indonesia (Indonesia Raya) on April 6, 1928. The switch was intended to widen its appeal among other (non-Javanese) ethnic groups. However, almost every other ethnic group already had their own organizations.<sup>50</sup>

Another prominent non-Islamic party in Indonesia was the Union of the Indonesian Nationalism (Perserikatan Nasional Indonesia, hereafter referred as to PNI) founded on July 4, 1927. It began with a small study club in Bandung in 1925 which discussed Tjokroaminoto's comparative study of Islam and Socialism written in 1924. At that time, Tjokroaminoto was trying to strike a balance between the communist and the religious factions in his organiza-

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<sup>49</sup>Ibid., 16-23.

<sup>50</sup>Ibid., 135-140.

tion. In October 1926, one member of the study club, Sukarno, published an article in the magazine Young Indonesia (Indonesia Muda) which tried to explain and reduce the antagonism between the Communists and the Moslems. He argued that in the Indonesian society there were three dominant and complementary ideologies, Nationalism, Communism, and Islam.<sup>51</sup> To deny the existence of one of these three, according to Sukarno, was to repudiate the Indonesian pluralism.

The PNI gained sympathy from the people, because Sukarno was a member of the SI and he was acceptable to the Moslems. His success in uniting different ethnic groups indicated, in the Javanese culture, that he was a powerful person. Moreover, the PNI sharpened the issue of a color-class struggle between "the brown Indonesian and the White rulers"<sup>52</sup> and introduced national symbols: the flag, the lingua franca and the national anthem.<sup>53</sup> Although people were sympathetic to the PNI activities, only 10,000 people registered as PNI members. The radical PNI behavior made many people hesitant to openly join the PNI because they feared punishment by the government. However, its ideology

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<sup>51</sup>Dahm, History, 64.

<sup>52</sup>John Ingleson, The Secular and Non-cooperating Nationalist Movement in Indonesia (Clayton, Australia: Monash University Press, Ph.D diss., 1974), 30.

<sup>53</sup>Pringgodigdo, Sejarah, 63-65.



of proletarianism (Marhaenism), enabled the PNI to attract a broader support than just its registered members.

Sukarno saw the need for a unifying political force in Indonesia. At a Bandung meeting in December 1927, the Union of the Indonesian Political Association (Permufakatan Perhimpunan-perhimpunan Politik Kebangsaan Indonesia, PPPKI) was formed. It was the first federation of the Indonesian parties, consisting of the PNI, SI, BU, PASUNDAN, Soematran bond, KAUM BETAWI, Indonesische Studieclub, and the Algemeene Studieclub. The federation did not last long, because each element had an interest in their own representation in the Volksraad.

By October 1930, government intelligence reported that most army members and policemen believed that the PNI would conduct a rebellion in the near future. On this basis, the government arrested Sukarno and friends on December 19, 1930. The government also forbid military personnel and civil servants under the Department of Home Affairs (Department van Oorlog) to join the PNI and even to read the PNI's newspapers the Periangan Bull (Banteng Periangan) and the Indonesian Union (Persatuan Indonesia). The prohibition on PNI activities was issued on April 17, 1931. At a special congress on April 25, 1931, in Jakarta, leaders of the PNI agreed to abolish the party.<sup>54</sup>

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<sup>54</sup>Ibid., 220.

Attempting to keep the PNI's goals alive, Sartono established the Indonesian Party (Partai Indonesia, PARTINDO) in April 1931. Seventy-one study clubs were organized in a very loose structure where each club kept its autonomy. Sartono adopted the PNI's radicalism but failed to attract much support for PARTINDO, since PARTINDO was filled with urbanized, educated people who tended to be insensitive to the needs of the masses. Secondly, most of the former PNI members were more attracted to a competing association, the Indonesian National Education (Pendidikan Nasional Indonesia, known as PNI-BARU) in 1931. According to Sjahrir, Sukarno had made a mistake when "he turned the independence movement into a holy-war."<sup>55</sup> Sjahrir thought that educating people about the course of the national movement was more important than enthusiasm and activism with unclear goals and poor organization of the PARTINDO.

A national movement dependent upon a few key men at the top was doomed to failure since the Dutch could be relied upon to remove such leaders from the political scene. Such a movement, they believed, would have enduring strength only if a significant number of the Indonesian people were educated to political maturity and a thorough understanding of nationalist principles.<sup>56</sup>

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<sup>55</sup>Ibid., 67.

<sup>56</sup>Ibid., 93.

Thus, Sartono proposed the PNI's old-style mass movement, while Sjahrir and Hatta proposed building a party-cadre.

Neither the PNI-BARU nor PARTINDO performed the two functions of party because the government was hostile to both parties. Due to its radicalism, PARTINDO was banned in 1933 and the party leaders officially dissolved it in 1936. The Dutch accused the PNI-BARU leaders of spreading anti-Dutch sentiment, arrested Hatta and his associates sending them into exile at Boven Digul in 1934, and suspended all PNI-BARU activities in 1936.<sup>57</sup>

The attitude of the Dutch toward the political groups became destructive when Soetardjo, a Volksraad member, submitted his petition in 1936. The petition proposed "to discuss plans for the evolutionary development of Indonesia over [a] ten year period toward self-government within the limits of the existing Dutch Constitution."<sup>58</sup> Despite the fact that the petition gained a majority vote in Volksraad, it was rejected by the government in 1938. Thus, rejection confirmed that the executive branch of government was more powerful than the legislative branch of government, and again revealed the limitation of the Ethical Policy.

When Europe was threatened by fascism, some Indonesian parties were less concerned with the demands of the

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<sup>57</sup>Kahin, Nationalism, 91-92.

<sup>58</sup>Ibid.

people than with the defense of the Netherlands. To mobilize the masses, the Indonesian leaders formed the Indonesia People's Movement (Gerakan Rakyat Indonesia, GERINDO) in 1937, and the Federation of Indonesian Political Parties (Gabungan Politik Indonesia, GAPI) in 1939. Both organizations served as one-way communication channels for the government. Thus, economic depression in the early 1930's and the increasing threat of fascism in Europe had transformed the limited pluralistic political system to a no-party system.

Another type of non-Islamic party in Indonesia was the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). Beginning in 1916, ISDV tried to spread Marxism among the SI members by inserting its cadres, such as Semaun and Dharsono, into Sarekat Islam.<sup>59</sup> SI's original goal of protecting traditional batik traders from exploitation by the Dutch and the Chinese was transformed into a struggle of powerless Indonesians against powerful Dutch and Chinese. ISDV's Marxism found receptive ears among the traditional batik traders.

The Indonesian leaders of the ISDV devoted particular attention to developing relations with the Sarekat Islam, to which they also belonged. They were aided by deteriorating economic conditions and general restless-

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<sup>59</sup>Pringgodigdo, Sejarah, 24-25; McVey, Indonesian Communism, 22.

ness in 1918, which had a considerable effect on the spirit of Sarekat Islam. The extent to which ISDV slogans found response in the popular movement was indicated by the temper of the 1918 Sarekat Islam congress, which was distinctly revolutionary: not only did the meeting protest sharply against the authorities, but it based its attack on the charge that the government was the protector of "sinful" capitalism.<sup>60</sup>

ISDV cadre operated freely within the SI. During SI's third congress in Bandung in 1918, there were 80 branches with 360,000 members, 20,000 of which were ISDV activists.

There were three reasons for the ISDV success. First, some SI leaders actively supported the ISDV. Hajji Muhammad Misbach, a SI leader, for example, stated that Islamic egalitarianism was equivalent to the Communist classless society. People could be good Moslems while becoming communists.<sup>61</sup> Second, unlike other parties, ISDV defined goals and the method to reach those goals. BU, IP, and PNI were able to recognize the Indonesian problems and to formulate their goals. But they were not clear on how they were going to reach those goals. ISDV, on the other hand, could define the problems, formulate the goals, and

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<sup>60</sup>Ibid., 36-37.

<sup>61</sup>Misbach never considered himself as a Communist. He constantly said that he was the defender of the purest Islamic teachings. For him, Islam should not be used to mask individual political interest. Misbach was arrested and exiled to Manokwari, West Irian, in 1924. He died there in 1926. Pringgogidgo, Sejarah, 28.

provide the Marxist method of class struggle as the means to reach those goals. Third, the objective situation seemed ready for the revolutionary method proposed in Marxism. The Bolshevik revolution in Russia in November 1917 proved that the poor could topple the rich from power. A revolution seemed necessary in NEI to overcome the desperate situation of the masses.

Despite the ISDV success in generating support and a providing channel of expression for the mass, the party was not able to communicate the people's demands to the government. The Dutch were highly suspicious of the ISDV activities, particularly since Semaun and Dharsono were appointed to lead the SI branch in Semarang in 1916 within the SI organization, each branch had full autonomy. At the end of 1917, the ISDV conducted a local rebellion in Semarang. The rebellion was put-down within three days by the government and ISDV was banned. However, due to the dual membership of the ISDV and SI, it was difficult for the government to recognize the ISDV members. Therefore, although the ISDV was formally abolished, communism in SI continued.

As early as 1916 factionalism occurred within the ISDV. The "radical communists" wanted to imitate the Russian revolution. The "soft communists" preferred to use Marxism solely as a means to develop Indonesian nationalism. The radical group succeeded in eliminating the soft

group from SI membership in 1917.<sup>62</sup>

Since 1917, the "Radical Communists," also known as SI "Red," were opposed by the Moslem group known as SI "White." The Moslems developed their base in Yogyakarta, led by Hajji Agus Salim and Abdul Muis. The Communists developed their camp in Semarang, led by Semaun and Dharsono. They swept the Dutch from ISDV membership and changed the party name to the Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia, hereafter referred to as PKI) on May 23, 1923, to emphasize that ISDV was also nationalistic.<sup>63</sup> However, the PKI did not consistently follow its nationalistic slogan, because shortly after the ISDV changed to the PKI, its leaders called for joining the Comintern.<sup>64</sup>

In 1922, the PKI was expelled from the SI and began to operate independently. PKI members conducted a door-to-door campaign in order to attract supporters. This strategy was a success because it convinced people that the PKI was serious about conveying the people's demands to the government. The PKI leaders became convinced that they had adequate supporters to launch a rebellion. It is estimated

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<sup>62</sup>McVey, Indonesian Communism, 26-27.

<sup>63</sup>Ibid., 35-36, 63.

<sup>64</sup>For an excellent discussion on this subject, see Ruth McVey, Indonesian Communism, chapter IV, 48-75.

that in 1916 there were 25,000 militarymen under the Communist influence, and by 1918 about 20,000 PKI activists. Prior to the PKI rebellions in 1926 and 1927, the party had 55,000 to 60,000 members.<sup>65</sup> The PKI launched rebellions in several places in Java, such as at Jakarta, Jatinegara, Tangerang, Banten, Parahiangan, Solo, and Kediri in 1929. This series of rebellions gave reason enough for the Dutch to ban the party in 1930.<sup>66</sup> The PKI disappeared from open activity in politics until the Indonesian independence in 1945.

#### The Islamic Parties

Stimulated by the establishment of the Chinese organizations, especially in trading, the Arab and Sumatran traders founded Jam Yat Khair in 1905. The organization was based on Islam and consisted of persons of Arab descent as well as Indonesians. Unlike the Chinese and the Dutch, the Arabs were able to cooperate with the Indonesians because both ethnic groups shared the Islamic faith. It should be added that both Indonesians and Arabs had suffered from the Dutch racism manifested in economic privileges to the Chinese. Deliar Noer observed that

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<sup>65</sup>Rangkaian Peristiwa Pemberontakan Komunis di Indonesia (Jakarta: Lembaga Studi Ilmu-ilmu Kemasyarakatan, LSIK, 1983), 12-18 passim.

<sup>66</sup>Pringgodigdo, Sejarah, 83-91.



controversy arose between the Indonesian and the Arabs on the issue of hierarchial status. Important positions were occupied by the Arab while the Indonesians held unimportant positions.

Jam Yat Khair was able to structure the people's demands, especially among the Indonesian-Arab, but toward whom it communicated grievances is unclear.<sup>67</sup> The Dutch tended to ignore Jam Yat Khair demands simply because this group did not reflect the interests of a recognized group in the Dutch ethnic caste system. Al Irsjad, a somewhat more egalitarian Arabic group, was founded in 1913. But Al Irsjad was not able to attract much support from the Indonesians either because of competition from the Union of Islamic Traders (Sarekat Dagang Islam, SDI).<sup>68</sup>

SDI was founded by Hajji Samanhudi in 1909 to protect Indonesian batik producers from being exploited by the Chinese batik traders. Unlike other Indonesian parties developed in the beginning of the 19th century, the SDI combined ethnic sentiments with economic interests. Later, in 1912, when the SDI became the Islamic Association (Sarekat Islam, SI), ethnic sentiments and economic interests were combined with religious sentiment. This combination gave the SI strength to resist the Chinese as well as

<sup>67</sup>Sartori, Parties, 57.

<sup>68</sup>Noer, Modernist, 56-58 passim.

the Dutch policies.

The SDI perceived that the Dutch policies had facilitated the Chinese dominance of domestic economy. As a protest, the SDI conducted a boycott of Chinese batik dealers in 1911. The Dutch responded by banning the SDI, which convinced the Indonesians that the Dutch were truly protective of the Chinese. As a result, the SDI was reorganized into a political party, the SI in 1912, and became radical due to the inclusion of religious sentiment into the party program. The SI attacked Dutch Christianization Politics (Krestenings Politick) because it was conducted through political and economic persuasion. For example, the average subsidy for Christian schools in the period of 1920 to 1940 was 1,373,275 guldens (the Dutch currency) while the average for Islamic schools was only 5,975 guldens.<sup>69</sup>

The SI program apparently met the people's demands for three reasons. First, the publication of the SI magazine, the Priyayi Forum (Medan Priyayi), enabled the party to communicate its ideas to the people. Although the SI leaders were middle-class men living in urban areas, they were able to maintain communication with rural people. Second, the use of Islam had attracted people to join the

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<sup>69</sup>Choirul Anan, Pertumbuhan dan Perkembangan Nahdlatul Ulama (Sala: C.V. Jatayu, 1985), 102.

organization. The Islamic teacher (the Kiyai) of the Islamic school (pesantren) in rural areas urged people to support the SI for the glory of Islam.<sup>70</sup> Third, many Javanese viewed the SI as the manifestation of the Javanese messiah the Queen of the Justice (Ratu Adil). Tjokroaminoto, an SI leader, was believed to be the incarnation of Ratu Adil. As a result, the SI membership increased dramatically. In April 1912, SI members numbered 4,500. The number became 66,000 in August 1912; 93,000 in December 1912; 150,000 in April 1913; and 366,913 in August 1914.<sup>71</sup>

In 1915, Hajji Agus Salim, a Sumatran leader, rejected the use of the Ratu Adil myth in the SI. Immediately, 10,000 Javanese withdrew from their SI memberships. Tjokroaminoto reacted by saying that the Javanese myth was still relevant to SI goals. The statement brought back the expelled SI members, and by 1918 the SI claimed 389,410 members.<sup>72</sup>

Although the SI was considered to have had a greater

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<sup>70</sup>Ibid., 3-8, 24-33 passim. Pesantren or Islamic schools existed since 1830. They are located mostly in rural areas in Java and Sumatra. The Kiais (the teacher) and his santris (the student) are usually considered the informal leaders among rural people. Most of the time, the Kiai has more power than the formal leader. People prefer to listen to the Kiai rather than to the village master.

<sup>71</sup>Dahm, History, 40, 42.

<sup>72</sup>Ibid., 53-54.

impact than the BU and IP,<sup>73</sup> SI members were scattered in fifty-six autonomous regions, known as SI Daerah. Tjokroaminoto proposed to unite these SI Daerah. He requested the development of a Central Islamic Association (Central Sarekat Islam, CSI) to Governor-General Idenburg on June 30, 1913. It was rejected in 1914, but then it was approved in 1915. CSI was permitted only as an organizer of the SI Daerah. This status changed in 1916 when the government gave authority for the CSI to take disciplinary actions against the SI Daerah. It was possible that the government concession was due to its suspicion of the growing importance of the ISDV in the SI since 1914.

Up until 1921, when Hajji Agus Salim proposed party disciplinary action forbidding SI members to have dual memberships, the SI was more like a federation than a unified party. It had the reputation of a mass party because it was open to everybody, including non-Moslems. Inevitably the SI became a coalition of various political groups which made the composition of the SI extremely heterogenous.<sup>74</sup> The main problem the SI had was that its members held dual membership. In most cases, the members,

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<sup>73</sup>Kahin, Nationalism, 65-70; Noer, Modernist, 101-102.

<sup>74</sup>Howard Federspeil, Persatuan Islam: Islamic Reform in the Twentieth Century Indonesia (Ithaca, NY.: Cornell University Press, monograph series, 1970) 18-20.

especially the Communists, paid more respect to other groups. Consequently, the SI lost its credibility as an Islamic party, a most significant issue in Indonesian society, and conflict between the SI elements were intensified. To regain its credibility as the mouth of Islamic interests, the party leaders accepted Hajji Agus Salim's proposal on Party Disciplinary Action.

The party disciplinary action in 1921 was an expulsion of the ISDV from the SI. The action cost SI support among labor organizations which had come under the communist influence. The SI was declared a pure Islamic party under a new name the Islamic Association Party (Partai Sarekat Islam, PSI), on February 17, 1923.

The PSI leaders used MUHAMMADIYAH as the party's main pillar.<sup>75</sup> But this policy created a rivalry between the two important Islamic organizations: the MUHAMMADIYAH, also known as the scholarly Moslem group, and the Islamic Preachers' Association (Nahdlatul Ulama, NU), also known as the traditional group. MUHAMMADIYAH was an organization founded by Kiai Hajji Ahmad Dahlan, a Javanese nobleman, on November 12, 1912. This organization consisted of educated Moslems in urban areas and its aim was to purify Islamic teachings from Javanese-Hinduism. MUHAMMADIYAH was challenged by the NU founded by Kiyai Hajji Hasyim Asy'ari on

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<sup>75</sup>Noer, Modernist, 101.

January 31, 1926. In contrast to the MUHAMMADIYAH, the NU operated among rural people and was centered at the Islamic school (pesantren). The NU argued that it was not realistic to purify Islam from the Javanese-Hinduism in the Indonesian society since the two could coexist peacefully.<sup>76</sup> The NU and MUHAMMADIYAH were two of the main affiliates of PSI.

By drawing two rivals under the PSI umbrella, the party was able to mobilize the Moslems in urban and rural areas effectively. PSI members increased to 2,500,000 by 1928. With this dual support, the PSI was able to get the attention of the government and was an important vehicle for expressing the people's demands. However, the party leaders failed to solve the NU and MUHAMMADIYAH rivalry. It was easier for both organizations to compete within the framework of the PSI than to compete independently because of the Dutch political pressure. But having two affiliated organizations with deep differences in their goals competing for influences among PSI members had a weakening effect on the PSI.

In 1929, the PSI was renamed the Indonesian Islamic Association Party (Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia, PSII).

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<sup>76</sup>For the rivalry between MUHAMMADIYAH versus NU, see Jainuri, Muhammadiyah: Gerakan Reformis Islam di Jawa Pada Awal Abad Kedua Puluh (Surabaya: Bina Ilmu, 1981), 84-96; Anan, Pertumbuhan, 3-8, 33-35.

The addition of the word "Indonesia" was to make the party more attractive by convincing people that the PSII had national orientation in addition to its adhering to universal principles of Islam. But, instead the PSII went into a decline after the death of its leader, Tjokroaminoto, in 1934. Also, conflicts between factions within the PSII became intense leading to a schism. In 1937, Agus Salim founded the Self-realization Movement in Education (Pergerakan Penjadar) to challenge the PNI-BARU founded by Sjahrir and Hatta in 1931. Then, Kiai Hajji Mas Mansur, the PSII leader of the MUHAMMADIYAH, tried to reconcile the various "sects" of the party by formulating the Council of Moslem Parties Association (Majlisul Islamil A'laa Indonesia, MIAI) in 1937. The MIAI existed until it dissolved itself in 1943 without meeting its goals. Other factions broke off as well, including the Committee for Defending the truth in PSII (KPK-PSII) and the Indonesian Islamic Party (Partai Islam Indonesia, PARI) in 1938. Factionalism in the PSII distracted from channeling the people's demands since so much effort went into keeping party unity. Although it was considered the largest party in Indonesia, PSII was neither cohesive nor able to communicate effectively with its members.

To conclude this section, the Islamic parties have had strong potential to structure the people's demands.

However, due to the mixture of Islam and the Javanese-Hinduism, and the different interpretation of the Islamic teaching itself, the Islamic parties failed to use their potentiality. As in the case of the non-Islamic parties, the Islamic parties were not able to join the government because the political parties were allowed to exist by the Dutch to serve as a channel of communication from the government to the people.

#### Sukarno's Vanguard Party

The chronic problem in the Indonesian nationalist movement was how to create parties which could perform the functions of structuring the people's demands and willing to cooperate in a government, without at the same time endangering unity. The three dominant ideologies in Indonesia, i.e., Nationalism, Islam, and Communism led to competition not cooperation plus unity.<sup>77</sup> However, as early as 1926 Sukarno viewed cooperation between the nationalist, the communist, and the Moslem as possible.<sup>78</sup>

Based on an organic state theory, Sukarno perceived that the political parties in Indonesia should be a com-

<sup>77</sup>Ingleson, Perhimpunan, 280, 477; Nagazuni, Dawn, 255-258; Noer, Modernist, 127-129, 258-259.

<sup>78</sup>Sukarno, Dibawah Bendera Revolusi (Under the Banner of Revolution) vol I (Djakarta: Publication Committee, 1963) 1-23.



ponent of the state.<sup>79</sup> This was the basic philosophy of the Sukarno idea of a vanguard party (Partai Pelopor). He said that, regardless of their ideologies, people should join the vanguard party because they faced the same enemy, "colonialism and imperialism." Because of the color-caste system where Indonesians were considered as a one single ethnic group, multiple parties were dysfunctional. What Indonesians needed was to concentrate on organizing one party that could facilitate communication horizontally among Indonesian ethnic groups and, vertically with the Dutch government. Sukarno's idea for a vanguard party had its roots in the Javanese political traditions despite the fact that he was a member of the SI. He described his vision as follows:

With one party which educates the common people into awareness and radicalism. With one party, which guides the common people in their journey towards victory, which fastens the strength of the common people in their daily struggle, which becomes the vanguard of the common people in progressing towards goals and ideals ... in their struggle to overthrow the enemy.

One vanguard party? Yes, one vanguard party. And not two, not three! One party alone which can be best and most complete, other parties are certainly less good, less complete. It is only one party that can become the vanguard.<sup>80</sup>

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<sup>79</sup>David Reeve, "Sukarnoism and Indonesia's Functional Group State," Review of Indonesian and Malayan Affairs (RIMA), vol 13, no. 1, 1979.

<sup>80</sup>Sukarno, Dibawah, 282, 283.

After he was released from prison in 1932, Sukarno found that the political conditions were favorable to accept his idea.<sup>81</sup> To condition people for his idea, Sukarno said that the majority of the Indonesians were "marhaen" people.<sup>82</sup> Marhaenism was popularized by Sukarno to bridge the differences between Nationalism, Communism and Islam. Politically, this idea earned minor attention until 1957 when Sukarno imposed it as the remedy of Indonesian political problems in the late 1950's.

There was a contradiction between Sukarno's idea of vanguard party, which could operate only in a single-party system, and his proposal that the Republic of Indonesia should create a pluralistic system where parties were allowed to operate freely. People had trouble clearly understanding Sukarno ideas, especially in what kind of political system his vanguard party should operate?

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<sup>81</sup>Sukarno, Mencapai Indonesia Merdeka, 2d published (Jakarta: Idayu, 1982), 39.

<sup>82</sup>Sukarno, Dibawah, 202, 280-285. Sukarno defined "Marhaenism" as Marxism a la Indonesia. It was a concept to muddle through different streams operating in the Indonesian society. Marhaenism was composed of a Communist manifesto of class struggle, Islamic egalitarianism, and the Javanese-Hindu concept of the relationship between the ruler and the ruled in a family principle. Imperialism and capitalism were viewed as the primary causes of the Indonesian dull-wittedness and retrogression.

The Indonesian Parties

During the Japanese Occupation: 1942-1945

Japan came to Indonesia on February 14, 1942, and surrendered to the Allied forces on August 14, 1945. Despite its short occupation, the Japanese had a significant influence on the political system and Indonesian politics. They inserted military officers into the bureaucracy which strengthened the administration.<sup>83</sup> They banned political groups "whom they suspected of harboring pro-Dutch sympathies."<sup>84</sup> But the Japanese encouraged the formation of Indonesian groups that would serve the purpose of winning the Pacific War. Political communication between these groups and the Japanese government was one-way. The groups were not able to express the people's will to the government; instead, they were used to convey the Japanese message and interests.

If Indonesians knew that their organizations were tools of the Japanese rule, why were they willing to establish such groups? The answer lay in the Japanese promise that if they won the Pacific War, Indonesia would get its independence. For this reason, the Japanese formed

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<sup>83</sup>Robert Jay, Religion and Politics in Rural Central Java (New Haven, CT.: Yale University, Southeast Asia Studies, Cultural Report Series number 12, 1963), 24.

<sup>84</sup>Ibid., 102.

the Triple A Movement (Gerakan Tiga A) in 1941 "to exploit the resources of Indonesia for the benefit of their war effort [the Asian War] without having to make concession to Indonesian nationalism."<sup>85</sup>

To lure the Indonesians, the Japanese formed a Central Advisory Committee (Tyoo Sangi In) at the national level and Advisory Committees (Sangi Kai) at the provincial level and in major cities. They added a number of Indonesians Advisors and a portion of the Council of Advisors (Dewan Sanyo) were Indonesians.<sup>86</sup> Also, the Japanese attempted to exploit Islam by forming the Islamic Muslim Council (Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia, hereafter referred as to MASYUMI) in 1943. MASYUMI enabled Islamic groups to make contact with the Japanese government as well as with the people. However, Japanese policy toward non-Islamic groups was different. They were not popular among the Japanese because most were demanding a free Indonesia.

By the middle of 1944, Japan's position in the War became critical. At this stage, the Japanese began to consider the non-Islamic parties' potential to mobilize

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<sup>85</sup>Kahin, Nationalism, 103. The Three A Movement stood for the slogans introduced and much propagandized by the Japanese: Japan the leader of Asia, Japan the protector of Asia, and Japan the light of Asia.

<sup>86</sup>Benedict RO'G Anderson, Some Aspect of Indonesian Politics Under the Japanese Occupation: 1944-1945 (Ithaca, NY.: Cornell University Press, Interim Report Series, Modern Indonesian Project, 1961), 9-12.

masses as well. Responding to the nationalists' demands on September 7, 1944, Japan announced that the independence of Indonesia would be given in "the near future." To convince the Indonesians, the Japanese formed the Investigating Body of Measures for the Preparation of Indonesian Independence (Badan Penyelidik Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia, hereafter referred to as BPUPKI) in May 1945, then the Indonesian Independence Preparatory Committee (Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia, hereafter referred to as PPKI) in July 1945. Members of those bodies were both representatives of the parties and ethnic groups.<sup>87</sup>

Thus, at least at the end of the Japanese occupation in Indonesia, the Japanese tried to construct a pluralistic party system. However, it was only a partial attempt since some members of the representative bodies were not affiliated with parties but rather were appointed by the Japanese. The appointment of members to representative bodies became acceptable in the Indonesian political culture and is still in practice today.<sup>88</sup>

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<sup>87</sup>A.G. Pringgodigdo, Berdirinya Negara Republik Indonesia (Surabaya: Pustaka Indonesia, 1958); Kahin, Nationalism, 121, 127; Reeve, Golkar, 65.

<sup>88</sup>The members of the PPKI were considered as the Founding Fathers of Indonesia. They ratified Pancasila as the state ideology, they elected the first President and Vice-President of Indonesia, and they stated that Indonesia was a democratic country. However, they never discussed

Two other important aspects of the Japanese occupation were the use of parties as the mouthpieces of the government, and the inception of military superiority over civilian bureaucrats. Only parties who were willing to carry the government policy could exist. The policy was directed to mobilize the people to win the Pacific War. This policy was congruent with the notion of the elite-mass relationship in the Javanese political culture, for example, the establishment of the Center of People's Power (Pusat Tenaga Rakyat, PUTERA) in 1943. This was the manifestation of the Javanese teaching on the concentration of power. Mobilized participation was also congruent with the Javanese culture, because the mass could not participate until the elite asked.

The Japanese trained Indonesian youths in the military field by establishing military units, such as the Shinendan, Gakusotai, Keibondan and Heiho. Although they were mobilized, only few people were attracted to join these units. Most of them preferred to fight underground against the Japanese fascism, or to join the Compulsory Working Program, known as the Romusha. The Indonesian rejection to join these military units was because they were suspicious that they were used to defend the Japanese

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how to fill the state institutions in Indonesia. Pringgodigdo, Berdirinya, 23-32; Kahin, Nationalism, 123-126; Reeve, Golkar, 66-75.

interests, not the Indonesian. The Japanese cleverly manipulated the Indonesian nationalism by creating another military unit called the Defenders of the Motherland (Pembela Tanah Air, PETA). Due to the fact PETA was using Indonesian words, most of the people joined this organization.<sup>89</sup> Later, the PETA became the backbone of the Indonesian Army established in 1945.

The Japanese used military personals to control the civilian bureaucrats. They did it by establishing a military command in accordance with the civilian bureaucracy. In Java, for example, civilian bureaucrats had to consult with military commanders of respective levels before making a decision. There was an All Java Military Advisor (Djawa Rengo Seinendan). Below him were Koti Rengo Seinendan (at the Provincial level); Syu Rengo Seinendan (at the Regency level); Ken Tiho Seinendan (at the District level); and Son (at the Sub-district level).<sup>90</sup> Later, the Indonesian Army developed a structure similar to the Japanese to control the civilian bureaucrats.

A note should be made here on the impact of the Japanese-militarized Indonesian social organizations on the

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<sup>89</sup>Anthony Reid, The Indonesian National Revolution 1945 (Victoria, Australia: Longmans, Studies in Contemporary Southeast Asia, 1974), 14; Kahin, Nationalism, 114.

<sup>90</sup>Moela Marboen, Djaman Djepang Pemuda Indonesia Mendapat Pendidikan Latihan Militer Setjara Luas, (Yogyakarta: Seminar Sedjarah Nasional II, 26-29 Agustus 1970).

future of Indonesian politics. Eventually the impact was difficult for anyone forming a relatively stable political party without a military wing. The champions of each stream depicted early were supported by the military organizations; the Indonesian Socialist Youth (Pemuda Sosialis Indonesia, PESINDO), the HIZBULLAH and SABILLAH, and the Pioneer Legion (BARISAN PELOPOR) later was renamed the Buffalo Legion (BARISAN BANTENG) affiliated with the PKI, MASYUMI, and PNI respectively. Even a small party like the PARKINDO had a military wing called the party of the Indonesian People of Sulawesi (Kebaktian Rakyat Indonesia Sulawesi, KRIS). The biggest military organization was a territorial based, group known as the People's Army (Laskar Rakjat), loosely organized and unaffiliated with any parties. These LASKAR RAKYATs were used as the backbone of the formulation of the Indonesian Army on October 5, 1945.<sup>91</sup>

The importance of these organizations is their effectiveness in communicating with the people. They were social organizations and were able to demonstrate their capabilities to protect the people from the Dutch. Consequently, these military wings served as the most efficient tools to aggregate people's support as well as to express the people's demands.

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<sup>91</sup>Kahin, Nationalism, 162-164.



The Early Independence Period: 1945 to 1955

Indonesia gained its independence on August 17, 1945. It was followed by the establishment of the Central Indonesian National Committee (Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat, KNIP) on August 22, 1945. The KNIP consisted of 135 members, representing ethnic groups in Indonesia. Initially, the 135 members were appointed by President Sukarno. The KNIP functioned as the provisional parliament until a permanent body could be elected. At the regional level, each province had an Indonesian National Committee (KNI).

President Sukarno announced on August 27, 1945, that he preferred PNI as the vanguard for Indonesia. This PNI was different from the PNI of 1927 or the PNI-BARU of 1931. The PNI of 1945 was proposed to accumulate all political interests regardless of ideologies, and as the leader of other parties to accomplish the Indonesian revolution. Sukarno believed that only one party should lead the others, and, according to him, this notion is congruent with the Javanese principle. The 1945 PNI was banned shortly by Sukarno due to the increasing opposition led by Sjahrir, a Socialist Party activist.<sup>92</sup> Sjahrir accused Sukarno of attempting to change the political system by

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<sup>92</sup>Ibid., 148 passim.

making it more authoritarian.<sup>93</sup>

Finding themselves held by international and domestic constraints, a lack of other practical alternatives, an attachment to individual leaders -especially Hatta and Natzir- to the values of Western democracy, plus the need to build a popular support, the Indonesian leaders switched from a strong Presidential system to a Constitutional Parliamentary democracy.<sup>94</sup> This gave Sjahrir a chance to give the KNIP more legislative power. Through a Presidential decree number 10 of 1945, on October 16, 1945, the KNIP was vested with full legislative power.

On November 3, 1945, the government announced another decree which stimulated the formation of political parties. The decree could be seen as a sword with two edges. It stated that "every citizen has rights to form a political party." The announcement indicated that the government preferred a pluralistic party system. Therefore, the decree formally rejected Sukarno's idea of a vanguard party. However, the decree also stated that the formation of a party was conditional, "that those parties sought to strengthen our struggle to defend freedom and security

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<sup>93</sup>Ibid., 153.

<sup>94</sup>Herbert Feith, "Dynamics of Guided Democracy," Ruth McVey, ed., Indonesia (New Haven, CT.: Yale University Press, Southeast Asia Studies, 1967), 314.

among people."<sup>95</sup> It was understood that the government had rights to consider in whether or not the formation of a political party would jeopardize the security. Therefore, the decree opened the way for government intervention to regulate parties.

The Indonesians anticipated the November 3, 1945, decree with great enthusiasm. Old parties which were banned during the Dutch and the Japanese era re-emerged.<sup>96</sup> In addition, about 35 parties based on regional identities, occupation, religion and ideology were registered between November and December 1945.<sup>97</sup> Most of them had no national organization and simply served as the mouthpiece of regional or ethnic groups. Although two or more parties were often based on a similar ideology in one region, they refused to cooperate, which reduced their ability to structure the people's demands. For this reason, an Indonesian scholar posted that political parties in Indonesia "represent mental and psychological climates rather than clearly defined political opinions."<sup>98</sup>

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<sup>95</sup>Parlementaria, 1954, no page number.

<sup>96</sup>Reeve, Golkar, 87.

<sup>97</sup>Ibid.; Kahin, Nationalism, 156-157.

<sup>98</sup>Soedjatmoko, "The Role of Political Parties in Indonesia," in Philip W. Thayer, ed., Nationalism and Progress in Free Asia (Baltimore, MD.: John Hopkins University, 1956), 133.

All of a sudden the Indonesian government realized that too many parties would make the discussion process for reaching unanimous decisions (musyawarah-mufakat) difficult.<sup>99</sup> To make parties manageable, the government attempted to simplify them in mid-1946. Instead of actively regrouping parties, the government persuaded party leaders to discuss liquidating their parties. Old established parties, such as the PNI, MASYUMI, and PKI, actively persuaded small parties to join them. The attempt failed because the party system was largely determined by the electoral system which was based on a proportional representation. Each party, no matter how small, was guaranteed representation in the KNIP.

President Sukarno viewed the composition of the KNIP membership unbalanced. Twenty-four percent of the KNIP members were from small parties. Among the seven old parties, only three had more than twenty percent; the other four had less than three percent. Occupational groups had no representatives, and outer islands and ethnic minorities were under-represented. This composition, in Sukarno's view, potentially imperiled Indonesian unity. For this reason, in March 1947 he made a governmental intervention to the legislative body.

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<sup>99</sup>The discussion to reach a unanimous decisions is the fourth principle of the Indonesian ideology, Pancasila.

As shown in Table 5, President Sukarno tried to balance the KNIP representative members with representatives from the associational groups and regions. The membership of the KNIP increased to 200 by the end of 1946 and rose to 514 in March 1947. The additional seats were to balance the old parties' representatives. The President also tried to fill the KNIP with non-party leaders by increasing regional representatives and appointing representatives of occupational groups.

TABLE 5

THE COMPOSITION OF KNIP IN MARCH 1947  
(Pre-enlargement figures in brackets)

<u>Parties:</u>		
PNI	45 members	(45)
MASYUMI	60 "	(35)
Partai Sosialis	35 "	(35)
Partai Buruh	35 "	( 6)
PKI	35 "	( 2)
PARKINDO	8 "	( 4)
Partai Katholik	4 "	( 2)
<u>Occupational:</u>		
Workers	40 "	( 0)
Peasants	40 "	( 0)
<u>Regions (other than Java):</u>		
Sumatra	50 "	( 1)
Kalimantan	8 "	( 4)
Sulawesi	10 "	( 5)
Molucas	5 "	( 2)
Lesser Sundas	5 "	( 2)
<u>Racial Minorities:</u>		
Chinese	7 "	( 5)
Arabs	3 "	( 2)
Dutch	3 "	( 1)
<u>Miscellaneous:</u>		
Individuals, minor parties, etc.	121 "	(49)
TOTAL	514 "	(200)

Source: Dahm, The History of Indonesia in the Twentieth Century, 1971, 127, Table VIII.

Another stimulant to the growth of the parties in Indonesia between 1945 to 1955 was the promise to hold a national general election.<sup>100</sup> But the general election was not conducted until 1955. Every time a proposal of a proposed election law was submitted to the KNIP, the members rejected it. There were two main reasons for this rejection. First, some incumbents feared that they would be unseated. Second, there was a general fear among the Communists and Nationalists about the electoral strength of Islam, particularly MASYUMI. This fear arose from a memory of the Japanese occupation, when only the MASYUMI effectively communicated with the government. It was reported that some of the MASYUMI leaders believed that they could govern Indonesia by themselves.<sup>101</sup>

#### MASYUMI

MASYUMI was founded under Japanese auspices in September 1944 to mobilize the Indonesian Moslems. It was a federation of individuals and organizations, most notably the MUHAMMADIYAH, NU and PSII. By incorporating the three biggest Islamic groups, the MASYUMI enjoyed support from middle-class Moslems (from the PSII and MUHAMMADIYAH),

<sup>100</sup>Mashuri Maschab, Kekuasaan Eksekutif di Indonesia (Jakarta: Bina Aksara, 1983).

<sup>101</sup>Feith, Decline, 274-275.

urban educated Moslems (from the MUHAMMADIYAH) and rural people (from the NU). It represented, what Feith calls, "Islamic entrepreneurial political culture."<sup>102</sup>

The MASYUMI could have become a channel of communication with every class of Indonesian society. The party was considered the largest and also the most heterogeneous party in Indonesian history. The party leaders successfully employed the Islamic faith as the basis of their political ideology "but it lacked a set of policies to which all groups within the party could be committed."<sup>103</sup>

There was another reason why the MASYUMI successfully attracted non-Moslem supporters. Within the MASYUMI there were two rival groups, the MUHAMMADIYAH (the modernist) and the NU (the conservative). In the Javanese culture, the ability of the MASYUMI leaders to encompass two rival groups was a sign of power. However, it did not last long and a split began in 1947. Eventually the MUHAMMADIYAH won the battle for influence by capturing the nomination for the Minister of Religion in the Natzir cabinet (September 1950 to March 1951). The PSII was the first to be expelled from the MASYUMI in 1947, followed by the NU in 1950.<sup>104</sup> This splintering was probably the reason why the MASYUMI

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<sup>102</sup>Ibid., 134.

<sup>103</sup>Ibid., 135; Kahin, Nationalism, 156.

<sup>104</sup>Ibid., 186-187, 191 passim.



failed to dominate the 1955 election. For many Moslem supporters, the party became unable to express their demands. For the non-Moslem supporters, the MASYUMI seemed to lose power when the leaders failed to conciliate rival groups.

Leaders of the PSII were disappointed with their minor role in the MASYUMI. They felt that as the mother of Islamic parties in Indonesia, the PSII should play a major role in any Islamic federation. While the PSII tried to cooperate with the NU and the PERTI<sup>105</sup> in the Indonesian Muslim League (Liga Muslimin Indonesia) to challenge MASYUMI, the PSII's effort never succeed.

#### NAHDLATHUL ULAMA (NU)

The NU's commitment to build an Islamic brotherhood involved this "social organization" actively in politics. The main bases for the NU were the pesantren in rural areas in Java and Sumatra. Further, the NU was an organization built from below and was a nuclear organization which NU succeeded in providing a communication network of pesantren who otherwise kept their autonomy. The NU emerged as a political force in 1950 but retained its affiliation with

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<sup>105</sup>PERTI stands for Pergerakan Tarbiyah Islamiyah, a movement to modernize Islamic schools founded in 1918. Its activities were concentrated in some areas of West Sumatra, therefore it had no significant effect on the political system.

the MASYUMI. After President Sukarno recognized the NU as a party on February 22, 1952, the party walked-out from the MASYUMI on April 6, 1952.<sup>106</sup>

In order to compete better with other Islamic parties, the NU changed its membership requirements. A pesantren background was no longer the principal requirement for joining this party. Any Moslem could join the NU as long as he or she obeyed the executive body's (Syuriah) regulations.<sup>107</sup> The party tried to benefit from Sukarno's popularity by giving the President a honorary title, Walliyul Amri Dlaruri Bisysyankati.<sup>108</sup>

The award caused a conflict in the NU between the Natzir group, supported mostly by non-Javanese, and the Sukiman group, supported mostly by the Javanese. Natzir argued that President Sukarno should not be given such a title because he had rejected the idea of Indonesia as an Islamic State. However, in Natzir's view, Islamic teachings could not be separated from politics and administration. On the other hand, Sukiman, a MASYUMI leader with a Javanese background, viewed the award as being appropriate. Apparently the Sukiman group generated strong support from

<sup>106</sup>Anan, Pertumbuhan, 189, 194-195.

<sup>107</sup>Ibid., 198.

<sup>108</sup>Ibid., 200. Literally means: the leader of the state that has received the blessing of Allah.

the pesantren in rural Java, which out-numbered the pesantrens in other islands.<sup>109</sup> Natzir stepped-down as Prime Minister and was replaced by Sukiman in April 1951.

The effect of the Natzir-Sukiman split was of great importance. Communication broke down between the Islamic groups making them unable to express the people's demands and to provide communication between the people and the state. The Natzir group was known as the Sumatran Party (Partai Sumatra) while the Sukiman group was known as the Javanese Party (Partai Jawa). As a result, for example in connection with the issue of unequal distribution of national surplus, a regional sentiment intensified. Regional rebellions were strengthened, such as the DI-TII, in West Java between 1949 to 1962, and the DI-TII in South Sulawesi and in Aceh between 1953 to 1956. The regional sentiments also inspired the PRRI rebellion in West Sumatra in 1958. The involvement of the MASYUMI in PRRI rebellion incited Sukarno to ban the party in 1959.

#### SOCIALIST PARTY

The Socialist Party was formed in December 1945. It was an amalgamation of two small parties established a month earlier, the Indonesian Socialist Party (Partai Sosialis Indonesia, PSI) of Amir Sjarifuddin, and the

<sup>109</sup>Feith, Decline, 138; Benda, Crescent, 150.

Socialist People's Party (Partai Rakyat Sosialis) of Sutan Sjahrir.<sup>110</sup> Most Socialist Party members were former PNI-BARU supporters, intellectuals who had skills needed for the running of a modern state. Feith writes:

The party leaders argued that more could be achieved by a small cadre-party, a party of well-trained and well disciplined political workers. Its greatest source of strength was its position in the higher echelons of bureaucracy.<sup>111</sup>

The Socialist Party in Indonesia was not a mass-based party. It was an elitist party concerned about educating a small number of people who would inspire a socialist movement. PNI-BARU had a similar vision in 1931, and like the PNI-BARU, the Socialist Party failed to generate support from the common people. A communication gap occurred between the educated elites in the urban areas and the uneducated people in rural areas. Consequently, the party did not well understand the people's needs and therefore could not well express these needs to the government.

A split between Sjahrir and Sjarifuddin occurred in February 1948 due to the interpretation of Marxism. Sjahrir viewed "Marxism as a method of social analysis

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<sup>110</sup>Kahin, Nationalism, 158.

<sup>111</sup>Feith, Decline, 130.

rather than a guide to action (held by Sjarifuddin)."<sup>112</sup>  
Sjarifuddin's view made him decide to switch to the PKI and he was involved in the Communist rebellion in Madiun in 1948.

#### PKI

PKI originated from the ISDV which was founded in 1914. Due to its being banned by the Dutch and its reputation as a rebellious party, the PKI operated underground during the Japanese era. It re-appeared on October 21, 1945, under the leadership of Muhammad Jusuf, a leader who Sukarno believed was uninvolved in past rebellious acts. Actually Jusuf had direct connection with the illegal PKI established by Muso in 1935 and the earlier PKI which launched the rebellion of 1926-1927.<sup>113</sup>

After it reemerged in 1945, the PKI continued its former tactic of operating within other parties, especially under the cover of the Socialist Party. Eventually the PKI operated independently after its two strongest leaders, Sudjono and Alimin, returned from Australia in May 1946 and Yen-an, China, on August 12, 1946, respectively. When the Amir Sjarifuddin cabinet was replaced by Hatta on January 29, 1948, the PKI interpreted the change as a setback to

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<sup>112</sup>Ibid., 130; Kahin, Nationalism, 259, 319-320.

<sup>113</sup>Ibid., 159.

the Indonesian revolution, especially after Hatta ratified the Round Table Agreement in 1949. The PKI believed that a total correction to the Hatta government was needed and hence conducted another rebellion in 1948.<sup>114</sup>

Despite ranking fourth in the 1955 election, the PKI was never asked to help form a government by the other bigger parties. The Indonesian government never dissolved the PKI; the ability of PKI leaders to adjust to a changing situation helped the party to survive. The new generation of Communists, Aidit, Lukman, Njoto, and Sudisman, were willing to condemn their predecessors for PKI rebellious acts. Sukarno was sympathetic. Under Sukarno's protection, the PKI was able to employ its structure, including affiliates such as the People's Union (Sarekat Rakjat) founded in 1922, to structure demands from people in all classes.

The PKI became the most effective party to structure the people's demands, partly because of Sukarno's patronage, but most importantly because the party did not get involved in the struggle of power between parties in the post 1955 era. Its leaders devoted their attention to strengthening the PKI. Mass organizations were developed based on occupation and economic class such as the peasants' association (BTI) and the People's Youth (Pemuda

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<sup>114</sup>Feith, Decline, 133 passim.

Rakjat). Their primary task was to convince the people that the PKI could seriously represent people's interests and communicate them to the government. By creating special organizations for a particular occupation and class economy, the PKI tried to demonstrate that the party was deeply concerned with people's problems. Later, in 1957, the strength of the PKI was apparent when it ranked second in elections of regional councils in various places in Java.

#### PNI

The PNI originated from the Union of the Indonesian People (Serikat Rakyat Indonesia, SERINDO) formed in November 1945. SERINDO conducted a conference on February 1, 1946, at which similarly based nationalist organizations merged into a new PNI. Those organizations were the PNIs of Pati, Palembang, Madiun, Sulawesi, and the Indonesian People Party (PRI) of Madiun. By the end of 1946, the PNI had 370 branches with 4 million members. People's enthusiasm for the PNI arose from the similarity of its ideology to that of the PNI of 1927, or Marhaenism.<sup>115</sup>

The PNI challenged the PKI's popularity because of the PNI's association with Sukarno and the President's

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<sup>115</sup>Kahin, Nationalism, 155; Parlementaria, 21; Mintz; Mohammed, 127.

interpretation that Marhaenism was "Marxism a la Indonesia."<sup>116</sup> The party supported the syncretistic mystical beliefs of Javanese-Hinduism held by a majority of the poor peasantry. This placed the PNI in direct competition with PKI and NU, because the PNI appealed to the lower class and it operated within the rural areas.

However, the lack of a clear interpretation of Marhaenism and loosely organized mass-organizations led to serious internal divisions.

As a party for which nationalism itself was central to value orientations, it was particularly difficult for the PNI to adapt itself to the postrevolutionary situation, which seemed to many of its members to call for new issues, new goals, and new patterns of political perception.<sup>117</sup>

#### The 1955 General Election

After seven years of parliamentary debates, the election law was approved on April 7, 1953. During 1945 to 1953, the implementation of a parliamentary democracy and a pluralistic party system produced 172 parties and thirteen cabinets. The election itself was conducted by the fifteenth cabinet on September 29, 1955, for the parliament

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<sup>116</sup>Ibid.

<sup>117</sup>Feith, Decline, 140.



and December 15, 1955, for the Constituent Assembly.<sup>118</sup>

In the 1955 parliamentary election, the 172 parties and quasi-political groups competed for 257 seats. Feith argues that the 1955 election was the most democratic election in Indonesian history. There were no restrictions on campaigning and the people were free to select their representatives. The eligible voters were more than 43 million or 55.27 percent of the population. Voting turnout was 87.87 percent of the eligible voters.<sup>119</sup> Twenty-eight out of 172 parties and quasi-political groups gained a seat or seats; but only four of the twenty-eight gained majority votes. Those were the PNI, MASYUMI, NU, and PKI with 22.3, 20.9, 18.4 and 16.4 percents respectively.<sup>120</sup>

After the election, parties were supposed to better communicate the need of the people to the government. They had discussed the issues openly with the people, they had formulated their ideas, and most importantly the people had legitimized them to govern. But, instead of producing

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<sup>118</sup>We are not concerned with the elections for the Constituent Assembly because its main objective was to decide the Indonesian constitution. Later, the People's Congress (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, MPR) took over the task of the Assembly. Furthermore, article 2 (1) of the 1945 Constitution stated that "the MPR shall consist of members of the parliament (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, DPR)."

<sup>119</sup>Feith, Decline, 429 passim. About 2.5 percent of registered voters would have died in the twelve to seventeen months waiting since registration.

<sup>120</sup>Ibid., 434-435.

stable governments the parties continued to quarrel for power. This was the primary reason for President Sukarno to declare a Martial Law in 1957.

The main reason for the Martial Law was regional rebellions. There seemed no direct connection between a regional rebellion and a suspension of parliamentary democracy which operated in Indonesia between 1945 to 1957. But if we look at the composition of cabinets formed in that period, the Army never held a position in any cabinet, despite the growing intention of Army involvement in politics. In the cabinets formed after the 1955 election, the PKI was excluded inspite the fact the party ranked fourth in the election. Most importantly was the fact that President Sukarno could not control the parties in parliamentary system. Hence, regional rebellion was just an excuse for the President and the Army to replace the parliamentary system with another in which both could participate. Therefore, Martial Law was seen as a stepping stone for the President and the Army to enter politics.

### Conclusions

The evidence discussed in Chapter II strongly indicates that government intervention in a political party's life had occurred ever since the formulation of

political parties in 1908. The Dutch, the Japanese, and the Indonesian governments determined when the parties were needed and the purpose of building political parties. During the Dutch era, the purpose of having political parties was to give political legitimacy to the government. In the Japanese period, the parties were directed to mobilize the mass to win the Pacific War. After the Indonesian independence in 1945, the purpose changed to structure the people's demand to be competed in a general election, and to structure government.

With regard to a party system, a lack of clear-cut party membership criteria and multiple or overlapping memberships during the 1908-1955 period makes it difficult to pick one of the seven typologies provided by Sartori.<sup>121</sup> This chapter has observed that parties emerged in the first two decades of the 1900's, merged into several big parties in 1920's, were banned by the Dutch in 1930's as well as in the Japanese era, and then proliferated after 1945. This fluctuation happened because of the changing social and political environments between 1908 to 1945. Parties performed their functions under the constraint of the Javanese traditional thinking, i.e., the concentration of

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<sup>121</sup>Reginald Harrison, Pluralism and Corporatism, (London, England: George Allen and Unwin, 1982) 98. She suggests that the differences among parties are primarily explained by a reference to their core support.

power and the family principles. This constraint gave an opportunity for the government to continuously threaten parties.

There was a very important aspect regarding the use of parties in the Japanese era. The government used parties to mobilize people for military purposes. The effect of militarization and the involvement of parties in that program were twofold. First, the Japanese introduced military men to get involved in politics. When Indonesia gained its independence in 1945, political parties had military wings, making it difficult for anyone to establish a stable, wholly civilian party. Secondly, the Japanese inserted the idea of military superiority over the civilian bureaucrat by creating military commands parallel with the civilian bureaucracy.

A government decree on November 3, 1945, attempted to restore party roles and functions during the Dutch and the Japanese periods. The decree stimulated parties to actively involve in structuring the people's demands and building a government. The decree tended to resemble a polarized pluralism party system. But, the Indonesian government found that the large number of parties seemed to be not practical and difficult to manage.

The political instability during the 1945 to 1957 period was caused by the inability of the party elites to

cooperate. For this reason, President Sukarno restated his idea on the importance of a vanguard party to the Indonesian society. In order to end regional rebellions and to ensure political stability, the promulgation of the Martial Law in 1957 opened the path for the President to realize his idea. This, eventually, gave an initial step to the formulation of monolithic polity in Indonesia.

CHAPTER III  
PLURALISTIC ERA AND ITS COLLAPSE:  
1955 - 1966

After Indonesia gained its independence on August 17, 1945, the chief political goal was to form a representative government. Holding a general election in 1955 was considered an important step to achieve this goal. Although the election created a more representative government, the 1955 election was followed by further government instability. This chapter explores the reasons why the parties found it difficult to cooperate with one another. What factors were involved? What was the remedy? Finally, what were the consequences of the election for the parties and the political system?

In answering those questions, this chapter also provides support for propositions numbers two and three of this study. Those propositions are:

2. The party functions of conducting government declined between 1949 to 1958.

2 (a). Between 1949 and 1958, the functions of parties were structuring the electorates and conducting government;

2 (b). Between 1949 and 1958, the parties were unable to express and aggregate demands of various groups in Indonesia;

2 (c). After 1958, parties in Indonesia were still involved in structuring voting choices and conducting government, but they were closely controlled by the government.

3. Between 1958 and 1965, the government increasingly intervened to modify and to constrain the functions of parties.

#### The 1955 Election and Its Aftermath

The 1955 General Election was designed to elect party representatives for the purpose of constructing a stable government. During the 1945 to 1955 period, Indonesia attempted to implement a parliamentary democracy. There were three different legislative bodies but none of their members were elected by the people.<sup>1</sup> This practice violated Article 35 of the 1950 Provisional Constitution which stated: "The will of the people is the basis of public authority. This will is expressed in periodic and genuine elections which are held by universal and equal

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<sup>1</sup>KNIP (1945 - 1949) with 536 members; DPR-RIS (1949-1950) with 146 members; DPRS (1950-1955) with 235 members.

suffrage and by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedure."

As suggested in chapter II, the political situation in 1945 to 1955 seemed to have resembled a consociational democracy. In this model, it is possible to maintain a stable democratic government in a plural society as long as the elites are willing to cooperate.<sup>2</sup> Parties are viewed as the organized political manifestation of the cultural segments. Each party must have at least one representative in the National elite cooperation. Each elite has equal rights because the assumption is that no one segment is superior than the others.<sup>3</sup> But despite the approximation to this model, stable government in Indonesia was not achieved. At least four interrelated factors help to explain why: the elections were postponed for a long time; secondly, when they finally occurred, no truly national party emerged; thirdly, the elections did not produce a majority party; fourthly and consequently, there was too much fragmentation of power.

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<sup>2</sup>Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies (New Haven, CT.: Yale University Press, 1977), 1-5, 170.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., 25, 61.



The Long Delay Until  
the 1955 General Election

Conducting a general election was the first political priority for every Indonesian government formed between 1945 to 1955. Initially, the election was scheduled for January 1946. There were two reasons for having the election so quickly. First, there was a concern to deflect criticism of the Republic of Indonesia being a fascist government of the Dutch. As the former authority, the Dutch tried to regain their power in Indonesia after the Japanese surrender. When the KNIP proposed a forerunner party in August 1945, the Dutch quickly responded by accusing Indonesia of wanting to form an authoritarian regime. Second, some members of the elite, such as Sjahrir, a Socialist party activist, demanded replacement of the Indonesian leaders "who had excessively collaborated with the Japanese or who had been unduly influenced by Japanese militaristic indoctrination."<sup>4</sup> Sjahrir wanted an Indonesian government elected by the people, not appointed by the Japanese.

The election never became a reality until 1955. The primary causes for the delay were the occurrence of

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<sup>4</sup>John Sutter, Indonesianisasi: Politics in Changing Economy 1940-1955, vol. II, (Ithaca, NY.: Cornell University Press, 1959), 315 - 316.

physical attacks and political uncertainties between 1945 to 1950. The Dutch conducted military attacks on the Republic of Indonesia in 1947 and 1949 in an attempt to reconquer Indonesia. The United States of America intervened to hinder the Dutch attempt. Then the Round Table Conference in November 1949 resulted in the creation of a federal system, the Republic of the United States of Indonesia (RUSI). A parliamentary democracy was adopted, partly because two of the three nations of the United Nations' commission on Indonesia, namely Australia and Belgium, had such parliamentary systems. However, the federal system was seen by most Indonesians as an instrument of Dutch control and an obstacle to the attainment of Indonesian independence.<sup>5</sup> By August 17, 1950, Indonesia had discarded the federal structure, but the parliamentary democracy system remained.<sup>6</sup>

Another political disturbance to the planned election was the communist rebellion in 1948. Although the government was able to put the rebellion down within two weeks, it had a significant destabilizing impact on national politics. The captured communist leaders, including Aidit

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<sup>5</sup>George McT. Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia (Ithaca, NY.: Cornell University Press, 1952), 450.

<sup>6</sup>Herbert Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia (Ithaca, NY.: Cornell University Press, 1962), 38-45.

and Lukman, were freed before they could be put on trial because of the second Dutch attack that began in February 1949. Thus, Indonesians faced enemies from both the outside (the Dutch) and the inside (the PKI).

Although Indonesia survived the Communist rebellion and the Dutch military attacks, the political situation remained unstable. The Army was not cohesive, and the government had not yet established the governmental structure indicated in the 1950 Constitution. Most importantly, there was a lack of cooperation among party elites. This was manifested in the parliamentary debate to decide the election law.

#### The concession of the 1955 election law

An election law was proposed to the parliament by Prime Minister Natzir in late 1950. When Natzir stepped down from the premiership, the parliament had not yet discussed the proposal. Sukiman replaced Natzir as the Prime Minister in 1951. He got action on the proposal, but it was rejected by the parliament on August 1, 1951, because it proposed a proportional representation system while most of the parliamentarians preferred the single member parliament or district system.<sup>7</sup> Many politicians

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<sup>7</sup>In the district system: "the state is divided into a set of districts, usually having roughly equal populations; one representative is elected from each district to be a

believed the proportional representation system might produce an over-representation of the majority Javanese. In reply, the Parliament rejected the politicians' proposal, because a district system might make the Javanese under-represented.<sup>8</sup> Sukiman was replaced by Wilopo who submitted another proposal but it was also rejected by the parliament in September 1952 because of the same reason.<sup>9</sup>

Feith has mentioned two main reasons why the parliament rejected the election law proposals. First, most of the parliamentarians had little political support from the people because they were appointed by President Sukarno. An election was viewed as an unnecessary risk to their incumbency in parliament. Second, there was a growing fear of the potential electoral strength of the Islamic parties especially by the supporters of the PNI who feared that an

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member of the legislative body of the state; and whoever gets a plurality of the votes wins the seat." Phillips Shively, Power and Choice (New York, NY.: Random House, 1987), 143. In the proportional representation system, "candidates stand only as members of party lists, and it is for one or another of these lists that the elector's ballot actually is cast. The total number of seats to be awarded then is divided among the parties in proportion to the number of votes received by them." Richard S. Katz, A Theory of Parties and Electoral Systems (Baltimore, MD.: The John Hopkins University Press, 1980), 21.

<sup>8</sup>Herbert Feith, The Indonesian Elections of 1955 (Ithaca, NY.: Cornell University Press, Interim Report Series, 1957), 1-3; Soedjono, Tjara Penglaksanaan Memilih Perwakilan Rakjat Konstituante dan Parlemen Oleh Rakjat (Djakarta: Djambatan, 1954).

<sup>9</sup>Ibid., 273-274.

election would produce an Islamic majority which would likely produce an Islamic state. There was some justification for this fear; in local elections in Kediri, Solo, Jogjakarta and Northern Sulawesi, the Islamic party MASYUMI had beaten the PNI.<sup>10</sup>

The long wait for a general election gave parties time to campaign down to the village level. Most Indonesian parties were formed first at the national or regional level. The spare time gave the parties an opportunity to establish bases and solicit support from the local people. In order to gain maximum support, they often appealed to communal and regional issues. This had a divisive effect on Indonesian unity.

Moreover, the lack of a communication network among the Indonesian islands enabled regional parties to become the de facto government in particular areas,<sup>11</sup> and to exert control over the economy and natural resources.<sup>12</sup> As a result, party conflict was intensified by regional as well

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<sup>10</sup>Herbert Feith, The Wilopo Cabinet 1952-1953, (Ithaca, NY.: Cornell Modern Indonesian Project, Monograph Series, 1958), 95 - 96.

<sup>11</sup>Karl Jackson, "The Political Implication of Structures and Culture in Indonesia," in Jackson and Pye, ed., Political Power and Communications in Indonesia, (Berkeley, CA.: University of California Press, 1978), 23.

<sup>12</sup>Sutter, Indonesianisasi, 305-310.

as ideological division.<sup>13</sup>

After seven years' debate, the parliament ratified law no. 7/1953 on the conduct of the 1955 election. Instead of using one of the two electoral systems, law no. 7/1953 combined them. Indonesia was divided into sixteen electoral districts, and each district had at least three representatives in the parliament. Feith describes the distribution of seats as follows:

Within each electoral district seats would be distributed to parties and other candidate bodies in proportion to the number of votes they had received. Remaining votes would be pooled either between different parties within an electoral district (if these had previously given notice of a vote-pooling agreement between them) or amalgamated by one party at the national level.<sup>14</sup>

A party or any "voters' association" made a list of candidates. A candidate must at least twenty-one years old of age, while the eligible voters were eighteen years or had previously married. The first candidate must be supported by the signature of 200 registered voters, and twenty-five for every other candidate. These regulations gave room, if not encouraged, the development of several parties, voters' association, or even individuals to compete in the 1955 election. Due to the strength of

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<sup>13</sup>Barbara Harvey, Peremesta: Half a Rebellion (Ithaca, NY.: Cornell University Press, monograph series publication no. 57, 1977), 4.

<sup>14</sup>Feith, Indonesian Elections, 3.

cultural and ethnical orientation, it was easy for anyone to generate 200 signatures. The law had, therefore, produced a multi-party system. However, to be elected as a parliamentarian, one candidate had to have 300,000 votes.

The presence of a party list indicated that the electoral system used the proportional representation. But the electorates were allowed "to vote for an individual within a candidate list by writing the individual's name on the paper."<sup>15</sup>

#### Regional Bases of Party Support

The results of the 1955 election established the pre-eminence of four parties. Three of the four parties gaining the most support, PNI, NU, and PKI, obtained more than two-thirds of their vote in East and Central Java and thus parties tended to be concentrated regionally. The PNI obtained 65.5 percent of its national vote in the areas where traditional and aristocratic values were strong. The NU obtained 73.9 percent of its national vote in the areas where traditional, syncretic Javanese values were strong. The PKI generated 74.9 percent of its vote in land poor areas, reflecting more of a class basis of its support.

In contrast, the MASYUMI obtained only 25 percent of

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<sup>15</sup>Ibid., 4.

its national vote in Java,<sup>16</sup> generating its strongest support in Aceh, West Sumatra, and South Sulawesi.<sup>17</sup>

Economic and political deterioration culminated in the regional rebellions between 1956 and 1958 in which two parties were implicated. A silent coup by Ahmad Husein over Governor Ruslan Muljohardjo of the Central Sumatra territory occurred on December 20, 1956. Lieutenant Colonel Simbolon, the Commander of Army's First territory of Sumatra, refused an order from the Central Command in Jakarta beginning December 22, 1956. Most important were the Inclusive Struggle (PERMESTA) conducted by Lieutenant Colonel Ventje Samuel on March 2, 1957, in Makassar, South Sulawesi and the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia (PRRI) organized by Lieutenant Colonel Husein on February 15, 1958, in Padang, West Sumatra.<sup>18</sup> The government believed that the PSI and MASYUMI were behind the PERMESTA and PRRI respectively.

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<sup>16</sup>Ibid., 62, 65-66, 78.

<sup>17</sup>Alfian, Hasil-hasil Pemilihan Umum 1955, (Djakarta: Lembaga Kebudayaan Nasional, Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia, 1971), 115 - 123.

<sup>18</sup>George McT. Kahin, "Indonesia," in Kahin, ed., Major Governments of Asia (Ithaca, NY.: Cornell University Press, 1963), 112.



### No Majority Party

The 1955 General Election produced the four largest parties but none of them obtained a majority. Yet, a majority party was needed to ensure government stability. The majority party in the parliament could have countered other parties' vetoes, so the government could continue working.

Table 6 shows that the accumulated vote for the four largest parties was 78 percent. The highest percentage was obtained by PNI (22.3 percent), and the lowest was the PKI by 16.4 percent. The large size of the "other" category, almost 22 percent equal to the support for the largest party, the PNI, should be noted.

TABLE 6  
THE RESULT OF THE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS  
(national level)

Parties	Number of valid votes	Percentage of total vote	Number of seats
PNI	8,434,653	22.3	57
MASYUMI	7,903,886	20.9	57
NU	6,955,141	18.4	45
PKI	6,176,914	16.4	39
Others	8,314,705	22.0	35

Source: Herbert Feith, The Indonesian Elections of 1955, 1957, 58-59.

According to Feith, the 1955 election caused the sharpening of santri-abangan, a social dichotomy.<sup>19</sup> In Table 6, the PNI and PKI can be considered to represent the abangan outlook, and NU and MASYUMI in the santri group.<sup>20</sup> If this dichotomy is imposed in Table 6, we see that the abangan outlook applied to 38.7 percent votes, while the santri outlook applied to 39.3 percent. Thus, even if the PNI and PKI had united, or the NU and MASYUMI collaborated, they would not have obtained a majority vote. Among the "others'" 22 percent, the abangan outlook had a larger market than the santri, because small parties of the abangan stream obtained 17.8 percent vote, while small parties of the santri stream obtained only 4.2 percent.

Within each streams, there was a growing rivalry between champions of abangan and santri to generate the "other" vote in the 1955 election. However, many small parties of the abangan stream could not be sharply differentiated from either supporting the PNI or the PKI. For example, the Labor Party (PBI) declared nationalism and

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<sup>19</sup>Herbert Feith, "Dialog," PRISMA (Jakarta: LP3ES, Jakarta, 7 August 1978) 40-48. For the discussion on the concept of abangan and santri, see Clifford Geertz, The Religion of Java (Glencoe, IL.: Free Press, 1960).

<sup>20</sup>Since 1952 the PKI tried to collaborate with the PNI. The collaboration was a camouflage for PKI to come back to political arena after its unsuccessful coup in 1948. See Donald Hindley, The Communist Party of Indonesia 1951-1963 (Berkeley, CA.: University of California Press, 1966), 242-250.

class struggle as its ideology.<sup>21</sup> In contrast, a division tended to be sharper in the santri stream. The NU elites found it difficult to collaborate with the MASYUMI leaders, because the MASYUMI leaders seemed to be sympathetic to MUHAMMADIYAH, the long rival of the NU.

A new development in party collaboration emerged after the 1955 election. Ideology became more important than regionalism or geographical boundaries in the efforts by the four biggest parties to form coalitions with majority support. These attempts sharpened conflict among the four largest parties and within the small parties being courted by them. The small parties realizing their value to the large parties, struck hard bargains.

#### Too Many Parties,

#### Too Few Cabinet Positions

The attempt to implement parliamentary democracy, the political commitment of Indonesian leaders to a unitary state, and the pluralistic nature of Indonesian society made political representation an important issue in parliament as well as in the cabinet. The most difficult issue was regional representation. Party leaders of the outer

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<sup>21</sup>For further discussion on the ambiguity of party's ideologies, see Republik Indonesia, Kepartaian dan Parlemenaria di Indonesia (Djakarta: Kementrian Penerangan, 1958).

islands, i.e., the Indonesian islands except Java, feared that the implementation of a parliamentary democracy with proportional representation would result in an over-representation of Java. For example, in 1955, Java with 66.2 percent of the population received 69.65 percent of total number of parliamentary seats.<sup>22</sup> People of the outer islands viewed themselves as a permanent minority, which they viewed as particularly unjust given the fact that the central government obtained most of its revenues from the resource-rich outer islands. "... Because the decisions were made by majority vote, they had reason to fear that their interests might be sacrificed to those of the people of Java."<sup>23</sup>

As early as October 16, 1946, President Sukarno made the KNIP more representative. He enlarged the membership of KNIP from 200 to 514 people, which was intended to increase the proportion of representatives from the outer islands. As shown in Table 7, the absolute number of outer islands' representatives increased. But the proportion of outer islands representatives declined, except for Sumatra.

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<sup>22</sup>Feith, Decline, 472.

<sup>23</sup>Harvey, Permesta, 5.

TABLE 7  
COMPARISON OF PARTY REPRESENTATION  
(in percentage)

Parties	Old KNIP	Sukarno's Proposal	Percentage Change in Proportion of Total
PNI	22.5	8.8	- 61
MASYUMI	17.5	11.7	- 33
PSI (Socialist)	17.5	6.8	- 61
Labor	3.0	6.8	+ 126
PKI (Communist)	1.0	6.8	+ 580
PARKINDO (Christian)	2.0	.8	- 60
Catholic	1.0	.8	- 20
<b>Occupational:</b>			
Workers	0	7.8	+ 780
Peasants	0	7.8	+ 780
<b>Regions:</b>			
Sumatra	.5	9.7	+1,840
Borneo	2.0	1.5	- 25
Celebes	2.5	2.0	- 20
Molucas	1.0	1.0	0
Lesser Sundas	1.0	1.0	0
<b>Minorities:</b>			
Chinese	2.5	1.3	- 48
Arab	1.0	.6	- 40
Dutch	.5	.6	+ 20
Individuals, minor parties and armed organizations	.5	24.3	+4,860

Source: George McT. Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1952) 201.

Table 7 also indicates an increasing proportion of left-wing parties, Labor Party and PKI. The cumulative seats of left wing parties in Sukarno's proposal was 105, outnumbering the PNI (the leader in the abangan stream) which held forty-five seats or the MASYUMI (the leader in the santri stream) which held sixty seats. This was the main reason why Prime Ministers between 1945 and 1948 came from the leftwing parties.

There was no official record on the reason why President Sukarno wanted to increase the representatives of the left-wing parties. The explanation could be inferred from the aggressiveness of the parties against colonialism and imperialism, the two political topics Sukarno favored. However, the proposal clearly indicated that Sukarno tended to be friendly to the left wing parties ever since Indonesia gained its independence.

Table 8 compares the composition of party strength in Sukarno's proposed KNIP with the parliament produced by the 1955 election. In the 1955 parliament, the outer islands' and ethnic representatives were cancelled. The government assumed both categories were represented by regional parties, such as the Dayak Unity Party in Kalimantan, and the Consultative Council on Indonesian Citizenship (BAPERKI), a party represented by Chinese interests. Most regional or ethnic parties were small, because their

exclusiveness made it difficult to gain support from other regions or ethnics. As a result, most small parties were unable to generate 300,000 votes to put a representative in the parliament as regulated by election law no. 7/1953. This way, the small parties faded away or amalgamated with other big parties of similar ideology.

There are three interesting facts depicted in Table 8. First is the increasing strength of PKI, despite the fact that the party had conducted a rebellion in 1948. For President Sukarno this fact convinced him that indeed communism was a part of the Indonesian society. Sukarno believed that the 1955 election had agglutinated three ideologies operating in Indonesian society, namely Nationalism, Religion, and Communism because the election indicated that only parties based on these ideologies were able to generate adequate vote. The Nationalist gained 22.2 percent vote, the Religious (Islam) gained 39.7 percent (that is the addition vote of MASYUMI and NU), and the Communist gained 15.2 percent vote. Therefore, he was firmly convinced that those three ideologies were inseparable parts of the Indonesian society. Second, the non-Islamic parties, PNI, PSI, Labor Party, PKI, PARKINDO and CATHOLIC, were stronger than the Islamic parties, MASYUMI and NU. There was a continuous pattern of the non-Islamic parties' superiority since the formulation of the



TABLE 8  
THE COMPARISON OF PARTY REPRESENTATIVES IN  
SUKARNO'S KNIP AND THE 1955 PARLIAMENT  
(in percentage)

Parties	KNIP	1955	Percentage Change in Proportion of Total
PNI (Nationalist)	8.8	22.2	+ 152
MASYUMI (Islam)	11.7	22.2	+ 89
NU (Islam)	0	17.5	+ 100
PSI (Socialist)	6.8	1.9	- 72
Labor (Communist)	6.8	.8	- 88
PKI (Communist)	6.8	15.2	+ 123
PARKINDO (Christianity)	.8	3.1	+ 287
CATHOLIC	.8	2.3	+ 187
Others	24.3	14.8	- 39

Sources: Kahin, Nationalism, 1952, 201; Feith, Decline, 1962, 434-435.

KNIP in 1945. This fact worried Moslem supporters that the Indonesian government was going to build a secular state. They had a reason to be concerned, because in 1945, when PPKI members were about to decide the 1945 Constitution, the non-Islamic politicians successfully turned down Islamic demands to declare Islam as a state religion. The Darul Islam movement in West Java was based on this issue.

Third, another Islamic party, the NU, appeared to be a serious competitor for the well established MASYUMI. Although both parties were based on Islam, they were not as cohesive as the Moslem supporters thought. A long rivalry between the Islamic parties began, making them ineffective challengers of the non-Islam parties.

The main problem with the implementation of a polarized pluralism party system, parliamentary democracy, and proportional representation system in Indonesia was that party strength in the parliament did not correspond with party representations in cabinets formed between August 1945 and March 1957. In 1956, Soedjatmoko, an Indonesian scholar, contended that political parties in Indonesia represented "mental and psychological climates rather than clearly defined political opinions."<sup>24</sup> Therefore, in order

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<sup>24</sup>Soedjatmoko; "The Role of Political Parties in Indonesia," in Philip W. Thayer, Nationalism and Progress in Free Asia (Baltimore, MD.: The John Hopkins University, 1956), 133.

to create a stable government, the cabinet should adequately represent the various cleavages in society. He repeated his argument in 1967:

Any political system in Indonesia is only stable in so far as there is no direct effort to the demands of the various cultural groups to maintain their influence. This point[s] to the necessity of ensuring adequate representation and full participation of these groups in political decision making as well as in the political power itself. Unless this is secured governments are bound to be seen as illegitimate and almost any decision is bound to increase political tension in society.<sup>25</sup>

Table 9 shows the distribution of party representatives in the cabinet. In the cabinets before the 1955 election, the Socialists and the Communists were well represented, while the Islamic parties were under-represented. After the 1955 election, despite the Communist party ranking fourth, it was not allowed cabinet representation. President Sukarno felt that this practice denied political reality and undermined Indonesian unity based on three inseparable elements: Nationalism, Religion, and Communism. His dissatisfaction led him to appoint a cabinet based not on ideological representation but rather on functional representation. Consequently, in the Djuanda cabinet, the Communists and the Army began to have representation in the cabinet.

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<sup>25</sup>Soedjatmoko, "Indonesia: Problems and Opportunities," Australian Outlook, December 1967, 275.

TABLE 9  
PARTIES' REPRESENTATIVES IN CABINETS  
(August 1945 to March 1957)

Name of the Cabinet	Non-Islam					Islam	
	PNI	PSI	PKI	PARK-INDO	CATHOLIC	NU	MASYU MI

Before 1955 Election.

Presidential	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Sjahrir I	-	7	-	2	-	-	1
Sjahrir II	-	7	-	2	-	-	3
Sjahrir III	4	6	-	2	-	-	7
Amir S. I	7	7	1	1	-	-	-
Amir S. II	7	10	1	1	-	-	4
Hatta I	3	1	-	1	-	-	4
Hatta II	5	-	-	1	-	-	4
Susanto	5	-	-	-	-	-	2
Halim	3	3	-	1	-	-	4
RIS	3	-	-	1	-	-	4
Sukiman	4	-	-	1	-	-	5

After 1955 Election.

Wilopo	4	2	-	1	-	-	4
Ali I	4	-	-	-	-	3	-
Burhanuddin	-	2	-	1	1	2	1
Ali II	6	-	-	2	2	5	4
Djuanda	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

Source: Feith, Decline, 1962; Mashuri Maschab, Sistim Pemerintahan Republik Indonesia, (Yogyakarta: Bina Aksara, 1985).

To recapitulate, the composition of the Indonesian cabinets was initially based on functional group representation in August 1945 and returned to the same basis after the second Ali Cabinet resigned on March 14, 1957. In the fifteen cabinets in between, political parties were represented and played important roles in conducting government. PKI was an exception, this party obtained 16.4 percent of the vote in the 1955 election, occupied 39 seats in parliament, and thus was one of the largest parties. However, the party had no representative in cabinets formulated after the 1955 election.

In their effort to create a quasi majority, the other three large parties tried to include smaller parties of a similar ideology. Whenever any one of the three large parties received a mandate from the President to form a cabinet, its leaders tried to exclude the other large parties. Instead, the party's leaders tried to include as many representatives of smaller parties of a similar ideology as possible. This practice made the cabinet vulnerable, because the other large parties in the parliament could easily veto the cabinet's programs. It also resulted in increasing ideological polarization of Indonesian politics, making the achievement of compromises needed to govern effectively increasingly difficult. We turn now to a description of which parties coalesced around each

ideology.

### Nationalism

Nationalism was the most popular modern ideology in the early Republican period. The PNI, the leading nationalist party, incorporated not only several small parties in Java but also three parties from outside Java. The incorporated parties included the Indonesian People's Union (SERINDO) in West and Central Java, the National Union in Bangka Island, South Kalimantan and Sumbawa, and the Indonesian People's Movement for Independence (GERKINDO) in North Sulawesi. Not necessarily amalgamated but consistently following the PNI lead in politics was the Indonesian Party (PARTINDO).<sup>26</sup>

Thirteen other small parties were more loosely identified with PNI policies. This group can be subdivided into two: the abangan type of parties, and the parties based on Christianity. In the first classification were the Greater Indonesian Party (PARINDRA), the Indonesian Farmer Party (PTI), the Unity of Indonesian Marhaen (PERMAI), the Women People Party (Partai Wanita Rakyat), the People's Sovereign Party (PKR), the Greater Indonesian Union (PIR), the Indonesia Nationalism Party (PARKI), the Party for a Free Republic of Indonesia (PRIM), The People's

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<sup>26</sup>Nazaruddin Syamsuddin, PNI dan Kepolitikannya: 1963-1969 (Jakarta: Rajawali Press, 1984), 20.

Party, the National People's Party (PRN), and the Republican Party.<sup>27</sup>

In addition, affiliated with the PNI were mass organizations for almost every segment of society. Those organizations included the Marhaen Youth Movement (GPM), the Marhaen Women Movement (GWM), the Marhaen Labor Union (KBM), the Indonesian Farmer League (BTI), the Indonesian Nationalist Student Movement (GMNI), the Indonesian Nationalist Pupil Movement (GSNI), the National Cultural Institution (LKN), the Association of Scientists (ISRI), the Marhaen Fishermen Movement (GNM), the Indonesian Teachers' Movement (IPM), the Marhaen Civil Servant Movement (GRPM), and the Marhaen Islamic Movement (DMI).

The second category included parties based on Christianity. There were two small but cohesive parties in this category, the Catholic Party (Partai Katholik) and the Indonesian Christian Party (PARKINDO). Due to their small size, they were relatively more cohesive than the Islamic and nationalist parties. The appeal of these parties suffered from their being previously associated with Dutch parties.<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>27</sup>Republik Indonesia, Kepartaian dan Parleментарia (Djakarta: Kementrian Penerangan, 1954).

<sup>28</sup>Ibid., 391.

Religion (Islam)

The MASYUMI was considered the leading Islamic party at least until NU defected in 1952. Originally MASYUMI aspired to incorporate all Islamic parties, but its leaders failed to maintain harmony with other Islamic parties. As a composite party consisting of ideologically distinct elements, the MASYUMI was vulnerable to factionalism. The split between the MASYUMI and NU in 1950 weakened MASYUMI's strength. This split was considered the main factor in the inability of Islamic parties to achieve a majority in the 1955 election.

The reason for MASYUMI's conflict with the NU was the rivalry between the NU and the MUHAMMADIYAH. When DR. Halim of MASYUMI received a mandate to form a cabinet on January 21, 1950, he appointed Faqih Usman of MUHAMMADIYAH as the Minister of Religion. This act antagonized the NU because the position was formerly held by NU. In the eyes of the NU leaders, this special treatment given by the MASYUMI leaders to MUHAMMADIYAH was a serious threat to NU's role in MASYUMI; in addition the NU leaders felt that the influence of the Kiyais (Islamic Teacher) would be minimized.<sup>29</sup> Thus, NU withdrew from MASYUMI and became an independent party in 1950.

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<sup>29</sup>Choirul Anan, Pertumbuhan dan Perkembangan Nahdlatul Ulama (Sala: Jatayu, 1985), 186-187; also Feith, Decline, 233-237.



The NU consolidated its supporters primarily in rural areas, especially in East Java. The party program focused on education, which was similar to its rival, MUHAMMADIYAH. Unlike MUHAMMADIYAH which generated support from urban people, NU effectively used rural Islamic traditional schools (Pesantren) as its base of activities. By having its base at the rural level, the NU was relatively free from competition with other parties who concentrated their activities in urban areas.

Beginning on August 30, 1952, the NU intensified its opposition to MASYUMI (and MUHAMMADIYAH). NU formed a rival organization to MASYUMI called the Indonesian Moslem League (Liga Muslimin Indonesia). The League consisted of the NU, PSII, PERTI, DARUL DA'WAH WAL IRSJAD, and the Indonesian Islamic Chinese Association (Perserikatan Tionghoa Islam Indonesia).<sup>30</sup> The advantage of the League for the NU was that member parties could help spread NU programs in the urban areas of Java, Western Sumatra, and Southern Sulawesi. Thus, the League enabled the NU to operate both in rural and urban areas. The League strongly indicated that the NU tried to take over MASYUMI's role as the leader of the Islamic movement.

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<sup>30</sup>Kepercayaan, 413.

### Communism

The PKI was the leading communist party. For a short period of time, after its failure in the 1948 coup, the party was highly selective in recruiting members. To be accepted as a member of PKI, a person had to have a mentor (a member of PKI) to teach him or her about communism.<sup>31</sup> The party developed a strong organizational structure with Central Committees at the national level, Provincial Committees at the provincial level, Section Committees at district and municipality levels, Sub-section Committees at sub-district levels, and finally Resort Committees at the village level.<sup>32</sup> Consequently, PKI became the most cohesive party in Indonesia during the 1950 to 1965 period.

Closely associated with communism were the parties based on socialism. These parties were the Indonesian Socialist Party (PSI), the Proletariat (MURBA), and the Labor Party (PBI). These small socialist parties often had representatives in cabinets formed between 1949 to 1957 because they were not always in agreement with the PKI.

To conclude this section, the 1955 election did not meet its objective to establish a stable and representative government. Not only because the election produced no major party strong enough in the parliament, thereby

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<sup>31</sup>Ibid., 498.

<sup>32</sup>Ibid., 501.

guaranteeing the stability of the government, but also the lack of cooperation among party elites, especially at the national level, that caused the government's malfunction. These situations frustrated President Sukarno and the Army, who stayed away from political arena during the parliamentary democracy era. For these reasons, both Sukarno and the Army inclined to get involve in politics by pulling-out the importance of parties. The way they eliminated the parties' role was by promulgating a Martial Law in 1957, followed by the inception of guided democracy in 1959.

#### Guided Democracy

On October 26, 1956, President Sukarno gave a speech before the Constitutional Assembly in which he accused the malfunctioning of parties for weakening Indonesian unity. Initially he considered banning some of the parties but apparently he could not decide which ones and he feared that selective prohibition would cause political unrest. But he finally called for a ban on all parties.

We made a very great mistake in 1945 when we urged the establishment of parties, parties, parties. Now that mistake is wreaking its vengeance upon us ... Let us all join to bury the political parties.<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>33</sup>Herbert Feith and Lance Castles, Indonesian Political Thinking 1945-1965 (Ithaca, NY.: Cornell University Press, 1970), 81.

President Sukarno contended that some parties supported regional movements which were seriously endangering Indonesian unity.

Indeed, since 1957, the PSI openly supported the PERMESTA rebellion in North Sulawesi, and some prominent MASYUMI leaders supported the PRRI rebellion in West Sumatra. Both rebellions tried to attract national government attention on the unbalanced economic development between Java and the outer islands. Leaders of those rebellions felt that outer islands, rich in natural resources, had suffered too much to develop Java. The mixture of ethnic and economic sentiments brought by the PERMESTA and PRRI had put Indonesia in a political crisis.

According to the 1950's Constitution, the President and Vice-President were formally inviolable and above the political arena. However, due to the actual role of President Sukarno in Indonesian politics, all political groups and the Army put their hopes in him to overcome the political crisis. In order to give Sukarno a legal basis for active involvement in politics, Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo dissolved his cabinet on March 14, 1957. On the same day Sukarno announced Martial Law.<sup>34</sup>

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<sup>34</sup>Daniel S. Lev, The Transition to Guided Democracy: Indonesian Politics 1957-1959 (Ithaca, NY.: Cornell University Press, Monograph Series, Modern Indonesian Project, 1966), 15-16.

Martial Law opened the way for the Army's active involvement in politics, to the detriment of parties.

As Lev points out:

The stage of siege gave the army commanders of every district immense authority, subordinating civilian administration to military orders ... martial law was to become the army's political charter, forming the basis for its full participation in the political life of Indonesia as the political parties were to realize before long.<sup>35</sup>

The Martial Law also benefitted Sukarno. During parliamentary democracy, Sukarno lacked formal or legal political roles commensurate with his political influence. For Sukarno, the Martial Law provided the authority he needed to impose his idea of "guided democracy."<sup>36</sup>

In another speech on February 21, 1957, Sukarno introduced his political "conception" (Konsepsi) to complement his guided democracy. He claimed Konsepsi meant a return to Indonesian personality.<sup>37</sup> Konsepsi had two components, the Gotong Royong Cabinet and the National

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<sup>35</sup>Daniel S. Lev, "The Political Role of the Army in Indonesia," in Wilson C. McWilliams, Garrisons and Governments: Politics and the Military in the New States (San Francisco, CA.: Chandler Publishing Company, 1967), 153.

<sup>36</sup>David Reeve, "Soekarnoism and Indonesia's Functional Group State, RIMA, vol. 13, # 1, June 1979, 88, 103.

<sup>37</sup>Notosoetardjo, Proses Kembali Kepada Djiwa Proklamasi 1945: Apakah Demokrasi Terpimpin Itu? (Djakarta: Djambatan, 1959), 81-95.

Council (Dewan Nasional).

The Gotong Royong Cabinet had representation from all parties or factions in Parliament which had a certain electoral quotient. However, all appointed ministers gave up their party identities because the Gotong Royong Cabinet was based on functionalism. A similar principle was imposed on the National Council. The Council was composed of representatives of functional groups, religious groups, important ministers, the army chiefs of staff, and regional representatives. Sukarno himself led the Council.

Sukarno felt that the Indonesian parties should operate on the Indonesian principles of consensus (mufakat) and mutual aid (gotong royong). Working under these principles, parties would exchange views until they reached a consensus. Sukarno opposed decision making through a majority vote. For the gotong royong principle to work effectively, there needed to be a leader of the discussion. Hence, Sukarno contended that Indonesia needed to return to the Presidential system of the 1945 Constitution, because it provided for a strong President. This should be accompanied by a dissolution of parties and creation of one party, or a state party (staatpartij).<sup>38</sup> He seemed to have preferred a single, hegemonic party.

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<sup>38</sup>David Reeve; GOLKAR of Indonesia (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1985), 111.

Sukarno never made the concept of guided democracy clear until August 17, 1959. It became clear that he did not intend to dissolve parties.<sup>39</sup> Parties would be allowed to exist provided they worked together under the guidance of one strong leader (Sukarno). A strong leader was needed to ensure that party elites would cooperate and reach agreement.

Sukarno made it clear that guided democracy was just an element of his political manifesto (known as MANIPOL). In his speech entitled "Rediscovery of Our Revolution," Sukarno said that to achieve "a just and prosperous society" Indonesia needed to implement five political doctrines. Those doctrines were the 1945 Constitution, Indonesian socialism, guided democracy, guided economy, and Indonesian identity. The Indonesian acronym for these doctrines was USDEK.<sup>40</sup> Thus, guided democracy was one of the five elements in MANIPOL-USDEK.

The political parties' reactions to Sukarno's political conception were varied. The MASYUMI, PSI and KATHOLIK openly disagreed with it. For them, the National Council

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<sup>39</sup>Sukarno, Dibawah Bendera Revolusi, vol. II, (Djakarta: Publication Committee, 1964) 178.

<sup>40</sup>Political Manifesto (Djakarta: Department of Information Republic of Indonesia, 1959) 50. USDEK was the Indonesian abbreviation for Undang-undang Dasar 1945, Sosialisme Indonesia, Demokrasi Terpimpin, Ekonomi Terpimpin, and Kepribadian Indonesia.

was one step away from the development of a single party state, because the National Council was designed to eliminate the parties' role in government. The functional bases of representation made parties nothing but the instrument of the state to convey messages to the people.<sup>41</sup> These parties were excluded from the Djuanda cabinet, formed on April 9, 1957. Parties which disagreed with Sukarno's idea but remained loyal to the President were the NU, PARKINDO, IPKI, and PSII. Two parties, PNI and PKI agreed with Sukarno's idea. PNI leaders, due to the patronage of President Sukarno, had no choice but to support his idea. In the case of the PKI, the party supported Sukarno's idea in an effort to rehabilitate its image after the 1948 coup.

In order to understand how the Army officers reacted to the President's political conception, some background is necessary. On October 17, 1952, the army conducted a "half" coup. Military leaders had felt that civilian politicians were mismanaging the country and intervened in military problems. The army demanded that the President dissolve the parliament and conduct a general election as soon as possible. Sukarno refused because the army

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<sup>41</sup>Yahya Muhaimin, Perkembangan Militer Dalam Politik di Indonesia, (Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada University Press, 1982), 99.



movement was considered unconstitutional.<sup>42</sup> But his refusal did not mean that Sukarno disagreed with the Army's criticism.

With Martial Law in effect, the President's political conception opened the door for the army to become actively involved in politics. The Army supported Sukarno's idea to eliminate the parties' role. However, only by obtaining a functional group status could the army gain acceptance in the Gotong Royong cabinet as well as in the National council. To achieve this status, the army formulated several civil-military cooperative bodies (BKS). Three BKS were founded between 1957 to 1958. They were the Youth-Military Cooperative Body (BKS Pemuda-Militer), the Labor-Military Cooperative Body (BKS Buruh-Militer), and the Farmer-Military Cooperative Body (BKS Tani-Militer). The Army personnel worked directly with the relevant mass-organizations at the village level.

The PKI was strongly opposed to the army being considered a functional group. The PKI opposition was understandable because the BKS competed for support at the same level and among the same groups as the PKI. The parties felt that their mass-organizations would be swallowed by the army. By November 23, 1958, the National

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<sup>42</sup>Ulf Sundhausen, The Road to Power (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1982), 71.

Council formally accepted the Army's role as a functional group. From here on the parties had a new contender, the Army.

There were two important realities in the implementation of guided democracy: the growing role of the Army in politics and the President's need for mass support to counterbalance the growing power of the Army. The tug of war between the President, the Army and the parties culminated in July 1959. For this reason, we will divide the implementation of this guided democracy into pre- and post-July 1959.

#### The Army's Role Prior to July 1959

President Sukarno depended on the Army to turn back the regional rebellions which apparently were supported by the MASYUMI and PSI. As the result, the Army had a strong position in bargaining with the President. This was the main reason for his acceptance of the Army in the National Council as a functional group on November 23, 1958.

General Nasution, Commander of the Army, wanted the Army to play a political role with or without martial law.<sup>43</sup> In his speech on November 11, 1958, before the military cadets in Magelang, Central Java, he reminded the

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<sup>43</sup>Lev, Transition, 193.

cadets that three to five soldiers died every day in the Army's struggle to liberate West Irian and thereby accomplish the Indonesian revolution. The army had a moral obligation to defend the country, but suffered too much in comparison to the civilians. The Army no longer could tolerate the wrong doing of civilian politicians. His speech elaborated "the Army's Middle Way," or the Army as playing both a military and a civil role. Daniel Lev considers the speech as "a basic document in Indonesian Constitutional and political development."<sup>44</sup>

Based on the Middle Way doctrine, the Army intensified its campaign to dissolve parties. Responding to the military intervention in politics, the parties opposed the Army's proposal on economic development which was submitted to the parliament in September 1958. This altered the relationship between the Army and parties. Sukarno tried to soften the conflict by holding "open talks" with party leaders between December 1958 and January 1959. His failure persuaded him to side with the Army leaders in their opinion that the parliament was inefficient and should be dissolved. Through a decree on July 5, 1959, the President dissolved the parliament.

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<sup>44</sup>Ibid., 191.

### The Parties' Role Prior to July 1959

Regional rebellions gave Sukarno no choice but to cooperate with the Army.<sup>45</sup> He came to need the party leadership as a lever against the Army leadership.<sup>46</sup> To counter the Army, the President needed popular support but he had weakened the role of the parties in politics.

Although the PNI was closely associated with President Sukarno, only some of the leaders supported guided democracy. By the end of the 1950's, persons of a more conservative social orientation consolidated their hold on the party leadership. The PNI became less aggressive and lost its revolutionary elan.<sup>47</sup> With Sukarno's intervention, a prominent supporter, Sidik Djojokusarto, overcame his rivals and became the chairman of the PNI. The President selected Sidik because he had radical views.

The PKI supported guided democracy with great enthusiasm in its attempt to stay close to President Sukarno and to restore its image after the 1948 coup. The PKI was the party most prepared to participate in guided democracy.

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<sup>45</sup>Yahya, Perkembangan, 121-128.

<sup>46</sup>Kahin, Nationalism, 601, 649-680; Lev, Transition, 202.

<sup>47</sup>John E. Rocamora, Nationalism in Search of Ideology: The Indonesian Nationalist Party 1946-1965 (Ithaca, NY.: Cornell University Press, Ph.D thesis, 1974), 203-211, 246-247, 397-401.

It had established mass organizations from the national to the village levels. It provided channels of mass mobilization for the President whenever he needed them. In the event of a coup, the PKI could mobilize people to counter the coup and give legitimacy to the President. In addition, by relying on PKI's mass organizations, Sukarno did not violate his own political conception because the mass organizations were functional groups.

President Sukarno intervened personally several times to ensure the inclusion of the PKI in both the National Council and the Cabinet. In light of PKI's fourth ranking in the 1955 election, Sukarno felt PKI representation could not be denied. Still, other party leaders refused to cooperate with the PKI in the Gotong Royong Cabinet and in the National Council. Sukarno responded by requiring that every minister and members of the National Council "accept office as individuals, not as party members."<sup>48</sup>

It became clear that under guided democracy, Sukarno intended to detach mass-organization from parties. Functional group representation was an indirect attack or a "soft" way to dissolve parties. With the Martial Law of 1957, the President could easily abolish parties. But he was aware of the growing intention of the Army to get involved in politics. He did not like parties, nor the

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<sup>48</sup>Reeve, GOLKAR, 118.

Army fully participating in politics. With functional group representation the President believed he could generate mass support including the Army creation of civil-military cooperative bodies. On January 20, 1960, Sukarno merged the functional groups into a National Front. In essence the Front was just another form of Sukarno's idea of a vanguard party (Partai Pelopor).

Sukarno's Reaction:  
Toward Monocentrism, 1959-1966

Sukarno found himself trapped in the struggle between the parties and the Army. He tried a compromise between the two by offering the Army a system more acceptable than liberal democracy, and the parties an alternative more acceptable than a military junta.

On July 23, 1958, Sukarno called the National Council to explore how to obtain a new parliament and a new political system consisting of representation by functional groups.<sup>49</sup> A committee was set-up under Asem Emingpradja, but no proposals were forthcoming due to very deep divisions.<sup>50</sup> Then, the Army took the initiative by submitting

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<sup>49</sup>Ruslan Gani, Pantjasila: The Prime Mover of the Indonesian Revolution (Djakarta: Djambatan, 1965), 133-135.

<sup>50</sup>Ibid., 139-143.

a proposal to the National Council on August 14, 1958. The proposal included a ban on civil servants from political activities and party memberships, a denial of the right of military men to participate in elections, but compensated by appointed representation to legislative bodies, guarantee that prominent military leaders should be included in the highest level of decision making, a limitation on the number of parties, and non-accountability of the cabinet to the DPR.<sup>51</sup> The parties strongly disagreed with the Army's proposal.

To resolve the deadlock in the National Council, Sukarno, with strong support from the Army, intervened by announcing a Decree on July 5, 1959. The Decree consisted of three points:

1. The dissolution of the National Council.
2. The re-enforcement of the 1945 Constitution for the entire Indonesian nation and the entire Indonesian territory, as from the date of the issuance of the Decree, and the abolition of the 1950 Provisional Constitution.
3. The setting-up within the shortest possible time of a Provisional People's Consultative Assembly (the MPR) which was to consist of members of the House of Representatives (the DPR) plus representative of the regions and groups, and a Provisional Supreme Advisory Council (the DPA).<sup>52</sup>

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<sup>51</sup>Abdul Haris Nasution, Kekaryaan ABRI (Djakarta: Seruling Masa, 1971), 26, 157-160, 381 passim.

<sup>52</sup>The Process and Progress of Pancasila Democracy, Department of Information Republic of Indonesia, 1987, 22-23.

This decree officially began the era of guided democracy, although parliamentary democracy had actually ended with the declaration of Martial Law. The period between March 14, 1957, to July 5, 1959, was critical to Indonesian parties, because it was the period of transformation from a multi-party system toward a single party system.

The July 5, 1959, decree concentrated political power in the President's hands. The decree increased the degree of formal authoritarianism in Indonesian politics because the 1957 Martial Law was still effective. On July 22, 1959, the President issued two Presidential Decisions. In decision Number 2/1959, the President dissolved the National Council and appointed new parliamentarians. In decision Number 3/1959, the President established a Provisional Advisory Committee (DPA) whose members were appointed by him. These decisions violated the spirit of the 1945 Constitution, if not the letter.

Through Presidential decision number 7/1959, the President implemented his ideas on the simplification of political parties. The decision dissolved the MASYUMI and PSI for their roles in the PRRI and PERMESTA rebellions. However, because the Martial Law was still in effect, competitor parties could not benefit much from the ban.

To regulate the local level, the President issued Presidential Decree Number 6/1959 which voided the power of



regional parliaments to elect Governors. Hereafter, all Governors would be appointed by the President. This regulation was intended to limit the role of regional parties in the government.

By January 1960, parties had to choose between supporting the government or being banned. The President issued three requisites to recognition as a political party. Those three requisites were:

1. The acceptance of Pancasila as a state ideology and the 1945 constitution.
2. The limitation of party branches throughout the country.
3. The relinquishment of aid from abroad.<sup>53</sup>

On April 15, 1961, the President announced that ten political parties were permitted to operate in Indonesia. Those ten parties were: PNI, NU, PSII, PARKINDO, KATHOLIK, PERTI, IPKI, MURBA, PKI, and PARTINDO. Another Presidential Regulation, Number 13/1960 of July 5, 1960, obligated these parties to register their constitutions, the total number of their branches and their members' names, ages and occupations, and to account for their funds, both receipts

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<sup>53</sup>Bernhard Dahm, History of Indonesia in the Twentieth Century, trans. by P.S. Falla, (New York, NY.: Praeger Publishers, 1971), 200.

and expenditures.<sup>54</sup>

The President may have wanted these required details in each party for his campaign to regain West Irian. He wanted to use the parties to mobilize the masses. Nine of the parties the President permitted were supporters of his National Front. Through Presidential Decision Number 13/1960, the functional groups created by the Army were joined to the National Front.<sup>55</sup>

The effort to simplify parties continued but with an emphasis on ideology, in Government Regulation Number 14/1960 of July 12, 1960. The regulation called upon members of the Gotong Royong Parliament (DPRGR) to group themselves into four groups: Nationalist, Islam, Christian and Communist.<sup>56</sup> The simplification reached its next phase on September 23, 1960. Through Presidential Decision Number 5/1960, one-half of the DPRGR seats were allocated to parties, the other half to functional groups.<sup>57</sup> Since the functional group was dominated by the Army and its mass-organizations, the simplification of parties in 1960

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<sup>54</sup>Penerbitan Chusus (Djakarta: Department of Information, number 124, 1961) 14-18.

<sup>55</sup>Imam Pratignyo, Lahirnya GOLKAR (Jakarta: Rajawali, 1982) 71.

<sup>56</sup>Penerbitan Chusus (Djakarta: Department of Information, number 125, 1961).

<sup>57</sup>Penerbitan Chusus (Djakarta: Department of Information number 143, 1962).

resulted in the triumph of the Army over the political parties.

President Sukarno moved toward further ideological simplification in 1963, when he advocated a single ideology, NASAKOM, a combination of three ideologies in Indonesia: Nationalism, Religions, and Communism. According to Sukarno, NASAKOM was a logical continuation of the state's ideology, Pancasila.<sup>58</sup> Although many party leaders argued that such a combination was impossible due to deep philosophical differences between Islam and Communism, Sukarno argued that this combination was plausible.<sup>59</sup> Many Islamic leaders opposed NASAKOM because they felt NASAKOM symbolized the triumph of secular nationalism (the abangan) over Islam (the santri).<sup>60</sup> Sukarno may have intended to leave it vague.

What NASAKOM meant, ten parties or three, or an inspiring spirit for the whole nation, was never spelled-out. Indeed its vagueness was useful to Sukarno for he would play-off interpretation against each other.<sup>61</sup>

The 1959 to 1962 period in Indonesian politics has

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<sup>58</sup>Dahm, History, 192.

<sup>59</sup>Sukarno, Nationalism, Islam and Marxism (Ithaca, NY.: Cornell University Press, 1970), 35-65.

<sup>60</sup> Lev, Transition, 234.

<sup>61</sup>Reeve, Golkar, 316.

been called "the period of stable conflict."<sup>62</sup> None of the three actors in the guided democracy--Sukarno, the Army and the PKI--were able to dominate the others. Guided democracy consisted of minimum agreement among Sukarno, the Army and the PKI.

The political tension between the PKI on one side, and the Islamic parties and the army on the other side, culminated the evening of September 30, 1965, in an attempted in which the PKI was implicated. The Army seized the opportunity, aided by the Islamic groups, to annihilate the PKI and mass organizations affiliated with it. With the removal of President Sukarno on March 11, 1966, the Army was unopposed and in a position to dominate Indonesian politics. Among the four largest parties resulting from the 1955 election, only the NU and PNI survived in the post- 1965 period. These parties became the main target of the New Order government (supported by the Army) prior to the 1971 general election.

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<sup>62</sup>Herbert Feith, "The Dynamics of Guided Democracy," in Ruth McVey, Indonesia (Ithaca, NY.: Cornell University Press, 1963), 325.

### Conclusions

Significant changes in the roles and functions of political parties occurred after independence in 1945. Under parliamentary democracy parties actively competed for popular support, structured the people's demands and participated in the conduct of government. The system approximated the model of Consociational Democracy. However, due to deep cultural distinctions among parties' supporters, and the lack of a party with majority support to emerge from the 1955 elections, the party elites were increasingly unable to cooperate, which brought Indonesia onto the brink of a civil war in 1957. To solve the crisis, President Sukarno announced Martial Law in March 1957. Through this Law, the President intended to realize his idea of a vanguard party because he thought that the continuation of a pluralistic party system would be divisive to Indonesian unity. A vanguard party never became a reality, however. Instead, the President established a National Front based on a functional group representation. The political parties continued to exist, but they had to work under the guidance of the President.

The Martial Law in 1957 also opened the way for the Army to enter politics. With its doctrine on the Dual Functions (Dwi Fungsi), the Army became eligible to

participate in politics. Hence, the political parties faced a new and powerful political contender in Indonesian politics. The involvement of the Army in Indonesian politics helped to establish a more monistic polity in Indonesia. The Army supported Martial Law and also encouraged President Sukarno to suspend parliamentary democracy and replace it with "guided democracy." Under it, only the President (backed by the PKI) and the Army played important roles. Political parties were allowed to exist, but they had to work within the framework of a National Front. Both President Sukarno and the Army sought to control the National Front.<sup>63</sup>

Guided Democracy collapsed in 1965 when an attempted coup gave the Army an opportunity to eliminate the PKI and President Sukarno. The Army no longer faced a meaningful opposition to its idea to eliminate parties' roles in politics. Thus, after 1966 Indonesia began moving toward the development of a single party system.

This chapter, therefore, has provided support for four propositions. Those propositions are:

1. Between 1949 and 1958, the functions of parties were structuring the electorates and conducting government;
2. Between 1949 and 1958, the parties were unable to express and aggregate demands of various groups in Indone-

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<sup>63</sup>Kahin, Nationalism, 657.

sia, which resulted in their ability to govern effectively;

3. After 1958, parties in Indonesia were still involved in structuring voting choices and conducting government, but they were closely controlled by the government;

4. Between 1958 and 1965, the government increasingly intervened to modify and to constrain the functions of parties.

## CHAPTER IV

### THE MODIFICATION OF PARTIES: 1966-1987

The purpose of this chapter is to explain how the political stabilization and economic development policies altered the party system under the New Order. The chapter aims to give the qualitative evidence of the development of a monolithic polity in Indonesia. Proposition number 4(a) and 1 proposed in this study will be argued. Proposition 4(a) is "the development of pro-government partisanship in Indonesia politics began in 1971." Proposition 1 is "the party system in Indonesia has evolved from polarized pluralism in the period immediately following independence to a hegemonic party system in 1970's and 1980's."

#### The New Order and Policies for Political Stabilization: 1966-1970

On August 26, 1966, General Suharto stated that "economic development would not be achieved unless we had political stability."<sup>1</sup> This statement gave a strong indication that the New Order viewed political stability as

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<sup>1</sup>Pemilihan Umum 1971 (Djakarta: Lembaga Pendidikan dan Konsultasi Pers, 1972), 4.



the requisite for economic development.

To achieve economic development under the shield of political stabilization, the New Order incorporated economic technocrats and army officers in government. The technocrats held responsibility for economic growth, and the army officers were responsible for political stability.

To conduct an economic development program, the New Order needed a massive capital. This need has been achieved by inviting foreign and private capitalists to invest in Indonesia, which has made Indonesia's economically dependent on an international liberal economy. Due to the Indonesian experiences in 1950's, foreign and private capitalists request political stability to secure their investment. This gives the Army a good reason to actively participate in politics.

To obtain political stability, the government reinforced the importance of "Five forms of Order," that are political, economic, social, legal, and security."<sup>2</sup> Any interference in one of these elements would be considered a serious threat to political stability. Since the orders incorporated all aspect of social life, they essentially forbid the people to make corrections or to give feed-back

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<sup>2</sup>William Liddle, "Participation and the Political Parties," in Jackson and Pye, Political Power and Communication in Indonesia (Berkeley, CA.: University of California Press, 1978), 94.

to the political system. These orders were carried by four state apparatuses: the State Intelligence Agency (BAKIN),<sup>3</sup> the Operation Commands for the Restoration of Security and Order (KOPKAMTIB),<sup>4</sup> Special Operation (OPSUS)<sup>5</sup> and General Director of Socio-political affairs in the Department of Home Affairs. These institutions work effectively to control political parties' activities, and at the same time to promote GOLKAR as the government's electoral machines.

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<sup>3</sup>BAKIN was to replace the Central Intelligence Board set-up by the PKI in 1966. BAKIN's role was to make intelligence assessments in fields outside those concerned directly with military affairs. Originally, it was particularly active in the Chinese community as well as being alert for signs of communist revival. But it evolved as a key instrument for the army to maintain power. Party candidates in a general election, civil servants wanting promotion, and even students studying abroad needed BAKIN clearance.

<sup>4</sup>KOPKAMTIB was founded in 1967. Its original purpose was to track down the PKI supporters. However, it evolved as the government's main instrument to control party activities and other social dissidents.

<sup>5</sup>The Special Operation is an institution directly responsible to the President. It is called "special" because the army officers can encompass the bureaucratic procedures to meet the Operation's objective. The main tasks of the Operation were: to clean-up the bureaucracy from the influence of political parties; and to make sure that other parties were not in a position to challenge the Army's political machine, the GOLKAR. Due to the student demonstrations in 1974, the Special Operation was dismissed by the President.

Parties as the Main Target of  
Political Stabilization

When the New Order came to power in 1967, the government was confronted with the needs of a popular support and a political stability. These needs were seen as problematic. Based on the 1945 Constitution, the popular support needed by the New Order must be generated through a general election. Article 28 of the Constitution guaranteed the existence of political parties as the means for the Indonesians to express their will. But the New Order felt that political parties were still giving priority to personal and group interests above those of the common people. The government viewed parties with disdain, holding them responsible for the years of political chaos that had ended in economic and social ruin. For these reasons, the New Order tried to deny the involvement of a party in government, and to replace the party with functional group representations.<sup>6</sup>

A parliament decision no. 12/1966 authorized the New Order to simplify parties. The government carried the decision under one condition, the simplification must ensure the continuation of the New Order political domina-

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<sup>6</sup>Julian Boileau, GOLKAR: Functional Group Politics in Indonesia (Jakarta: Yayasan Proklamasi, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1983), 51.

tion. But the government's electoral machine, GOLKAR, founded in October 1964, seemed unprepared for a snap election after the 1965 coup. There were 160 associational groups incorporated to GOLKAR in December 1965, and they became 291 groups in November 1967. But these groups were not cohesive and the leaders were not as popular as party leaders.<sup>7</sup>

Party leaders tried to use political momentum between 1966 and 1967 to regain their grip on politics. They demanded a general election by the end of 1967 with an assumption that the parties could re-organize their traditional regional supporters. The government rejected this because the political circumstances after the 1965 abortive coup were not conducive to conduct a general election. The holding of elections in such circumstances could well have led to a heightened physical conflict. The real reasons for the government, however, were that supporters of former President Sukarno would do too well if the elections were held too quickly,<sup>8</sup> and also the Army intended to incorporate the huge amount of franchises left

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<sup>7</sup>Peranan Sekretariat Bersama Golongan Karya Dalam Pembangunan (Djakarta: SEKBER GOLKAR, 1968), 40.

<sup>8</sup>Harold Crouch, "The Army, the Parties and Elections," *INDONESIA*, no. 1, April 1971 (Ithaca, NY.: Cornell University Press), 178.

by the PKI into the GOLKAR.<sup>9</sup> After a three-year debate in the provisional parliament, a compromise was reached to conduct an election on July 5, 1969, but rescheduled on July 3, 1971.

Based on the Presidential edict no. 13/1960, there would be nine political parties contesting the 1971 election. One of them, the PKI was ousted from politics in 1966. As the result, there were eight parties recognized as the contenders in the 1971 election. Those were PNI, NU, PSII, PARKINDO, KATHOLIK, PERTI, MURBA, and IPKI. The New Order viewed the composition of the contenders was unbalanced, because MASYUMI, the strongest Muslim party with firm support in Sumatra, was dismissed by President Sukarno in 1960. The government rehabilitated MASYUMI under a new name, the Indonesian Muslim Party (PARMUSI) in 1968. To fill the spot left by the PKI, the government placed the GOLKAR as another contestant. Hence, there were ten political contenders in the 1971 election.

Among four big parties produced in the 1955 election, only the PNI and the NU survived after the 1965 coup. The government recognized the strength of the PNI in the

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<sup>9</sup>Harold Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia (Ithaca, NY.: Cornell University Press, 1978), 264. After GOLKAR national convention in October 1988, the army admitted that several former communist activists had reached top positions in GOLKAR's leadership. TEMPO, 12 November 1988, 22-25; 26 November 1988, 24.

bureaucracy; and the NU's strongest support among the villagers. Between these parties, the government targeted the PNI for two reasons. One is the intention of the New Order to make effective bureaucracy. Another reason is because of the importance of PNI as the natural vehicle of the abangan stream. The other leading abangan party, PKI, was ousted. Hence, if the Army could control PNI, theoretically they could control the abangan electorates.

NU received less pressure than PNI for two reasons. One, the Army viewed the flexibility of NU leaders to adapt to a changing situation as not endangering the New Order's position. A few months before Sukarno was ousted from his Presidency, the NU leaders officially supported him. As the Army position was getting stronger, the NU leaders condemned Sukarno and joined the New Order. Another reason is that the government succeeded in building another santri party, PARMUSI, whose leaders were willing to cooperate with the Army. At least for the 1971 election, the government had PARMUSI to challenge NU for santri supporters.

To secure the GOLKAR to win the election, the government used two methods to intervene in the party's life. First, the government cleaned-up the bureaucracy from the influence of the PNI. The precedent for this was Presidential Regulation no. 2/1959 which prohibited government

employees of F grade or higher from being affiliated with parties. Government employees under the Ministry of Internal Affairs were to give up their party loyalty and join the Union of Home Affairs Employee (SSKDN), later becoming the Home Government Functional Staff corps (KOKARMENDAGRI) in 1970. After the 1971 election, KOKARMENDAGRI was expanded to include all civil servants and was renamed the Corps of Civil Servants of the Indonesian Republic (KORPRI). "Civil servants in all departments were denied the right to engage in political activity (read: party activity) and were required to show "monoloyalty" to the government (read: GOLKAR).<sup>10</sup> All government employees were automatically members of KORPRI, an organization affiliated with GOLKAR.<sup>11</sup>

Secondly, the parties entitled to hold election meetings were to notify the authorities concerned three days before such a meeting is due, and the campaign details were to be written and submitted first to the authorities in question. Party newspapers were prohibited to be circulated below district level. However, GOLKAR's newspaper, Suara Karya, had been freely distributed at village

<sup>10</sup>Donald Emmerson, "The Bureaucracy in Political Context: Weakness and Strength," in Jackson and Pye, ed., Political Power, 106-107 passim.

<sup>11</sup>Boileau, GOLKAR, 53; Crouch, Army and Politics, 267.

level.<sup>12</sup> These restrictions had given the parties a lack of issues to contest GOLKAR. The parties were practically lost before the election was actually conducted.

In addition to the depoliticization efforts,<sup>13</sup> the government made several violations against laws. Two most peculiar violations were against the law no. 15/1960 and the government's decision no. Se-01/Sekkab/41/71.

Article 18 of Law no. 15/1960 forbid political organizations to use Indonesia's National Coat of arms, flag, and the like as its electoral emblem, because the use of such symbols would automatically generate support from the people. However, the GOLKAR adopted an electoral emblem containing two of the five symbols of Pancasila.

In fact, GOLKAR emblem was clearly a selective combination of HANKAM [department of defence] and Home Affairs Department symbols. The electorate was thus given the distinct impression that GOLKAR was the official electoral contender, to be accepted by all

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<sup>12</sup>TEMPO, 10 July 1971, 7; Oey Hong Lee, "Indonesian Freedom of the Press and the 1971 Elections," in Oey Hong Lee, ed., Indonesia After the 1971 Elections (Kuala Lumpur: Hull Monograph on Southeast Asia, no. 5, Oxford University Press, 1974), 31-34.

<sup>13</sup> Depoliticization is associated with official and unofficial efforts to revise the dominant style of authority, by strengthening functional groups and institutions rather than the formal structures of government. Samuel Huntington, "Social and Institutional Dynamics of One Party System," in Huntington and Moore, Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society (New York, NY.: Basic Books Inc., 1970), 515.



Indonesian citizens.<sup>14</sup>

As early as 1966, General Nasution, the formulator of the Army Dual Function doctrine, called for the neutralization of the Army position vis-a-vis competitors in the general election. In his reply, President Suharto said that "ABRI [the Army] as the apparatus of national defence stands above all political groups. But ABRI as a functional group must choose a trusted partner, a partner who is really working for Pancasila."<sup>15</sup> Although it was not explicitly mentioned, what the President meant by "a trusted partner" was the GOLKAR.

Another government violation was on the government's decision no. Se-01/Sekkab/41/71 on May 1, 1971, which forbid Ministers to campaign with the state's expenses. This decision was to anticipate a number of ministers who covered their campaign activities with duty tour. Among them were the GOLKAR ministers were those who frequently violated the law. Eleven ministers typically used their department's budget for their campaign activities; six of them were GOLKAR leaders, and the other five were from NU,

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<sup>14</sup>Ibid., 16.

<sup>15</sup>Salim Said, "The Political Role of the Indonesian Army: Past, Present, and Future," Southeast Asia Journal of Political Science, vol. XV, no. 1, Singapore, 1987, 30; TEMPO, 23 March 1987.

PSII, KATHOLIK, PARMUSI and PNI.<sup>16</sup>

The Making of Political Paths for GOLKAR  
to Dominate Indonesian Politics

Prior to the 1971 election, Admiral Sudomo, the Commander of KOPKAMTIB, announced four issue areas which the party should not discuss. They were known as "the four don't's:" do not intimidate your opponents, do not offend the dignity of the government and its officials, do not disrupt national unity, and do not criticize the policies of the government."<sup>17</sup> To prevent the violation of these "don'ts," campaign materials, any type of publication, public discussion, and even sermons in Friday praying<sup>18</sup> needed the KOPKAMTIB approval. In conjunction with the KOPKAMTIB operation, the BAKIN spied the people's activities especially candidates for public offices. Party candidates in a general election, civil servants wanting promotion, and even students studying abroad needed BAKIN

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<sup>16</sup>TEMPO, 8 May 1971, 5.

<sup>17</sup>David Jenkins, Suharto and His Generals: Indonesian Military Politics 1975-1983 (Ithaca, NY.: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, monograph series, 1984), 42.

<sup>18</sup>Every Friday noon, the Moslems are obligated to perform mass prayer in mosques, similar to Christians going to church every Sunday. Before they pray, the priest (the Imam) gives a sermon which sometimes touches on political issues.

clearance.

The BAKIN and the KOPKAMTIB operations were to keep conflict alive within political parties, so the parties could not consolidate power to challenge the government. The operations included the spreading of controversial issues during a party national congress, such as the promotion of unpopular leaders for a party leadership. Although the congress might elected other leaders, the BAKIN would make a direct intervention to ensure that the elected leaders have passed the Army screening test. For example, in the PNI congress in 1968, the former Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo was the strongest candidate to become chairman. The BAKIN refused Ali because he had a close relationship with former President Sukarno. Instead, the BAKIN insisted that the congress elect Osa Maliki for he was willing to cooperate with the Army.<sup>19</sup>

The government was also promoting the rebirth of an Islamic party banned in 1960 by former President Sukarno, MASYUMI, and forcing the party supporters to elect the leadership approved by the BAKIN. The MASYUMI was strong in Sumatra and ranked second in the 1955 election. It was considered by the government as the natural channel of political demands for the non-Javanese Muslim. The govern-

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<sup>19</sup>For detail discussion in the election of Osa Maliki as the chairman of PNI, see Nazaruddin Sjamsuddin, PNI dan Kepolitikannya (Jakarta: Rajawali Press, 1984).

ment would not make the outer island underrepresented or misrepresented, but it also tried to avoid the re-emergence of former MASYUMI leaders due to their involvement in the PRRI rebellion. To elude the bad image of the MASYUMI, the government agreed to the foundation of the Indonesian Moslem Party (PARMUSI) but the leadership had to be approved by the BAKIN.<sup>20</sup>

In the election of PARMUSI leadership, The Army pretends in a neutral position when Jailani Naro, the Army's candidate, coup Djarnawi, the Chairman of PARMUSI in 1971. Djarnawi was the elected Chairman in the PARMUSI congress in 1970, but the government was reluctant to accept Djarnawi for he was "too popular" among the Moslems. In contrast, Naro was not a popular leader but he was loyal to the Army.

The government used the Army structure to mobilize the vote for GOLKAR, the government's electoral machine. Prior to the 1971 election, the government set up goals of 131 seats (36 percent of the elected seats) in parliament and made the GOLKAR one of the big three parties in the 1971 election. To achieve these goals, the government instructed the provincial and the district governments to

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<sup>20</sup>Crouch, "The Army," 188. For detailed discussion on the army's involvement in PARMUSI, see Kent Ward, The Foundation of Partai Muslimin Indonesia (Ithaca, NY.: Cornell University Press, Interim report series, 1970).

mobilize at least 30 percent of the local franchises to vote GOLKAR.<sup>21</sup> Also, through the BAKIN and the KOPKAMTIB operations, the government was trying to keep "pseudo" conflicts existing in the society, so the Army had reasons to maintain their appearance as a stabilizer in politics. For this reason, General Sumitro, the Commander of KOPKAMTIB, claimed, "If you had left it to GOLKAR in 1971, without any interference by ABRI [the Army], the Muslim parties would have won [the election]."<sup>22</sup>

The purpose of the government's intervention depicted above was to create an unfavorable situation for parties so that they could not pay attention and to challenge the government. In addition, the government designed a general election law that was guaranteed to produce a political domination for the GOLKAR.

#### The Concession of the 1971 Election Law

In the preparation for the 1971 election, the New Order proposed an election law that guaranteed the GOLKAR domination.<sup>23</sup> The proposal was based on the four prin-

<sup>21</sup>Ulf Surdhausen, The Road to Power (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1982) 265.

<sup>22</sup>Jenkins, Suharto and His Generals, 37.

<sup>23</sup>Masashi Nishihara, GOLKAR and the Indonesian Elections of 1971 (Ithaca, NY.: Cornell University Press, 1972), 6-7. In his study, Rae discovered that the election

principles of general election produced by the Army seminar in 1966. First, an election and its results were not really major goals but just a means for achieving greater stability in all fields. Second, the election should be based on single member constituency with the condition that every candidate had lived for at least one year in the district in which he was contesting. Third, to be recognized, a party had to have at least 1.5 million members, as well as branches in at least half of the 25 provinces and in at least half of the more than 200 districts. Fourth, to remain in existence after the election, a party would need to win at least two percent of the seats in the parliament. Then, parties must reorganize themselves in the form of three groups: nationalist, religious and socialist Pancasila. The government would let the parties decide the form of reorganization, whether the organization takes the form of a confederation, federation or fusion.<sup>24</sup>

These principles clearly provided the path for the new political structure in Indonesia. The principles not

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has significantly determined the shape of a political system. The governing party will try to make an election law that guaranteed the party to win the election. In most cases, the result of the election increases the vote for the governing party which indicated the formation of pro-government partisanship. Douglas Rae, The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws (New Haven, CT.: Yale University Press, 1971).

<sup>24</sup>Crouch, "The Army," 180.

only eliminate the number of parties, but also force the parties to form a new structure after the general election. Within the new structure, the parties will be subjected to government control to ensure political stability. The Army claimed these principles as the National Consensus because several civilian politicians and scientists were involved in the seminar.

To support the Army principles, the government tried to delay a general election in order to make GOLKAR strong enough to compete with parties. The election date was set for July 5, 1969, but postponed until July 3, 1971, because the parliament had not ratified the election law. The government intentionally make discussion on the law difficult by espousing ideas unacceptable to the parties. The two most controversial ideas were on the electoral system and the number of Presidential appointees in the parliament.

On the first controversial issue, the electoral system, the New Order was in favor of the district system, but parties desired the proportional representation. In the district system, people would elect their representatives directly; while in a proportional representation system they elected people from a list designed by a political party. The army argued that the district system ensured that every segment of Indonesian society would be

represented. If the candidate list is made by the party, the elected persons might represent a minority of the total vote cast in the district. In reply, the parties argued that the cultural orientation of the society might have made the parliament unbalanced. The district system would give a similar number of representatives between the majority Javanese and the other minor ethnic groups.

After two years' debate in the parliament, the New Order agreed on the proportional representation system. One of the reasons was the government urgently needed the political legitimacy to seek international financial support to begin an economic development program. The other reasons were that the government had made the GOLKAR strong enough to compete with parties, and the continuous conflict within the parties had made them unprepared for a general election.

The government forced the parties to accept two conditions for the implementation of a proportional representation system: each district in Indonesia obtains at least one seat in DPR and the number of representatives for each constituency is at least equal to the number of districts in the constituencies concerned. These conditions indicated that, similar to the 1955 election, the electoral system would be in the combination of the proportional representation and the district systems. The



combination seems appropriate for Indonesia because every region is sure to have at least one representative in the parliament.

The second controversial issue was the presidential appointees in the parliament. The proposal forbid active army personnel from competing in an election; instead it guaranteed the army representation in the parliament to be appointed by the President. One hundred of 360 seats in the parliament were reserved for the Army. The other 260 seats were contested by nine parties and one GOLKAR. Since the GOLKAR was intended to function as the political machine for the Army, the proposal is clearly designed for the Army domination.

The parties strongly opposed the proposal because the appointed membership in the parliament would reduce the democratic principles. Moreover, as shown in Table 10, the appointed membership was the continuation of political practice during the Dutch era in the 1900's. The government's proposal on the election law could be interpreted as a violation to the New Order's promise to implement the 1945 Constitution as it is. The problem is article 2 of the Constitution which states that the parliament shall consist of delegates from regional territories and functional groups in accordance with statutory regulations. Article 5 indicates that the regulations may come from the

President. Although article 20 requires the parliamentary approval for the regulations, the New Order seemed to have no difficulty since most (if not all) party leaders were loyalists to the government.

To defend the point about the Army appointees, the New Order argued that the presence of the Army representatives was in accordance with the national consensus to accept the Army's Dual Functions. But who would guarantee the Army neutrality, i.e., would the Army not support any parties? More precisely, how can the people differentiate between the GOLKAR representatives and the Army's?

TABLE 10  
THE INDONESIAN PARLIAMENTS 1918 - 1977

Institutions	Period	Elected		Appointed		Total
		Total	%	Total	%	
Volksraad	1918 - 1942	37	61.7	23	38.3	60
KNIP	1945 - 1949	0	0	536	100	536
DPR-RIS	1949 - 1950	0	0	146	100	146
DPRS	1950 - 1955	0	0	235	100	235
DPR	1955 - 1959	257	100	0	0	257
DPRGR	1960 - 1965	0	0	283	100	283
DPR	1965 - 1971	0	0	414	100	414
DPR (Proposal)	1971 - 1977	360	78.3	100	21.7	460

Sources: For 1918 to 1950, George McT. Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia (Ithaca, NY.: Cornell University Press, 1952), 39. For 1950 to 1977, Miriam Budiardjo, Dasar-dasar Ilmu Politik (Jakarta: Gramedia, 1977), 194-195.

On December 17, 1969, the proposal was ratified by the parliament as law no. 15/1969. The law stated that the election shall be conducted on four principles. Those are:

**General:** In principle all citizens, fulfilling the minimum requirements concerning age, namely having reached the age of 17 years, or having been married, are qualified to vote in the elections, and those who have reached the age of 21 years will have the right to be elected.

**Direct:** The voters have the right to cast their votes directly according to their conviction without intermediary and without stages.

**Free:** Every citizen qualified to vote is ensured of his personal safety in casting his vote according to his conviction, free from influence, pressure or oppression from whatever side or by whatever means.

**Secret:** The voters are guaranteed by law that nobody should know by whatever way, which and who they elect (secret balloting).<sup>25</sup>

To be appointed as a parliamentarian, one must have 100,000 votes for national, 20,000 votes for provincial, and 10,000 votes for district parliaments. A summing-up principle is used. Votes gained at one district would be added with other districts to constitute the result of a province; then this would be added with other provinces to constitute the result at the national level. This summing-up mechanism is potentially biased. A party loss in one district could win at the provincial level as long as the

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<sup>25</sup>Law no. 15 of 1969, appendix I section 3.

party could win in other more populated districts in the same province. Similarly, a party losing in a province could win at the national level. Hence, a discussion on the strength of political parties at the national level would not give an appropriate description of political dynamics in Indonesia.

The above principles were used in four general elections, i.e., in 1971, 1977, 1982 and 1987. In the 1971, 1977 and 1982 elections, the membership of the national parliament was 460, while at the provincial and the district levels there were seventy-five and forty representatives respectively. Due to the increasing number of the Indonesian population, in the 1987 election, the number of the national parliament representatives was 500, and for the provincial and the districts parliaments there were 100, and 50 representatives, respectively.

#### The 1971 Election and Its Aftermath

After sixteen years and two times delayed, the 1971 election was conducted on July 3, 1971, based on election law no. 15/1969. Table 11 demonstrates the strength of GOLKAR to dominate Indonesian politics after the 1971 election.

As the result of a series of governmental interventions prior to the 1971 election, at the national level the

GOLKAR generated 62.80 percent of the vote, way above the accumulated vote generated by the other nine parties. The GOLKAR cleaned-up a majority in twenty-five provinces with an average of 68.10 percent. However, among the 267 districts, as shown in Table 11, the PPP won in twenty-six and the PDI won in eleven districts.<sup>26</sup> Table 11 indicates that the government failed to gain support in the parties' core areas such as the santri parties (the PPP) in Sumatra and the abangan parties (the PDI) in East Nusa Tenggara.

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<sup>26</sup>In the 1971 election the PPP and the PDI were not actually in existence. These parties were created based on the composition of the PPP and the PDI in the preceding elections to make this study comparable.

TABLE 11  
 THE NUMBER OF DISTRICTS DOMINATED BY  
 POLITICAL PARTIES AND GOLKAR  
 IN THE 1971 ELECTION

Province	PPP	GOLKAR	PDI
Aceh	3	6	0
N. Sumatra	0	17	0
W. Sumatra	2	12	0
Riau	0	6	0
S. Sumatra	0	10	0
Jambi	0	6	0
Bengkulu	0	4	0
Lampung	0	4	0
W. Java	0	24	0
Jakarta	0	5	0
C. Java	4	27	4
Yogyakarta	0	5	0
E. Java	12	25	0
W. Kalimantan	0	7	0
C. Kalimantan	0	6	0
S. Kalimantan	2	8	0
E. Kalimantan	0	6	0
N. Sulawesi	2	4	0
C. Sulawesi	0	4	0
SE. Sulawesi	0	4	0
S. Sulawesi	0	23	0
Bali	0	8	0
W. Nusa Teng.	0	6	0
E. Nusa Teng.	0	6	6
Maluku	0	3	1

Source: Calculated from the General Election Institute, Jakarta, 1972.

The significance of the 1971 election was that through GOLKAR, the Army had entered into the central area of parliamentary politics. The Army had created a situation in which a one-party system could emerge because the GOLKAR attracted 62.80 percent of the total valid vote, NU 18.67 percent, PNI 6.94 percent, and PARMUSI 5.36 percent. The balance, 6.21 percent, was divided among the remaining six parties. Although General Ali Moertopo, a GOLKAR leader, claimed that "GOLKAR wanted to govern, not to dominate politics,"<sup>27</sup> political maneuvers prior to the 1971 election clearly indicated the GOLKAR's intention to dominate politics. Those maneuvers had conditioned electorates to support GOLKAR not only in 1971 but also in the preceding elections.

#### Repetition and Consolidation: 1977-1981

##### The 1977 Election

The result of the 1971 election convinced the government that the Islamic parties were potentially endangered by the GOLKAR domination, especially the NU which gained 18.67 percent of the vote in 1971 or an increase of 0.27 percent from the 1955 election. In contrast, the PNI, the most powerful abangan party, only gained 6.94 percent of

<sup>27</sup>TEMPO, 29 May 1971, 6.



the vote or a decrease of 15.36 percent from the 1955 election.

To avoid the Islamic potentiality of challenge to the GOLKAR in the preceding elections, immediately after the 1971 election the government introduced the "floating mass" principle. Originally, the floating mass concept allowed voters to vote for different parties in different elections, free from their personal, psychological predisposition. The concept prohibited villagers from getting involved in party activities. But, due to the KOPKAMTIB and the BAKIN operations, and the army structural commands, the floating mass concept can be perfectly understood as a means to prohibit the parties' operation and to mobilize villagers to vote for GOLKAR, which never formally admitted to being a political party.

Prior to the 1977 election, the government made a serious attempt to restructure the party system by forcing the parties to fuse into two composite parties. The process of party fusion began in 1970 when the parliamentarians started to regroup into the nationalist and the spiritual groups. The nationalist group, founded on March 4, 1970, was composed of PNI, MURBA, PARKINDO, KATHOLIK, and IPKI. The spiritual group, founded on March 14, 1970, was composed of NU, PARMUSI, PSII, and PERTI. After three years of discussion and heavy political coercion from the

government, the nationalist group became the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI) on January 10, 1973; and the spiritual group became the Unity Development Party (PPP), also known as the Islamic party, on February 13, 1973. This, according to the government, is in conjunction with the national consensus in 1966 to restore the party system. Party fusion in 1973 was promulgated as law no. 3/1975. Based on this law, there would be two composite parties, i.e., PPP and PDI, and one functional group, i.e., GOLKAR, to compete in the 1977 election.

Due to the different nature of PDI and PPP elements, the party fusion has reduced the arena of conflict but intensified the frequencies of conflict among parties.<sup>28</sup> The reduction of the number of parties may lessen the lines of conflict; however it limits the opportunity of parties to participate in government. In the formulae of the election depicted earlier, each party is guaranteed to have at least one representative in the parliament. The party fusion in 1973 created a bottle-neck through which elements of the composite parties had to struggle to promote candidates. As a result, conflict was likely to occur in the composite parties, i.e., the PPP and the PDI. A continuous

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<sup>28</sup>Manuel Kaisiepo, "The Dilemma of the Partai Demokrasi Indonesia," and Fachry Ali and Iqbal A. Saimima, "The Declines of Aliran in the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan," PRISMA, no. 25, Jakarta, June 1982, 16-31 and 32-54.

conflict within these parties would give a reason for the Army to intervene in the PPP and the PDI affairs.

The PDI was severely damaged because elements of the composite party have a lack of similar cultural orientation. For example, albeit the PNI was known as the abangan party, the members considered themselves as Muslim. Obviously they could not accept the chairman of the PDI as a former member of the PARKINDO or the KATHOLIK.

A slightly different situation can be observed in the PPP. In comparison to the PDI, the PPP is more cohesive, because elements of this composite party have a common ground, i.e., Islam as a religion. At least until the end of the 1977 election, it was relatively difficult for the Army to intervene in the PPP. As a result, as shown by Table 12, the PPP was able to increase its vote in fourteen provinces, while the Golkar decreased in fourteen provinces. Twelve of the fourteen provinces where the GOLKAR vote decreased were the provinces where the PPP increased its vote.

TABLE 12

THE COMPARISON OF PARTIES' PERFORMANCE  
BETWEEN THE 1971 AND 1977 ELECTIONS  
(in percentage at provincial level)

Province	PPP	GOLKAR	PDI
Aceh	+ 3.60	-11.99	+ 8.39
N. Sumatra	+ 4.26	-10.05	+ 5.79
W. Sumatra	- 5.71	- 4.14	+ 9.85
Riau	+ 9.43	-13.40	+ 3.97
S. Sumatra	+ 6.29	-12.80	+ 6.51
Jambi	+ 4.27	- 4.72	+ 0.45
Bengkulu	+ 4.22	- 6.24	+ 2.02
Lampung	+ 6.55	- 9.98	+ 3.43
W. Java	+ 6.85	- 9.85	+ 3.00
Jakarta	+ 1.16	-12.10	- 5.29
C. Java	- 4.53	+ 2.30	+ 2.23
Yogyakarta	- 0.71	-15.04	+15.75
E. Java	- 6.00	+ 3.93	+ 2.07
W. Kalimantan	+ 1.40	+ 2.22	- 3.62
C. Kalimantan	+ 8.16	-11.55	+ 3.39
S. Kalimantan	+ 8.53	-15.43	+ 6.90
E. Kalimantan	+ 0.28	+ 2.19	- 2.47
N. Sulawesi	- 6.20	+12.16	- 5.96
C. Sulawesi	- 0.99	+ 2.49	- 1.50
SE. Sulawesi	- 2.70	+ 3.47	- 1.04
S. Sulawesi	- 5.37	+ 6.82	- 1.45
Bali	- 0.80	+ 2.56	- 2.22
W. Nusa Teng.	+ 5.96	-12.33	+ 6.37
E. Nusa Teng.	- 1.25	+28.80	-27.55
Maluku	- 6.90	+24.13	-17.23
Irian Jaya	0.00	0.00	0.00

Source: Calculated from the results of the 1971 and 1977 elections. Published by Department of Home Affairs.

Table 12 indicates a zero-sum game between the PPP and the GOLKAR, that is, when the PPP vote increased the GOLKAR vote decreased and vice versa. The electorates seemed to view the PPP as an alternative for the GOLKAR. The party opposed several governmental policies including the proposal on a Marriage Bill, and the bill on Political Party and Mass Organization. This put the PPP in direct confrontation with the government. The PPP, therefore, became the primary target for governmental intervention after the 1977 election.

Table 13 shows the performance of the three parties in the election conducted on May 2, 1977. The voting turnout was 90.93 percent, a decline of 3.09 percent from the 1971 election. At a national level, GOLKAR gained a 62.11 percent vote, a reduction of 0.69 percent in the 1971 election. Despite the fact that the vote for GOLKAR was reduced in fourteen provinces, the party was able to maintain its domination in twenty-two of twenty-six provinces with an average of a 64.64 percent vote. The PPP was victorious in Aceh, South Sumatra, Jakarta, and South Kalimantan, while the PDI could not assume a majority in any of those provinces. From 277 districts, GOLKAR won in 247 districts, and lost in thirty-five districts.

TABLE 13  
THE NUMBER OF DISTRICTS DOMINATED BY  
POLITICAL PARTIES AND GOLKAR  
IN THE 1977 ELECTION

Province	PPP	GOLKAR	PDI
Aceh	7	3	0
N. Sumatra	0	17	0
W. Sumatra	2	12	0
Riau	0	6	0
S. Sumatra	4	6	0
Jambi	0	6	0
Bengkulu	0	4	0
Lampung	1	3	0
W. Java	1	23	0
Jakarta	0	5	0
C. Java	4	31	0
Yogyakarta	0	5	0
E. Java	8	29	0
W. Kalimantan	0	7	0
C. Kalimantan	0	6	0
S. Kalimantan	5	5	0
E. Kalimantan	1	5	0
N. Sulawesi	1	5	0
C. Sulawesi	0	4	0
SE. Sulawesi	0	4	0
S. Sulawesi	0	23	0
Bali	0	8	0
W. Nusa Teng.	1	5	0
E. Nusa Teng.	0	12	0
Maluku	0	4	0
Irian Jaya	0	9	0

Source: Calculated from General Election Institute, Jakarta, 1978.

Note: PPP and GOLKAR tied in one district in Central Java.

Table 13 also indicates that the GOLKAR could have easily abolished the domination of the PDI in the eastern region of Indonesia, especially in the East Nusa Tenggara province. But the GOLKAR could not challenge the domination of the PPP in the stronghold areas of the Islamic parties, especially in Aceh province. The result of the 1977 election convinced the government that the area of conflict was not between the nationalists, the religious people, or the socialist-Pancasila as proposed by the Army in 1966. Rather, the 1977 election showed a continuous struggle between the santri or the Islamic party versus the abangan party.

In fact, since 1978 to date, the government insisted that the Indonesians attend a special course on the Directives for the Realization and Implementation of Pancasila, known as the P4 course. This course was designed to provide "ideological justification" for the government's policy. About two million civil servants were obligated to attend this course. Then, the professionals, the students, and the masses were urged to attend the P4 course. By forcing the people to have a similar interpretation of Pancasila, the government was hoping to reduce the importance of other ideologies, especially Islam, for psychological affiliation of the electorates. Hence, the P4 course also served as the government's strategy to

condition the electorates to support GOLKAR in the 1982 election.<sup>29</sup>

#### The 1982 Election

The 1982 election was conducted on May 4, 1982. The voting turn-out was 91.52 percent, a decline of 0.59 percent from the 1977 election, or 2.50 percent from the 1971 election. The GOLKAR continuously dominated Indonesian politics with 63.74 percent vote at the national level, an increase of 1.63 percent vote from the 1977 election, or 0.94 percent from the 1971 election.

In comparison to Tables 12 and 13, Tables 14 and 15 indicate that the GOLKAR performed better in the 1982 than in the 1977 elections.

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<sup>29</sup>Michael Morfit, "Pancasila: The Indonesian State Ideology According to the New Order Government," Asian Survey, vol. XXI, no. 8, August 1981, 839-841 passim, 849.



TABLE 14  
 THE COMPARISON OF PARTIES' PERFORMANCE  
 BETWEEN THE 1977 AND 1982 ELECTIONS  
 (in percentage, at provincial level)

Province	PPP	GOLKAR	PDI
Aceh	+ 6.60	+ 2.25	- 8.85
N. Sumatra	+ 0.36	+12.46	-12.82
W. Sumatra	+ 9.95	+ 1.33	-11.28
Riau	- 4.20	+ 8.37	- 4.17
S. Sumatra	- 8.29	+15.30	- 7.01
Jambi	- 0.87	+ 1.31	- 0.44
Bengkulu	+ 6.48	- 5.83	- 0.65
Lampung	+ 1.42	- 2.49	+ 1.07
W. Java	- 0.17	- 2.94	+ 2.77
Jakarta	+ 0.94	+10.42	+ 4.87
C. Java	+ 3.53	+ 7.85	-11.38
Yogyakarta	+ 2.39	+ 3.97	- 6.36
E. Java	+ 3.25	- 2.06	- 1.19
W. Kalimantan	+ 0.59	+ 2.11	- 2.70
C. Kalimantan	-10.04	+14.36	- 4.32
S. Kalimantan	- 2.82	+ 9.85	- 7.03
E. Kalimantan	+ 1.45	+ 4.34	- 5.79
N. Sulawesi	- 9.95	+14.25	- 4.30
C. Sulawesi	- 2.46	+ 1.99	+ 0.47
SE. Sulawesi	- 0.52	+ 0.84	- 0.32
S. Sulawesi	- 3.19	+ 4.00	- 0.81
Bali	+ 0.46	+ 2.98	- 2.98
W. Nusa Teng	- 2.55	+11.12	- 8.57
E. Nusa Teng	- 0.59	+ 6.07	- 5.48
Maluku	+ 0.93	+ 3.38	- 4.31
Irian Jaya	- 0.83	+ 5.63	- 4.80

Source: Calculated from the results of 1977, 1982 elections. Published by Department of Home Affairs.

Table 14 shows that in the 1982 election the GOLKAR successfully recovered its vote lost in ten out of fourteen provinces in the 1977 election. Despite the efforts made by the government prior to the 1982 election to target the PPP, apparently the effort victimized the PDI. Based on Tables 13 and 14, the PDI was able to increase its vote in fifteen provinces in the 1977 election, but decreased in twenty provinces in the 1982 election. The PPP decreased its vote in eleven and thirteen provinces in the 1977 and 1982 elections respectively.

As shown in Table 15, the GOLKAR won in twenty-five of twenty-seven provinces with an average vote of 72.64 percent, an increase of eight percent from the 1982 election. The only province the GOLKAR lost was in Aceh, the strongest area of santri support.

The GOLKAR was victorious in 233 of 267 districts. It lost in twenty-eight districts, and tied with the PPP in sixteen districts. Despite the government's effort to reduce the importance of Islamic teachings through the P4 course, the result of the 1982 election indicates that the santri stream has stronger party attachments than the abangan stream, because the abangan party was practically out of the political arena since the 1977 election.

TABLE 15  
THE NUMBER OF DISTRICTS DOMINATED BY  
POLITICAL PARTIES AND GOLKAR  
IN THE 1982 ELECTION

Province	PPP	GOLKAR	PDI
Aceh	7	3	0
N. Sumatra	0	17	0
W. Sumatra	2	12	0
Riau	0	6	0
S. Sumatra	2	8	0
Jambi	0	6	0
Bengkulu	0	4	0
Lampung	0	4	0
W. Java	0	24	0
Jakarta	1	4	0
C. Java	3	31	0
Yogyakarta	0	5	0
E. Java	10	27	0
W. Kalimantan	0	7	0
C. Kalimantan	0	6	0
S. Kalimantan	1	9	0
E. Kalimantan	0	6	0
N. Sulawesi	0	6	0
C. Sulawesi	0	4	0
SE. Sulawesi	0	4	0
S. Sulawesi	0	23	0
Bali	0	8	0
W. Nusa Teng.	0	6	0
E. Nusa Teng.	0	12	0
Maluku	0	4	0
Irian Jaya	0	9	0
E. Timor	0	13	0

Source: Calculated from General Election Institute, Jakarta, 1982.

Note: PPP and GOLKAR tied in one district in Central Java.

However, despite the fact that the GOLKAR has never declared itself as an abangan party, there is reason to believe that the GOLKAR is the representative of this stream. The GOLKAR firmly supported the introduction of a new religion called aliran kepercayaan, in addition to the five major religions formally acknowledged in Indonesia, i.e., Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism, Hinduism, and Buddhism. This new religion has its origins in the Javanese-Hinduism tradition, which is the basis of the abangan stream.

The importance of the 1982 election was that the GOLKAR had successfully recovered the vote deficit in the 1977 election. Although the GOLKAR domination in the parliament remained strong since 1971, the result of the 1982 election gave the government a stronger position to make other interferences in the New Order preparations for the 1987 election. In addition to the GOLKAR domination, and due to the screening of all party candidates by BAKIN prior to an election, the parliament is filled with the loyalists. As a result, the executive could easily steer the parliament to issue laws which make the PPP and the PDI unable to perform their functions.

On February 19, 1985, law no. 3/1985 on "The Political Party and Mass Organizations" was ratified by the parliament. There are two important features in this law.

First, the government successfully forced parties to agree on Pancasila as the sole ideology of the party and mass organization in Indonesia. Second, the law stipulates that the mass organizations shall be free from party, except the GOLKAR which formally never considers itself as a party. All mass organizations have been encouraged to join the GOLKAR.

These two features effectively weed-out party support. Parties have lost their identities because other ideologies were denied by the New Order. Moreover, since their mass organizations have been detached, the parties do not have effective channels to communicate with the people. Hence, as in the preceding elections, prior to the 1987 election, parties are already in a no win situation.

#### The 1987 Election

The emasculation of the party reached its peak in 1985. In article 2(1) of the law number 3 of 1985, the government forced all political groups to accept Pancasila as the single ideology. This law denied Islam and Nationalism as the two prominent ideologies in Indonesia. As a result, the PPP and PDI have totally lost their identities as Islamic and Nationalist parties respectively.

The 1987 election was conducted on April 23, 1987, based on laws no. 1/1985 and no. 2/1985. Article 18 of law

no. 1/1985 stated that political organizations in the 1987 election should use symbols related to Pancasila. This article confused the people, because in the 1971 elections parties were prohibited from using any symbols in the Pancasila. Eventually, the New Order viewed the effectiveness of the PPP symbol, Kaabah,<sup>30</sup> to generate support among the Muslims. They insisted PPP leaders change the party's symbol to the less popular one, the star.

Tables 12, 13, 14 and 15 show that the PPP was continuously ceasing the GOLKAR in the 1971, 1977 and 1982 elections. The Army recognized that the strongest PPP supporter was the NU. Such data to show the NU contribution to the PPP vote in the previous elections are not available. However, we may refer to the vote gained by the PPP in the 1987 election after the NU formally declared itself as a mass organization, thus no longer affiliated with the PPP.

The government's endeavour to detach the NU from its affiliation to the PPP was begun shortly after the 1982 election. Several indirect government interventions were used, such as the development of new Islamic schools

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<sup>30</sup>Kaabah is the holy house in Mekkah, in the Arab Saudi. This holy house is used as a direction toward which all Muslims in the world should face while praying. The use of Kaabah as the PPP symbol was very effective because any Muslim has a psychological barrier against choosing Kaabah.

(pesantren) and the subsidy to rehabilitate some pesantrens. A more direct government intervention was the KOPKAMTIB operation to place its own men as the NU leaders in the NU National Congress in December, 1984. The election of Abdurachman Wachid as the NU Chairman was not only because he is the grandson of Hasyim Asyari, the founder of the NU, but also because Abdurachman is willing to cooperate with the Army.

Having placed the man of their selection, the KOPKAMTIB could easily persuade the NU decision to go back to the NU's 1926 spirit as a social organization. With its new status, the NU members were not obligated to vote for the PPP in the 1987 election. In theory, the NU members are now floating and are able to vote for either the PDI or the GOLKAR. In the period of 1984 to 1987, the NU branches in several provinces and districts declared themselves free from their affiliation to the PPP. This political action was known as "to flat the PPP campaign" (Penggembosan) during the 1987 election.

The effect of the NU walk-out to the PPP vote in the 1987 election is displayed in Table 16. As also shown in Table 17, the PPP had lost its domination in provinces where traditionally the Islamic parties assumed majority, such as the provinces of Aceh, West Sumatra, and East Java. In contrast, the PDI, which was always considered periph-

eral to politics, was able to increase its vote in twenty-three provinces including provinces traditionally known as the clusters for the PPP.

There was another political maneuver in 1983 to ensure the GOLKAR's victory in the 1987 election. In the GOLKAR national convention in 1983, the government proposed a political campaign on the training of party cadres at the village level (known as KARAKTERDES). The idea of the KARAKTERDES violates the Army's commitment on the floating mass principle to purify villagers from political activities. However, the KARAKTERDES does not violate law no. 3 of 1985 because in article 5(b) the law stimulates that parties register and educate their members with the state ideology, Pancasila.

The KARAKTERDES is an excellent example of how the New Order manipulated the law to ensure the GOLKAR's victory. Since the parliamentarians were screened by the BAKIN, they were supportive of the New Order political decision. Hence, the executive could easily direct political discussion and persuade a schedule for the legislative body to ratify a law. The KARAKTERDES was proposed in 1983 while the parliament ratified "The Political Party and Mass Organization" law in 1985. How could the GOLKAR leaders anticipate the proposal of a law



TABLE 16  
 THE COMPARISON OF PARTIES' PERFORMANCE  
 BETWEEN THE 1982 AND 1987 ELECTIONS  
 (in percentage at provincial level)

Province	PPP	GOLKAR	PDI
Aceh	-16.11	+11.99	+ 4.12
N. Sumatra	- 6.96	+ 0.22	+ 6.74
W. Sumatra	-19.14	+18.24	+ 0.90
Riau	-10.75	+ 8.04	+ 2.71
S. Sumatra	- 9.23	+ 4.14	+ 5.09
Jambi	- 5.61	+ 4.07	+ 1.54
Bengkulu	-15.89	+14.20	+ 1.69
Lampung	-22.69	+27.68	- 4.99
W. Java	-13.36	+ 7.98	+ 5.38
Jakarta	-17.78	+ 5.24	+12.54
C. Java	- 9.51	+ 7.74	+ 1.77
Yogyakarta	- 8.85	+ 9.64	- 0.79
E. Java	-15.86	+14.43	+ 1.43
W. Kalimantan	- 5.53	- 2.26	+ 7.79
C. Kalimantan	- 6.09	+ 4.97	+ 1.12
S. Kalimantan	-14.84	+12.57	+ 2.27
E. Kalimantan	-10.74	+ 6.52	+ 4.22
N. Sulawesi	- 1.35	+ 0.36	+ 0.99
C. Sulawesi	- 3.57	+ 1.82	+ 1.75
SE. Sulawesi	- 0.57	+ 0.21	+ 0.36
S. Sulawesi	- 1.36	+ 0.83	+ 0.53
Bali	- 0.28	- 0.61	+ 0.89
W. Nusa T.	-16.27	+13.95	+ 2.32
E. Nusa T.	+ 0.01	- 1.61	+ 1.60
Maluku	- 5.68	+ 6.24	- 0.56
Irian Jaya	- 0.43	+ 0.47	- 0.04
E. Timor	+ 0.51	- 5.77	+ 5.26

Source: Calculated from the results of the 1982 and 1987 elections. Published by Department of Home Affairs.

TABLE 17  
 THE NUMBER OF DISTRICTS DOMINATED BY  
 POLITICAL PARTIES AND GOLKAR  
 IN THE 1987 ELECTION

Province	PPP	GOLKAR	PDI
Aceh	3	7	0
N. Sumatra	0	17	0
W. Sumatra	0	14	0
Riau	0	6	0
S. Sumatra	2	8	0
Jambi	0	6	0
Bengkulu	0	4	0
Lampung	0	4	0
W. Java	0	24	0
Jakarta	0	5	0
C. Java	0	35	0
Yogyakarta	0	5	0
E. Java	1	36	0
W. Kalimantan	0	7	0
C. Kalimantan	0	6	0
S. Kalimantan	0	10	0
E. Kalimantan	0	6	0
N. Sulawesi	0	6	0
C. Sulawesi	0	4	0
SE. Sulawesi	0	4	0
S. Sulawesi	0	23	0
Bali	0	8	0
W. Nusa Teng.	0	6	0
E. Nusa Teng.	0	12	0
Maluku	0	4	0
Irian Jaya	0	9	0
E. Timor	0	13	0

Source: Calculated from General  
 Election Institute, Jakarta, 1988.

two years before the parliament actually ratified the law to build party cadres in 1985?

The ratification of law no. 3 of 1985 two years prior to the 1987 election gave the PPP and the PDI no time to recruit followers as the GOLKAR did since 1983.<sup>31</sup> Furthermore, the people who are confused with the New Order political maneuvers in every election since 1971, chose the safest way to join the GOLKAR rather than the PPP or the PDI. For this reason, the GOLKAR had no trouble recruiting eight million cadres within two years. Each cadre was given a target of recruiting seven voters. Therefore, through the KARAKTERDES campaign, the GOLKAR had secured thirty-five million voters at the village level in the 1987 election. Hence, there was no surprise that the GOLKAR, at the national level, was able to generate a 73.17 percent vote in the 1987 election.

### Conclusions

The analysis of this chapter strongly indicates that the economic development model adopted by the New Order provides a firm ground for the development of a hegemonic party.

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<sup>31</sup>Suara Karya, 19 October 1985. Formally, the KARAKTERDES campaign began on 18 October 1985. Informally, the preparations for the campaign have begun since 1983.

The GOLKAR domination in politics began in 1971 and has reached total domination in the 1987 elections. In these four successive elections, the GOLKAR had an average of a 3.92 percent increase, the PDI had average of 1.73 percent increase, and PPP suffered an average of a 5.17 percent decrease.

Among the four elections in the New Order era discussed in this chapter, the 1971 election was very important for the future of Indonesian politics. It was the time when the government introduced several political concepts, such as the Monoloyalty and the Floating Mass, as the building block of the New Order political system. This finding is supportive of proposition number 1: "the development of pro-government partisanship in Indonesia politics began in 1971."

Under the Army's protection, the GOLKAR was able to continuously dominate Indonesian politics in the period 1966 to 1987. The involvement of the Army in politics and the changing bases for political attachment, i.e., from the ethnic-cultural to a state-corporatism, during the New Order era indicate that Indonesian politics most resemble the model of Bureaucratic Authoritarian Regime (BAR) developed by Professor King in 1979. A corresponding party system to the BAR is a hegemonic party.

As the party system resembled a hegemonic type, only

one party, the GOLKAR, effectively governs while the other two parties, the PPP and the PDI, are peripheral to the system. As Professor Emmerson asserted, the elections in Indonesia, after 1971, are just "the test of legitimacy" for the New Order regime, i.e., the elections were conducted to see whether the regime remained popular among the people. The elections demonstrate "the sheer authoritative nature of Suharto and the absence of workable alternatives."<sup>32</sup> Therefore, this chapter strongly provides qualitative evidence to support proposition number 2 that: "the party system in Indonesia has evolved from polarized pluralism in the period immediately following the independence to a hegemonic party system in the 1970's and the 1980's."

This chapter suggests that the BAR model not only explains the Indonesian political system in the New Order era, but also is applicable to illustrate the evolution of the Indonesian party system from polarized pluralism to a hegemonic system in the 1970's and the 1980's.

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<sup>32</sup>Donald Emmerson, "Invisible Indonesia," in Foreign Affairs. vol. 66. no. 2. Winter 1987-1988, 380.

CHAPTER V  
A MODEL OF PARTY SYSTEM EVOLUTION  
IN INDONESIA

The discussion in the preceding chapters indicated that one variable, governmental intervention, seems to be the primary explanatory factor in the evolution of successive party systems. This chapter attempts to measure the impact of governmental intervention at successive points during the New Order period. However, it also views governmental intervention at any point in time as responding to, or partially determined by, the economic, social and political environments. In other words, this study postulates a relationship between governmental intervention and the environment in which it occurs.

Based on the discussion in Chapter IV, this study postulates that the changing environment helped the development of a hegemonic party. Once a hegemonic party was established, a gap developed between the party's elite, especially those in government, and the people who were nominal supporters of the party. Hence, in addition to the propositions proposed earlier in this study, another proposition is needed. This additional proposition is

"that governmental intervention becomes increasingly autonomous as the hegemonic party system becomes stronger."

The propositions numbers 4 and 5 proposed in this study will be tested. Those are:

4. After the 1971 election, the government was able to gradually eliminate the parties' functions by keeping the votes for the PPP and the PDI in a general election at a low level.

4.a. The development of a pro-government partisanship in Indonesian politics began in 1971.

4.b. Governmental intervention in Indonesia continues to increase voting turn-out.

4.c. The changes in the party system are significantly associated with the changes in the partisan composition of the electorates.

5. The intensification of governmental intervention in party politics in 1971 is positively associated with increasing corporatization of interest politics, increasing one party domination, and rising levels of economic development.

5.a. Governmental intervention significantly increased one party domination.

5.b. Governmental intervention significantly increased economic development.

## Methodology

### Research Design

In the Bureaucratic Authoritarian Regime (or the BAR) model adopted in this study, the role of state corporatism is very significant. Through state corporatism, the government attempts to evade the difficulty which often occurs in reaching consensus among political parties. Hence, in the BAR, the government intentionally creates an environment which lowers the role of political parties. In this study, government efforts to undermine the party role is called governmental intervention.

The New Order pursued the political legitimacy through a quinquennial election. The election serves as the checking point for the political legitimacy of the BAR. Governmental intervention depends on how well the regime's electoral machine performs in an election. If the vote for this machine declines in one election, or if the government anticipates a serious threat to the machine, then the intervention will likely intensify. This process puts governmental intervention not only as the cause but also the effect of a changing environment.

In this study, the environment that may determine the party system is characterized by five variables: voting turn-out, party domination, party conducting government,



pro-government partisanship, and economic development.

### Variable Operationalization

#### Governmental Intervention

Governmental intervention is defined as direct or indirect action taken by the executive to undermine the life of the parties or the party system.

Most of the direct governmental intervention is in qualitative variables, such as the monoloyalty doctrine, the floating mass concept, and the control over newspapers owned by the parties, particularly since 1971. Quantitative measurements are difficult partly because only archival or aggregate data were available for this study. Thus, this study uses surrogate or indirect indicators of governmental intervention, that is, the amount of development subsidy for regional governments.

This indicator is selected because the regional governments in Indonesia are dependent upon the central government for most of their revenue. The share a region receives depends largely (but not rigidly) upon its contribution to the aggregate national product. This flexible subsidy mechanism provides the governing party with a convenient means of bolstering its support and popularity, because party leaders (GOLKAR) are indistinguishable from government officials. Therefore, it can be

inferred that the size of the central subsidy will be inversely related to the support for non-government parties.

At the provincial level the indicator for central government intervention derives from dividing the provincial development budget by the total of a province budget and multiplying by 100 percent. In Indonesia, the province budget is composed of the development and the routine budgets. The development budget is designated to finance national projects located in a particular province.

At the municipality and district level, the indicator for government intervention derives from the Village Financial Supporting Program.<sup>1</sup> Since 1969, the central government allocated money to stimulate villagers' involvement in the national economic development program. From 1969 to 1977, the amount of money was based on the number of villages in a province. Since 1978, the amount was

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<sup>1</sup>This study uses unpublished data on the realization of the Village Development Supporting Program (Program Bantuan Desa). The data were obtained from the Direktorat Pembangunan Desa, Department of Home Affairs, Jakarta, Indonesia. This is one of the four types of village subsidies: village support (bantuan desa), incentives for successful accomplishment of previous development programs (hadiah lomba desa), incentives for special government programs (program bantuan khusus), and incentives for departmental programs (program bantuan departemen) such as the intensification of the Family Planning program. Through these subsidies, the central government can intervene in village affairs. However, this study had access only to data on village support. The other three subsidies are classified confidential.

based on the population of a village. Regardless of the method of allocating the money, most villages actually received less money since 1969 than they expected, according to the Department of Home Affairs. This study takes actual receipts as the percentage of expected receipts as the indicator of governmental intervention at the municipality and the district level.

#### Voting turn-out

Voting turn-out is the number of registered voters who vote. The indicator for voting turn-out derives from dividing the actual vote cast by the registered votes and multiplying by 100 percent.

The Bureaucratic Authoritarian Regime model adopted in this study to explain the politics during the New Order era acknowledges the importance of mobilized, symbolic activity, and material incentives to political legitimation. The New Order mobilized the people periodically through elections. Another way the New Order mobilized the people was development subsidy or projects, which this study views as a means of governmental intervention. This study assumes a positive relationship between governmental intervention and voting turn-out. Thus, the more the government intervenes in politics, the higher the voting turn-out.

### Party Domination

Party domination is defined as inequality among parties in amount of electoral support. Assuming a situation of equality, the total vote (100 percent) would be equally distributed among the three parties in Indonesia. If the parties were equally strong, each party would be expected to have 33.33 percent of the vote. This indicator is derived by subtracting the percentage of the vote obtained by each party from 33.33 percent. The accumulated residual for all three parties is used as the indicator of party domination. For example, if PPP obtained 20 percent (residual = 13.33), PDI 10 percent (residual = 23.33), and GOLKAR 70 percent (residual = 36.67 percent), the indicator of party domination would be 73.33 (13.33 + 23.33 + 36.67).<sup>2</sup>

This study expects a positive relationship between party domination and governmental intervention.

### Party conduct of government

Party conduct of government refers to the involvement of party leaders in the decision-making process. The involvement may take two forms: in the executive and in the legislative bodies.

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<sup>2</sup>The number of parties remained the same in each period of analysis, otherwise the value of this index would be a function of the number of parties.

This study uses the vote gained by the PPP and the PDI as indicators of party conduct of government. If these parties were capable of challenging the GOLKAR, then they have the opportunity to participate in government through winning seats in the legislative body. This study expects an inverse relationship between governmental intervention and the party conduct of government.

#### Pro-government partisanship

Pro-government partisanship is defined as electoral support for the party which most supports the government in each election. The indicator for this variable is the percentage of the total vote gained by GOLKAR in every election year.

According to the traditional norms in Indonesian society, the leader should be followed without question. For example, in the 1955 election, the PNI's support of President Sukarno helped the party to become one of the four big parties during the parliamentary democracy. One can expect that governmental intervention is positively associated with the degree of pro-government partisanship.

#### Economic development

Economic development is defined as the level of general economic conditions measured in every election

year. This study uses the gross regional domestic product per capita for the provincial level. This indicator is unavailable at lower administrative levels. However, this study was able to find an alternative indicator of economic development for one year, 1987, for the lower levels, namely, the receipts of local taxes per capita. We assume that government receipts of local taxes are positively associated with the level of economic development in the area. This study expects that economic development is positively correlated with governmental intervention.

#### The Model

The model used in this study is "the recursive model" developed by Gordon Hilton.<sup>3</sup> In this model, the position of one variable or a set of variables may vary from one time to another. Hilton describes this model as follows:

Attitudes at time  $t$  go through some causal sequence and produce a behavior at time  $t + 1$  which, in turn, goes through some other causal sequence to produce an attitude at time  $t + 2$ , and so on.<sup>4</sup>

The research design depicted earlier indicates that reciprocal causation is being postulated in this study.

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<sup>3</sup>Gordon Hilton, Intermediate Politometrics (New York, NY.: Columbia University Press, 1976).

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., 221.

Governmental intervention could cause the other variables at one election; but in turn the other variables could cause governmental intervention in the next election.

Diagram 1 simplifies the design.


By using regression analysis, this study attempts to determine the magnitude of the impact of each connecting line in Diagram 1. The bivariate regression analysis is used to determine the impact when governmental intervention is viewed as the cause or determinant of the other variables. The multivariate regression is used to determine the impact when governmental intervention is viewed as the effect or determined by the other variables.

#### Unit of Analysis

This study uses administrative divisions in Indonesia as its units of analysis, i.e., province, municipality and district levels. By the law no. 3/1985, parties may not operate below the district level. Although the prohibition was formally promulgated in 1985, the principle had been implemented since the 1971 election.

The purpose of using three different levels of analysis is to investigate at what level and in which election the model fits best.

DIAGRAM 1  
THE MODEL OF PARTY SYSTEM EVOLUTION



Keys: v1 = governmental intervention  
 v2 = voting turn-out  
 v3 = party domination  
 v4 = party conduct of government  
 v5 = pro-government partisanship  
 v6 = economic development



### Sampling

Due to the small number of units, this study uses the total population of twenty-five provinces<sup>5</sup> and forty-nine municipalities in the analysis at the provincial and municipality levels.

In 1987, the number of districts in Indonesia was 241. This study excludes the twenty-two districts in Irian Jaya and East Timor. Hence, the total population became 219 districts. In order to achieve a probability of 95 percent, the sample needed is seventy-two districts or 26.18 percent of the population.

To select the sample districts, Indonesia was divided into three geographical areas: Sumatra with fifty-one districts, Java with eighty-two districts, and other islands with eighty-six districts. The entire area of Indonesia is considered to be 100 percent. Then a proportionate sample of 33 percent was drawn from each area. Thus, this study selected a sample composed of seventeen districts from Sumatra, twenty-seven districts from Java, and twenty-eight districts from the other islands.

Within each area, districts were given a number chosen at random. To ensure representativeness, at least

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<sup>5</sup>As of 1987, the actual number of provinces in Indonesia is twenty-seven. But two provinces, Irian Jaya and East-Timor, did not participate in the 1971 general elections. Hence, they are excluded from the analysis.

one district was selected from each of the twenty-five provinces. The random sampling was conducted by picking one out of every five districts, until the designated size for each area was attained.

### Data Sources

This study uses archival, aggregate data. The data were published by the Indonesian Statistical Bureau and the Department of Home Affairs.

No evaluation of the reliability of the data was reported in these sources. This study assumes that the data are generally reliable, but acknowledges that this issue needs further research and analysis.

### Provincial Level

Between the 1971 and the 1977 elections

In the 1971 election, governmental intervention (v1) was first considered as the cause or the independent variable influencing voting turn-out (v2), party domination (v3), party conduct of government (v4), pro-government partisanship (v5), and economic development (v6). These dependent variables were measured in 1977.

Table 18 presents the results of bivariate regression

of these variables. The Table shows that direction of influence expected in this study did not occur between the 1971 and 1977 elections. The T statistics indicate that governmental intervention had no significant effect on any of the dependent variables. This statement is supported by the low R-square also presented in Table 18. The R-square values indicate that none of the dependent variables is explained by governmental intervention in the 1971 election. In conjunction with the R-square values, the significant levels indicate that there is no correlation between the independent variable and the dependent variables. This indicates the possibility that other variables not included in this study had more influence on the dependent variables.

Although v1 did not significantly influence v6, a large regression coefficient reflects the government's effort to generate supporters to GOLKAR by using economic development programs as its key issue. This is understandable since the people suffered from economic deterioration in the Guided Democracy era, and GOLKAR was a new political party in Indonesia.

TABLE 18

THE SUMMARY OF BIVARIATE REGRESSION ANALYSIS  
 BETWEEN GOVERNMENTAL INTERVENTION (1971) AND  
 SIX ENVIRONMENTAL VARIABLES (1977)  
 (provincial level)


Effect	Expected	Slope	T	R-square	Significant Level
v2	-	-.007	-.019	.00	.923
v3	-	-.022	-.047	.00	.962
v4a	+	-.103	-.950	.03	.351
v4b	-	.175	.130	.01	.524
v5	-	-.068	-.233	.00	.817
v6	+	2.218	.476	.00	.638

Key: v1 = governmental intervention  
 v2 = voting turn-out  
 v3 = party domination  
 v4 = party conduct of government:  
     v4a = vote gained by the PPP  
     v4b = vote gained by the PDI  
 v5 = pro-government partisanship  
 v6 = economic development

The next governmental intervention in 1971 was viewed as an effect (dependent variable) in a multivariate regression situation as reported in Diagram 2. The dependent variable was measured at 1977. Note that three of six coefficients significantly influence  $v_1$ . The R-square value is .5223 which indicates that 52.23 percent of variation in the dependent variable,  $v_1$ , can be explained by the dependent variables. The significant level of .0233 is significant at 95 percent probability. We can infer that government intervention in 1977 seems to have been a response, at least partially, to the political environment in 1971.

As shown in Diagram 2, the negative influence of  $v_3$  to  $v_1$  indicates that the GOLKAR had not dominated the Indonesian politics, therefore increased governmental intervention was needed. The relationship between  $v_4a$  and  $v_4b$  to  $v_1$  signify that the New Order took the results of the 1971 election very seriously in order to eliminate parties from politics. The establishment of two composite parties in 1973, the PPP and the PDI, was in preparation to make GOLKAR the dominant party. In addition, as discussed in Chapter IV, the government maintained "pseudo" conflicts within the PPP and the PDI to make these parties unable to challenge the GOLKAR in the 1977 election and beyond.

DIAGRAM 2  
THE MODEL OF PARTY SYSTEM EVOLUTION BETWEEN  
THE 1971 AND 1977 ELECTIONS  
(provincial level)



Keys: v1 = governmental intervention  
v2 = voting turn-out  
v3 = party domination  
v4 = party conducting government  
v4a = the vote gained by the PPP  
v4b = the vote gained by the PDI  
v5 = pro-government partisanship  
v6 = economic development

\* = significant at 95 percent probability, one tailed.

A large and significant coefficient between v5 to v1 indicates the New Order endeavour to "deliver the goods" or reward those areas which supported GOLKAR in the 1971 election. Although the GOLKAR dominated the 1971 election with 65.56 percent vote,<sup>6</sup> the New Order wanted to ensure that the new coalition was not a temporary one. The government felt the urgency to consolidate power permanently to GOLKAR, so the New Order would have strong ground to restructure Indonesian politics.

With regard to economic development (v6) the large, but non-significant bivariate regression coefficient, 2.218, indicates that governmental intervention may have had some effect on the 1977 environment. Possibly the government felt confident with the performance of economic development programs implemented since 1969. This was a false assumption, because the people became critical to the New Order's economic development strategy.

At the end of 1973, the students began to protest the inequalities of economic development. The protest received substantial support from the masses which led to social unrest in January 1974, known as the MALARI affair. Although the Army successfully restored order in a short period of time, the protest had forced the government to stress economic equality as a complement of economic

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<sup>6</sup>See table 1 in Chapter I.

development strategy. However, the student protest also helped the New Order to lower PPP and PDI credibility, because the students proved that they could be used as an effective channel of communication between the people and the government. Unprecedentedly, the students were able to perform one of the two functions of a party, i.e., to structure the people's demand.

From the analysis depicted above, this study concludes that between the 1971 and the 1977 elections, governmental intervention was likely the effect rather than the cause of the relationship between variables used in the regression equation.

#### Between the 1977 and the 1982 elections

Table 19 summarizes the results of bivariate analysis i.e., a situation where governmental intervention in 1977 is considered as the cause of the political environment and party system in 1982.

Table 19 demonstrates that the direction of the influence of independent variables to dependent variables did not meet the expectation of this study. Only one of the six dependent variables, that is economic development or v6, was significantly influenced by governmental intervention or v1. The R-square indicates that 39 percent



of the variation in v6 can be explained by v1. Also, the significant level of .000 means that v1 is significantly correlate with v6. Given our operationalization of governmental intervention and the increased subsidies from the 1973 OPEC engineered hike in revenues from oil, this effect is not surprising.

An interesting fact described in Table 19 is that governmental intervention did not determine the formation of pro-government partisanship (v5) in the 1982 election. It is possible that the government was confident with the implementation of monoloyalty and floating mass principles which produced a domination for GOLKAR in the 1971 election. Moreover, the government had forced a merger of parties into two composite parties, the PPP and the PDI in 1973. These principles had isolated the mass from the influence of political parties; therefore, in 1977, the government may have felt it less necessary to intervene indirectly with subsidies than in 1971.

TABLE 19

THE SUMMARY OF BIVARIATE REGRESSION ANALYSIS  
 BETWEEN GOVERNMENTAL INTERVENTION (1977) AND  
 SIX ENVIRONMENTAL VARIABLES (1982)  
 (provincial level)

Effect	Expected	Slope	T	R-square	Significant Level
v2	-	-.045	-.695	.02	.493
v3	-	-.145	-.321	.00	.750
v4a	+	-.059	-.782	.02	.441
v4b	-	.059	.236	.00	.815
v5	+	(a)	.001	.00	.991
v6	+	9.170	3.892 *	.39	.000 *

Note: (a) means the coefficient is too small, hence it can be ignored.


Key: v1 = governmental intervention  
 v2 = voting turn-out  
 v3 = party domination  
 v4 = party conducting government  
     v4a = vote gained by the PPP  
     v4b = vote gained by the PDI  
 v5 = pro-government partisanship  
 v6 = economic development

\* = significant at 95 percent probability, one tailed.

In the multi-variate situation, as depicted in Diagram 3, the independent variables do not influence the dependent variable ( $v_1$ ). The R-square value of .2821 indicates that only 28.21 percent of  $v_1$  can be explained by  $v_2$ ,  $v_3$ ,  $v_{4a}$ ,  $v_{4b}$ ,  $v_5$ , and  $v_6$ . About 71.79 percent variation in  $v_1$  is explained by extraneous variables. The significant level of .3281 indicates insignificant relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variable. In comparison to Diagram 2, where, in 1977,  $v_1$  was significantly influenced by  $v_{4a}$ ,  $v_{4b}$ , and  $v_5$ , this finding in Diagram 3 leads to the inference that government policy (intervention) was becoming autonomous from the economic, social and political environment.

DIAGRAM 3

THE MODEL OF PARTY SYSTEM EVOLUTION BETWEEN  
THE 1977 AND 1982 ELECTIONS  
(provincial level)



Note = (a) means the coefficient is too small, hence it can be ignored.

Key: v1 = governmental intervention  
v2 = voting turn-out  
v3 = party domination  
v4 = party conducting government  
v5 = pro-government partisanship  
v6 = economic development

\* = significant at 95 percent probability, one tailed.

To decide whether v1 is more appropriately viewed as the cause or the effect between the 1977 and the 1982 elections, this study compares the R-square values produced by the bivariate analysis (Table 19) and the multivariate analysis (Diagram 3). In a bivariate situation, the R-square is .39, that is 39 percent of variance in v6 is explained by v1; however, the R-square values between v1 and the other variables are very small. On the other hand, the multivariate model has R-square value of .2821, which mean that 28.21 percent variance in v1 can be explained by the independent variables. Thus, the higher R-square (.39) in the bivariate model provides support for viewing v1 as the independent variable in the 1977-1982 recursive model.

#### Between the 1982 and the 1987 elections

Although only the bivariate regression coefficients between v1 and v6 are significant, Table 20 shows that the direction of the influence of governmental intervention (v1) on the dependent variables supports the expectations of this study. However, the R-square values for all equations are very low.

As in the 1982 situation depicted in Table 19, the government's intervention stimulated economic development (v6) in order to ensure a GOLKAR victory in the 1987 elec-

tion. This evidence supports the qualitative findings in Chapter IV that the government spent a tremendous amount of money to make GOLKAR victorious in several provinces traditionally dominated by the political parties, such as in Aceh and South Kalimantan.

Diagram 4 summarizes the multivariate regression analysis, that is a situation when governmental intervention is considered as the effect of the independent variables. The Diagram shows that none of the independent variables, which are the product of the 1982 election, significantly influence governmental intervention in the 1987 election. In other words, the government ignored the social and political environment as changed by the results of the 1982 election. None of the five independent variables in the model influence government intervention. It may be concluded that New Order policy making in 1987 had become autonomous or largely free from the influence of the party system.

The evidence in Diagram 4 is consistent with our contention that a system emerged in the 1987 election, provided we understand that the hegemonic party (GOLKAR) functioned, not primarily to conduct government, but rather to structure the vote.

TABLE 20  
 THE SUMMARY OF BIVARIATE REGRESSION ANALYSIS  
 BETWEEN GOVERNMENTAL INTERVENTION (1982) AND  
 SIX ENVIRONMENTAL VARIABLES (1987)  
 (provincial level)


Effect	Expected	Slope	T	R-square	Significant Level
v2	+	.049	.990	.04	.332
v3	+	.233	.767	.02	.450
v4a	+	-.101	-1.233	.05	.229
v4b	+	-.030	-.255	.00	.800
v5	+	.131	.817	.02	.422
v6	+	6.055	2.182 *	.16	.039 *

Keys: v1 = governmental intervention  
 v2 = voting turn-out  
 v3 = party domination  
 v4 = party conduct of government  
       v4a = vote gained by the PPP  
       v4b = vote gained by the PDI  
 v5 = pro-government partisanship  
 v6 = economic development

\* = significant at 95 percent probability, one tailed.

DIAGRAM 4  
 THE MODEL OF PARTY SYSTEM EVOLUTION BETWEEN  
 THE 1982 AND 1987 ELECTIONS  
 (provincial level)

<u>Cause</u>	<u>Effect / Cause</u>		<u>Effect</u>
1982	1987	1982	1987



- Keys: v1 = governmental intervention  
 v2 = voting turn-out  
 v3 = party domination  
 v4 = party conducting government  
 v5 = pro-government partisanship  
 v6 = economic development

\* = significant at 95 percent probability, one tailed.



To conclude the discussion at the provincial level, this study has found that governmental intervention is best viewed as the effect rather than the cause of relationships between variables in the 1971-1977 recursive model. However, it appears to become largely autonomous in the 1977-1982 and the 1982-1987 recursive models.

#### The Municipality Level

Due to the unavailability of economic data on municipality level, this study has dropped the variable on economic development between the period of 1971 to 1982. As the result, there are only five variables in the models until 1987.

Between the 1971 and the 1977 elections

As summarized in Table 21, the bivariate regressions produce an outcome which shows that none of the dependent variables was significantly influenced by the independent variable, i.e., governmental intervention. Moreover, the low R-square values indicates that the variation in the dependent variables can not be explained by the independent variable.

TABLE 21  
 THE SUMMARY OF BIVARIATE REGRESSION ANALYSIS  
 BETWEEN GOVERNMENTAL INTERVENTION (1971) AND  
 FIVE ENVIRONMENTAL VARIABLES (1977)  
 (municipality level)

Effect	Expected	Slope	T	R-square	Significant Level
v2	+	.039	.427	.00	.671
v3	+	.084	.322	.00	.748
v4a	+	-.192	-1.409	.04	.165
v4b	+	-.055	-.244	.00	.808
v5	+	.249	1.389	.03	.197


Keys: v1 = governmental intervention  
 v2 = voting turn-out  
 v3 = party domination  
 v4 = party conducting government  
       v4a = vote gained by the PPP  
       v4b = vote gained by the PDI  
 v5 = pro-government partisanship

In the multivariate regression, where  $v_1$  is considered as the effect of the independent variables, Diagram 5 indicates that the result of the 1971 election did not significantly influence governmental intervention in the 1977 election. However, the R-square value of .2339 shows that 23.39 percent of variation in  $v_1$  can be explained by the independent variables. This is better than any R-square values in a bivariate equation as they are depicted in Table 21. Hence this study discovered that governmental intervention is best viewed as an effect rather than a cause in the 1971-1977 recursive model at municipality level.

DIAGRAM 5

THE MODEL OF PARTY SYSTEM EVOLUTION BETWEEN  
THE 1971 AND 1977 ELECTIONS  
(municipality level)

<u>Cause</u>	<u>Effect / Cause</u>	<u>Effect</u>
1971	1977      1971	1977



Keys: v1 = governmental intervention  
v2 = voting turn-out  
v3 = party domination  
v4 = party conducting government  
v5 = pro-government partisanship

Between the 1977 and the 1982 elections

The result of the bivariate regression analysis is summarized in Table 22. The Table shows that v1 significantly influenced the party domination (v3), and the pro-government partisanship (v5). This study operationalizes v3 and v5 as an indication of the development of a hegemonic party, i.e., GOLKAR. Therefore, Table 22 gives evidence that government intervention in 1977, at the municipality level, was intensified in order to guarantee domination of GOLKAR. The R-square value of .32 between v1 to v3 indicates that 32 percent of the variation in v3 is explained by v1. The significant level indicates that v1 significantly correlates with v3. Similarly, the R-square value shows that 35 percent variations in v5 were explained by v1. The significant level also indicated that v1 was significantly correlated with v5.

Table 22 also indicates that v1 was significantly correlated with the vote gained by the PPP (v4a) and the PDI (v4b). The direction of the relationship is negative. In conjunction with the significant effect of v1 to v3 and v5, which are the indicators of the emergence of a hegemonic party, the negative influence of v1 to v4a and v4b provides more evidence that in 1977 the government took further steps to develop a hegemonic party system.

TABLE 22

THE SUMMARY OF BIVARIATE REGRESSION ANALYSIS  
 BETWEEN GOVERNMENTAL INTERVENTION (1977) AND  
 FIVE ENVIRONMENTAL VARIABLES (1982)  
 (municipality level)

Effect	Expected	Slope	T	R-square	Significant Level
v2	-	-.053	-.814	.01	.419
v3	+	.958	4.806 *	.32	.000 *
v4a	+	-.240	-2.088	.08	.042
v4b	+	-.473	-2.537	.12	.014
v5	+	.713	5.121 *	.35	.000 *

Keys: v1 = governmental intervention  
 v2 = voting turn-out  
 v3 = party domination  
 v4 = party conducting government  
       v4a = vote gained by the PPP  
       v4b = vote gained by the PDI  
 v5 = pro-government partisanship


\* = significant at 95 percent probability, one tailed.

The evidence on the establishment of a hegemonic party discussed earlier is supported by evidences in the multivariate regression analysis. As depicted by Diagram 6, the result of the 1977 election did not significantly influence governmental intervention in the 1982 election. In other words, the government became immune from any economic, social and political changing. Although the significant level of .0199 indicates that the independent variables could explained the dependent variable, only 22.88 percent of  $v_1$  is explained by the other variables in the regression equation used in this study.

The bivariate regression analysis suggests that governmental intervention influenced the other variables in the equation. This finding is clearly shown in Diagram 6. The Diagram demonstrates that in the multivariate analysis none of the independent variables in the 1977 election significantly affected the dependent variable in the 1982 election. On the other hand, the bivariate analysis produced two significant coefficients, i.e.,  $v_1$  to  $v_3$ , and  $v_1$  to  $v_5$ . These coefficients reflect the government's effort to promote a hegemonic party, GOLKAR.

DIAGRAM 6  
 THE MODEL OF PARTY SYSTEM EVOLUTION BETWEEN  
 THE 1977 AND 1982 ELECTIONS  
 (municipality level)

<u>Cause</u>	<u>Effect / Cause</u>		<u>Effect</u>
1977	1982	1977	1982



Keys: v1 = governmental intervention  
 v2 = voting turn-out  
 v3 = party domination  
 v4 = party conducting government  
 v5 = pro-government partisanship

\* = significant at 95 percent probability, one tailed.



One note should be made on the zero influence of the PPP vote on governmental intervention. Considering that in the bivariate situation the v4a was influenced significantly negative by the v1, there was strong evidence to believe that the New Order seriously avoided the inclusion of the PPP element in the government. The reason for this goes back to the different cultural orientation between the New Order and the PPP. Although they never proclaimed the GOLKAR as an abangan party, the New Order's orientation was clearly based on the abangan tradition. On the other hand, the PPP explicitly proclaimed that the party is based on the santri orientation. Hence, there is no basic agreement between the New Order and the PPP on the principle of governing.

A similar base of cultural orientation between the PDI and GOLKAR, i.e., the abangan, made it easier for the government to intervene in the PDI rather than in the PPP. Both the PDI and GOLKAR think that the PPP leaders can not distinguish between religion (Islam) and political life. Both PDI and GOLKAR perceive that if the PPP take political control, the old issue of creating an Islamic state in Indonesia will re-appear. To prevent this from happening, occasionally the PDI and the GOLKAR cooperated by supporting only GOLKAR whenever the GOLKAR needed to ensure political domination. At the same time, their cooperation

showed that party affiliation among the abangan is weaker than that among the santri group.

To conclude this section, this study discovered that the bivariate analysis has stronger explanatory power than the multivariate analysis, because two of the five regression coefficients are significant. Therefore, in the recursive model between the 1977 and the 1982 elections at the municipality level, governmental intervention is shown as more of a cause than an effect.

#### Between the 1982 and the 1987 elections

Due to the available data, in the recursive model between the 1982 and the 1987 elections, economic development was used in the regression analysis. But, as shown in Table 23, the appearance of the economic development variable in the bivariate analysis does not help to explain 1982, because the R-square .00 indicates that v1 did not explain any variance in v6. In fact, all R-square values indicate that the independent variable did not influence the dependent variables. The significant level also indicates that v1 is insignificantly correlated with the dependent variables.

TABLE 23

THE SUMMARY OF BIVARIATE REGRESSION ANALYSIS  
 BETWEEN GOVERNMENTAL INTERVENTION (1982) AND  
 SIX ENVIRONMENTAL VARIABLES (1987)  
 (municipality level)

Effect	Expected	Slope	T	R-square	Significant Level
v2	-	-.101	.913	.01	.366
v3	+	.199	-.313	.00	.755
v4a	-	.123	1.616	.05	.112
v4b	+	-.032	.313	.00	.755
v5	+	5.745	-.883	.01	.381
v6	-	-.091	.292	.00	.771

Keys: v1 = governmental intervention  
 v2 = voting turn-out  
 v3 = party domination  
 v4 = party conducting government  
       v4a = vote gained by the PPP  
       v4b = vote gained by the PDI  
 v5 = pro-government partisanship  
 v6 = economic development, 1986/1987


Diagram 7 provides more evidence on the immunity of the government from changing economic, social and political environments. The R-square value indicates that 25.59 percent of variance in  $v_1$  was explained by the independent variables. The significant level of .0099 indicates a strong relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variable. However, the regression coefficients indicate that none of the independent variables significantly influenced the dependent variable ( $v_1$ ). In other words, in the 1987 election, the government has not only ignored the importance of the PPP and the PDI but also its own political party, GOLKAR. This finding supports our inference that the government used GOLKAR in the successive elections primarily for the purpose of renewing the regime's political legitimation.

To conclude this section, this study has discovered that, similar to the provincial level, the government became immune from the political environment as the GOLKAR became stronger and emerged as a hegemonic party in the four successive elections in the New Order era. Government officials, although promoted by the GOLKAR, have become isolated from their supporters.

DIAGRAM 7

THE MODEL OF PARTY SYSTEM EVOLUTION BETWEEN  
THE 1982 AND THE 1987 ELECTIONS  
(municipality level)

<u>Cause</u>	<u>Effect / Cause</u>		<u>Effect</u>
1982	1987	1982	1987



Keys: v1 = governmental intervention  
v2 = voting turn-out  
v3 = party domination  
v4 = party conducting government  
v5 = pro-government partisanship  
v6 = economic development

Note: There is no line between v6 and v1 due to the unavailability of data on economic development in 1982.

The District Level

Between the 1971 and the 1977 elections

The result of bivariate regression analysis is summarized in Table 24. The analysis produced the expected results of this study. However, v1 has significant effect only on the pro-government partisanship (v5).<sup>7</sup> Note also the negative influence of government intervention on the PPP. Although the regression coefficient between v1 and v4b is not significant, the relationship was not accidental because its significant level .002 indicates a strong association between v1 and v4b. This finding is no surprise because, through the floating mass concept which forbid villagers to get involve in politics, the government has successfully cut-off the Islamic party's bases at rural areas.

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<sup>7</sup>As in the analysis on municipalities, the economic development variable does not appear in the models until 1987 due to the unavailability of data.

TABLE 24

THE SUMMARY OF BIVARIATE REGRESSION ANALYSIS  
 BETWEEN GOVERNMENTAL INTERVENTION (1971) AND  
 FIVE ENVIRONMENTAL VARIABLES (1977)  
 (district level)

Effect	Expected	Slope	T	R-square	Significant Level
v2	+	.059	1.215	.02	.228
v3	+	.306	1.157	.01	.251
v4a	+	(a)	-.078	.00	.937
v4b	+	-.516	-3.109	.12	.002 *
v5	+	.510 *	2.932	.11	.004 *

Note: (a) means the regression coefficient is too small, hence it can be ignored.

Keys: v1 = governmental intervention  
 v2 = voting turn-out  
 v3 = party domination  
 v4 = party conducting government  
       v4a = vote gained by the PPP  
       v4b = vote gained by the PDI  
 v5 = pro-government partisanship


\* = significant at 95 percent probability, one tailed.

Diagram 8 clearly shows governmental intervention as a cause. In the multivariate situation, where governmental intervention is considered as the effect of or responding to the environment six years earlier, none of the independent variables significantly influenced the dependent variable. This means that governmental intervention in the 1977 election was not determined by the results of the 1971 election.

A note should be made at this point on the zero influence of the pro-government partisanship on governmental intervention in the 1977 election. Once again, here is evidence that governmental intervention is increasingly autonomous from the political environment. Not only was the government free from the influence of political parties, but also it is not effected by the vote generated by GOLKAR, the government's electoral machine. Although the significant level of .0063 indicates that the independent variables do help to explain the dependent variable, the R-square value shows that only 19.03 percent of variance in  $v_1$  was explained by the independent variables in the 1977-1982 recursive model.



DIAGRAM 8  
 THE MODEL OF PARTY SYSTEM EVOLUTION BETWEEN  
 THE 1971 AND 1977 ELECTIONS  
 (district level)



Note: (a) means the regression coefficient is too small, hence it can be ignored.

- Keys: v1 = governmental intervention  
 v2 = voting turn-out  
 v3 = party domination  
 v4 = party conducting government  
 v5 = pro-government partisanship

\* = significant at 95 percent probability, one tailed.

In making a comparison between the bivariate and the multivariate analyses, this study discovered that the bivariate analysis has more explanatory power than the multivariate analysis. In bivariate situations, v1 significantly influences v5. In multivariate situations, none of the independent variables significantly influence v1. Hence, this study found that in the 1971-1977 recursive model governmental intervention is more an effect than a cause.

#### Between the 1977 and the 1982 elections

Table 25 gives more evidence of the government's attempt to lower the PPP popular support in the 1982 election. As pointed out in Chapter IV, it was due to the PPP victory in several areas, especially in the prestigious area of Jakarta in the 1977 election. This was accompanied by a negative coefficient between v1 and v4b. The significant level between v1 and v4b indicates a strong relationship between these variables. Note also the significant and positive influence from v1 to v5. The negative influence of v1 on v4b gives another support to the cooperation of the PDI and the GOLKAR in an election to prevent the PPP from gaining a majority vote. However, the poor R-square values in Table 25 indicate that extraneous variables may have explained the 1982 election better than

variables used in this study.

Diagram 9 demonstrates that the position of governmental intervention in the period of the 1977 and the 1982 elections was more a cause than an effect. The Diagram shows that none of the independent variables, as the result of the 1977 election, significantly influence governmental intervention in the 1982 election.

An interesting fact from Diagram 9 is the lack of influence of v5 on v1. This phenomenon has occurred since the 1971 election. It reinforces the previous interpretation that governmental intervention is increasingly autonomous from the political environment which resulted from the previous election.

The R-square value of .1903 indicates that 19.03 percent of variance in v1 in the 1982 election can be explained by the result of the 1977 election. In comparison to the results of the bivariate regression analysis in Table 25, the R-square value in the multi-variate analysis is higher than any R-square values in the bivariate situation. For this reason this study conclude that in the 1977-1982 recursive model at district level, the government intervention is better viewed as an effect than as cause.

TABLE 25

THE SUMMARY OF BIVARIATE REGRESSION ANALYSIS  
 BETWEEN GOVERNMENTAL INTERVENTION (1977) AND  
 FIVE ENVIRONMENTAL VARIABLES (1982)  
 (district level)

Effect	Expected	Slope	T	R-square	Significant Level
v2	-	(a)	.055	.00	.956
v3	+	.142	.401	.00	.689
v4a	-	.119	-1.812	.04	.074
v4b	+	-.602	-2.877	.11	.005 *
v5	+	.471	2.041 *	.05	.045 *

Note: (a) means the coefficient is too small, hence it can be ignored.


Keys: v1 = governmental intervention  
 v2 = voting turn-out  
 v3 = party domination  
 v4 = party conducting government  
       v4a = vote gained by the PPP  
       v4b = vote gained by the PDI  
 v5 = pro-government partisanship

\* = significant at 95 percent probability, one tailed.

DIAGRAM 9

THE MODEL OF PARTY SYSTEM EVOLUTION BETWEEN  
THE 1977 AND 1982 ELECTIONS  
(district level)

<u>Cause</u>	<u>Effect / Cause</u>		<u>Effect</u>
1977	1982	1977	1982



Note = (a) means the regression coefficient is too small, hence it can be ignored.

Keys: v1 = governmental intervention  
v2 = voting turn-out  
v3 = party domination  
v4 = party conducting government  
v5 = pro-government partisanship

\* = significant at 95 percent probability, one tailed.

### Between the 1982 and the 1987 elections

The result of the bivariate regression is summarized in Table 26. The Table indicates significant influence of v1 (governmental intervention) to v6 (economic development in 1987). This finding is no surprise since the GOLKAR leadership set-up a goal of a 73 percent vote in the 1987 election. As discussed in Chapter IV, the government relied not only on the effectiveness of the floating mass and monoloyalty principles to secure a GOLKAR victory, but also it intensified the use of material incentives.

An interesting fact in Table 26 is the negative influence of v1 to v4b (vote gained by PDI). Although the regression coefficient is not statistically significant, the significant level of .001 indicates a zero-sum game between the PDI and the GOLKAR. It appears that, in the 1987 election, the party competition was not only between the abangan (PDI and GOLKAR) versus the santri (PPP), but also within the abangan stream.

TABLE 26

THE SUMMARY OF BIVARIATE REGRESSION ANALYSIS  
 BETWEEN GOVERNMENTAL INTERVENTION (1982) AND  
 SIX ENVIRONMENTAL VARIABLES (1987)  
 (district level)

Effect	Expected	Slope	T	R-square	Significant Level
v2	-	-.101	-1.290	.02	.201
v3	+	.367	.973	.01	.333
v4a	-	.134	1.445	.03	.152
v4b	+	-.538	-3.251	.13	.001 *
v5	+	.403	1.928	.05	.057
v6	+	11.617	1.271 *	.02	.207

Keys: v1 = governmental intervention  
 v2 = voting turn-out  
 v3 = party domination  
 v4 = party conducting government  
       v4a = vote gained by the PPP  
       v4b = vote gained by the PDI  
 v5 = pro-government partisanship  
 v6 = economic development


\* = significant at 95 percent probability, one tailed.

As was found at provincial and municipality levels, the multivariate analysis for the 1987 election indicates that the government became increasingly immune from the changing social and political environment as the result of the 1982 election. If Diagram 10 is compared with Diagrams 4 and 7, the influence of v3 and v5 on v1 becomes negative at the district level in the 1987 election. A significant level of .000 and an R-square of .3381 in the multivariate analysis indicates that the independent variables could influence the dependent variable. But the T-statistics produced insignificant regression coefficients. This finding strengthens our contention that the mass of GOLKAR supporters have little influence on their party elites (government officials). At least at district level, political parties (including GOLKAR) have become less meaningful institutions for people to channel their demands.



DIAGRAM 10

THE MODEL OF PARTY SYSTEM EVOLUTION BETWEEN  
THE 1982 AND THE 1987 ELECTIONS  
(district level)



Keys: v1 = governmental intervention  
v2 = voting turn-out  
v3 = party domination  
v4 = party conducting government  
v5 = pro-government partisanship  
v6 = economic development

\* = significant at 95 percent probability, one tailed.

Note: There is no line between v6 and v1 due to the unavailability of data on economic development in 1982.

To conclude this section, the 1982-1987 recursive model gives more evidence on a trend that the government has been increasingly more autonomous, and free from the changing economic, social and political environments. Among three recursive models tested at the district level, this study has discovered that the 1982-1987 model is the best because it has the highest R-square value and the lowest significant level.

#### Testing the Propositions

The additional proposition mentioned at the beginning of this chapter is supported. At the three levels of analysis, this study gives evidence that as the hegemonic party system became stronger, government intervention became immune from the political environment.

The other two propositions tested in this chapter are divided into three sub-propositions. As a result, this chapter tested seven propositions. Proposition number 4: "After the 1971 election, the government was able to gradually eliminate parties' functions by keeping the votes for the PPP and the PDI in a general election at a low level." The proposition predicted that governmental intervention was the cause of the variation among variables used in this study. The vote gained by the PPP and the PDI has been low since the 1971 election. However, as

depicted in Diagrams discussed earlier, after the 1971 election the position of governmental intervention was not always the cause of the variation. In Diagram 2, at the provincial level, after the 1971 election governmental intervention was considered as the effect of the election outcome. In contrast, in Diagrams 5 and 9, at the municipality and the district levels, governmental intervention was considered as the cause of the variation.

Hence, proposition number 4 is accepted at the municipality and the district levels of analysis, but it is rejected at the provincial level.

Proposition number 4.a.: "The development of a pro-government partisanship in Indonesian politics began in 1971." This proposition is accepted at the municipality and district levels. At the provincial level, as shown in Diagram 4, the development of pro-government partisanship began after the 1982 election. As displayed in Diagrams 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9, the government began to establish pro-government partisanship since the 1971 election. In the 1982-1987 situation, at the district level, instead of causing the formation of pro-government partisanship, governmental intervention became the effect of the partisanship.

Proposition number 4.b.: "Governmental intervention in Indonesia continues to increase voting turn-out." This

proposition is accepted in different election times and at different level of analysis. At the provincial level, governmental intervention decreased the voting turn-out in the 1971 and the 1977 election. In the 1982 election the intervention increased the voting turn-out. At the municipality and district levels, governmental intervention increased the voting turn-out in the 1971 and the 1977 elections. The intervention decreased the voting turn-out at both levels of analysis in the 1982 election.

Thus, this study has discovered governmental intervention had been effectively used to increase the voting turn-out at municipality and district levels rather than at the provincial level.

Proposition number 4.c.: "The changes in the party system are significantly associated with the changes in the partisan composition of the electorates." Throughout the discussion in this chapter, evidence was presented of the New Order's effort to eliminate the role of the PPP and the PDI in politics by reducing the parties' support in the successive elections. The bivariate regression analysis on the results of the 1971, 1977, and 1982 elections has found that the decline of the PPP and the PDI vote is always accompanied by the increase of pro-government partisanship. This gives GOLKAR an absolute political control which in turn produces a hegemonic party system in Indonesia.

Proposition number 5: "The onset of governmental intervention in party politics in 1971 is positively associated with the increasing corporatization of interest politics, increasing one party domination, and rising levels of economic development." This proposition states that governmental intervention is the cause of the relationship. But, as in the case of proposition number 4, the previous discussion showed that the intervention could be the cause or the effect of the relationship. To better explain proposition number 5, two sub-propositions are proposed.

Proposition number 5.a. "Governmental intervention significantly increased one party domination." At the provincial and the district levels, the influence of governmental intervention to the formation of one party domination was not supported. The influence was only significant at the municipality level in all election years.

Proposition number 5.b.: "Governmental intervention significantly increased economic development." At the provincial level, only in the 1971 election did intervention not insignificantly influence economic development. At the municipality level, the intervention negatively influenced the economic development. At the district level, the intervention lacked influence on economic

development.<sup>8</sup>

### Conclusions

Chapter V aims to construct a model of party system evolution in Indonesia. It employs the recursive model composed of bivariate and multivariate regression analysis. This model intends to test the consistent influence of governmental intervention to the shaping of a hegemonic political party system. The bivariate regression is used to determine the impact of governmental intervention to the environmental variables. The multivariate regression is used in a situation when governmental intervention is considered the effect of the relationship. The model is tested on three levels of analysis: the province, the municipality, and the district, in four successive elections in Indonesia in the New Order's era.

#### Provincial Level

The 1971-1977 bivariate, recursive model, showed that governmental intervention in 1971 significantly influenced economic development in 1977. The multivariate, recursive

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<sup>8</sup>Due to the unavailability of economic data at the municipality and the district levels in the 1971 and the 1977 elections, the influence of governmental intervention can only be tested in the 1982 election.

model indicated that government intervention in 1977 was influenced by the result of the 1971 election, i.e., three of six independent variables significantly influenced government intervention. Those three independent variables were the votes gained by the PPP, PDI, and the formation of a pro-government partisanship.

From this evidence we can conclude that the PPP and the PDI performed their functions of structuring the vote and conducting the government in the 1971 election. The government's effort to create a pro-government partisanship was challenged by the PPP and the PDI. For this reason the government paid serious attention to the result of the 1971 election. In other words, evidence suggests that governmental intervention in 1971 was a cause of economic development in 1977 and an effect or response to the 1971 political environment.

In the 1977-1982, bivariate, recursive model, again governmental intervention in 1977 significantly influenced economic development in 1982. This indicates the government's endeavour to use its economic development program as the key means for establishing political legitimacy. Governmental intervention had little effect on the formation of a pro-government partisanship in the 1982 election.

In the 1977-1982 multivariate, recursive model, the government intervention in 1982 was immune from the

influence of environmental variables in 1977. In other words, the results of the multivariate analysis support the results of the bivariate analysis that governmental intervention became autonomous from environmental changes. Thus, in the 1977-1982 recursive model, this study views governmental intervention more as a cause than an effect. This contrasts with the finding in the 1971-1977 models, where government intervention was found to be an effect of the 1971 political environment.

Again in the 1982-1987 models, governmental intervention was more a cause than an effect. The bivariate analysis indicated that governmental intervention significantly influenced one of the six environmental variables, i.e., economic development. On the other hand, the multivariate analysis showed that none of the six environmental variables, as the result of the 1982 election, influenced governmental intervention in 1987.

To conclude this section, this study discovered a trend of governmental intervention becoming increasingly immune from economic, social and political environment changes.



### Municipality Level

The bivariate analysis for the 1971-1977 recursive model indicates that governmental intervention in 1971 did not influence the five environmental variables in the 1977 election. The multivariate analysis for this model also produced insignificant influence of the five environmental variables in 1971 to governmental intervention in 1977. However, the R-square values in the bivariate situations are very low, while it is .2339 in the multivariate situation. For this reason, this study concludes that in the 1971-1977 recursive model governmental intervention can be viewed as responding to the political environment.

As at the provincial level, the position of governmental intervention changed in the 1977-1982 recursive model. The bivariate analysis indicates that governmental intervention significantly influenced the formation of one party domination and pro-government partisanship which reflects the government's efforts to make GOLKAR a hegemonic party. Hence, the function of governmental intervention changed from being an effect in the 1971-1977 model to the cause in the 1977-1982 model. The multivariate analysis showed that none of the five environmental variables in 1977 significantly influenced governmental intervention in 1982.

The 1982-1987 recursive model gave more support to viewing governmental intervention as a cause than an effect. The bivariate regression coefficient between governmental intervention in 1982 and pro-government partisanship in 1987, is large but not statistically significant. In the multivariate analysis, none of the five environmental variables in 1982 influenced the governmental intervention in 1987.

To conclude this section, this study found that governmental intervention is best considered as an effect in the 1971-1977 recursive model, but then it increasingly became more of a cause in the 1977-1982 and the 1982-1987 recursive models.

#### District Level

The bivariate analysis in the 1971-1977 recursive model indicates that governmental intervention in 1971 significantly influenced the formation of pro-government partisanship in 1977. The multivariate analysis, in contrast, showed that none of the five environmental variables in the 1971 election influenced governmental intervention in 1977. Hence, in this model governmental intervention is best viewed as a cause rather than an effect of the political environment.

The 1977-1982 recursive model gives further evidence on the function of governmental intervention as a cause of the political environment. The bivariate analysis produced a significant coefficient between governmental intervention and pro-government partisanship. At the same time, although the coefficient is statistically insignificant, governmental intervention has a negative impact on the PDI. This gives reason to believe that in the 1982 election the government targeted the PDI to regain GOLKAR domination after GOLKAR was defeated by the PPP in several areas in Aceh, Jakarta, and South Kalimantan.

The function of governmental intervention as the cause in the recursive model is supported by the results of the multivariate analysis in the 1977-1982 period. None of the five environmental variables in 1977 significantly influenced governmental intervention in 1982. Interestingly, the analysis indicates that government policy makers who are also GOLKAR leaders, are not only immune from the influence of PPP and PDI, but also from the GOLKAR supporters.

The bivariate analysis in the 1982-1987 recursive model indicates that governmental intervention significantly influenced the pro-government partisanship. The continuous evidence of governmental intervention influencing the pro-government partisanship since 1971 indicates

the formation of a hegemonic party system in Indonesia.

The multivariate analysis shows that none of the five environmental variables in 1982 influenced governmental intervention in 1987. Hence this study concluded that in the 1982-1987 recursive model, governmental intervention is best viewed as a cause than an effect.

In general, this study concludes that governmental intervention has increasingly become the cause of the economic, social and political changes. This section gives evidence that the governmental policy became autonomous of changes in the environment.

CHAPTER VI  
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The purpose of this chapter is to summarize all the findings discussed in the previous chapters. The findings are divided into two categories: the qualitative and the quantitative.

The Qualitative Findings

In Chapter II, the growth of interest groups in Indonesia is presented. The chapter examines how these groups evolved and became political parties.

The development of political parties was stimulated by the introduction of an Ethical Policy in 1899. The aim of the policy was to initiate modernization for the NEI people. One of the effects of the policy was that it gave more attention to education of Indonesians. Some of them went to Europe and the Middle East and became familiar with new ideas developed there. The students began to realize that their homeland was milked by the Dutch which aroused their political consciousness. However, to avoid Dutch political repression, instead of building a political party, they developed several interest groups, and their

activities emphasized social programs. This way, the students could insinuate their ideas to the Indonesian society.

In 1906, the Dutch government announced the establishment of the People's Assembly (Volksraad). Membership in the Volksraad was based on political association. Some of the members were appointed by the Governor General and some were elected in an election. To fill the elected portions in the Volksraad, the Dutch announced a law in 1917 which encouraged the development of political parties in the NEI. In order to guarantee representation in the Volksraad, each social group developed its own political party as the channel of expression. The law of 1917, therefore, initiated the development of an atomized party system. Multiple parties existed but no single party had a noticeable effect on any other party.

In conjunction with the social stratification of the NEI people--the Dutch at the top of pyramid, the Chinese in the middle, and the Indonesians at the bottom--the function of political parties varies between each stratum. There were two similarities to these parties. First, they functioned to protect the interests of each stratum. Second, they did not become involved in the sphere of government.

Parties that emerged in the Dutch period had their

roots in social fragmentation. The liberal economy had made parties as the protectors of economic interest of each stratum in the NEI pyramidal society. For example, one of the SI's goals was to protect the indigenous batik trader from the Chinese. However, through parties the government was able to manage conflict while undergoing modernization.

Although the parties had representatives in the Volksraad, they did not participate in government. They served as the rubber stamp for policies initiated by the executive. This was because the majority of the Volksraad members were appointed by the government. This study discovered the pattern of appointing some parliamentarians continuously or under every regime since.

Early in the Japanese occupation, all political parties were banned. The Japanese denied political representation through organized groups but encouraged them to mobilize the masses. Leaders of these groups were not involved in the conduct of government except during the last period of Japanese colonialism in 1944-1945 when group leaders became members of BPUPKI and PPKI, which served as mobilization parties or as the mouthpiece of the government. However, the parties did not play a role in the decision-making process. The parties were important only in the implementation of the Japanese policy, i.e., to mobilize the masses.

There were two other important political aspects from the Japanese era. First was the inception of military superiority over the civilian bureaucracy. It was during the Japanese era that the military men became involved in the civilian bureaucracy. This pattern of military superiority over civilian bureaucracy has emerged in Indonesian politics since the New Order era. Second, the use of mass organizations to mobilize the masses for participation in Japanese military activities led to political parties developing military wings. Equipped with military units, some parties provided de facto governments for several areas in Indonesia. This experience gave rise to an assumption that in order to survive, a party needs support from the military.

Chapter II demonstrated that the atomized party system initiated by the 1917 law evolved into a polarized pluralism party system at the end of the Japanese era marked by the proclamation of Indonesian independence on August 17, 1945. The evolution was caused by the Japanese policy to abolish parties and regroup them into mass organizations for the purpose of mass mobilization. The regrouping had reduced the number of parties existing in the Dutch era. This evidence supports proposition 1 that "The political party system in Indonesia has evolved from an atomized structure in the early twentieth century to a



system of polarized pluralism in the period immediately following independence."

The polarized pluralism system, reinforced by ethnic sentiment and military support, produced political instability in the early Republican period. This made President Sukarno persist in his idea of a vanguard party which he had developed in 1926. However, due to the criticism that it would lead to a fascist government, the vanguard party was turned down.

In Chapter III, this study found that shortly after Indonesia proclaimed its independence in 1945, the government tried to rebuild parties with broader roles and more functions. A parliamentary system of government was adopted, a general election was scheduled in January 1946, and the foundation of political parties was encouraged through a government decree on November 3, 1945. But these political initiatives revealed regional and ethnic sentiments and produced multi parties.

The absence of a major integrative party to guarantee a majority vote in the parliament made political stability fragile. Although two big parties often collaborated to form a government, not a single government in this period could accomplish its programs because the other big parties could veto the government's policy. For this reason, the President intervened in political parties by promulgating

martial law in 1957.

There were two conflicting developments in the 1945 to 1957 period. One was stated in proposition number 2(a) that "between 1949 and 1958, the functions of parties were the structuring of the electorates and conducting government." But the ability to perform these functions was disrupted by the deep cultural cleavages within the Indonesian groups, i.e., the santri and the abangan orientations. In most cases, the two orientations were further reinforced by ethnic sentiments. These distinctions resulted in narrow bases for parties to perform their functions because a party seemed to have difficulty in appealing for support across cultural or ethnic groups. This finding is expressed in proposition number 2(b) that stated "between 1949 and 1958, the parties were unable to express and aggregate the demands of various groups in Indonesia, which resulted in their inability to govern effectively."

The promulgation of Martial Law in 1957 gave the government a path to intervene in political parties. The law marked the end of the parliamentary era and its replacement with Guided Democracy. Under Guided Democracy, the parties had representatives in the legislative and executive bodies, but these people had to work under the guidance of the President. The parties were able to

structure the people's demands and, to some degree, were involved in decision making, as long as the party leaders accepted the President's "Political Conception" and the NASAKOM. However, similar to the practice during the Dutch era, the party representatives were appointed by the President. As stated in proposition number 2(c): "After 1958, parties in Indonesia were still involved in structuring voting choices and conducting government, but they were closely controlled by the government."

During guided democracy, the President played a central role in Indonesian politics. However, because Guided Democracy was declared in the scope of the martial law, and the Law provided a path for the Army to become involved in politics, the President increasingly had to share power with the army officers.

The President himself was highly suspicious of the Army political maneuvers ever since the October 17, 1952 attempted coup. When the Army started its campaign to develop several civil-military bodies (BKS) in 1958, the President realized that the BKS was the Army's tool to relate to the Army and the people. To bolster his position against a potential Army coup, the President sought the support of political parties, especially to the PKI. Thus, the Guided Democracy evolved from a concentration of power in the hands of the President to a triangular structure

composed of the President, the Army, and the PKI. Among these three actors, it was the Army which often took political initiatives, such as the announcement of martial law, the Army's support to the President's idea of the Guided Democracy, the guarantee for functional groups seats in the parliament, and the Army's direct involvement in social and political affairs through its Dual Function doctrine. The changing from a Parliamentary Democracy to a Guided Democracy had put the parties under the control of the government. This finding is supportive of proposition number 3: "between 1958 and 1965, the government increasingly intervened to modify and to constrain the functions of parties."

The evidence presented in Chapter IV suggests that during a short period between 1966 to 1969, the parties were able to conduct the government and to some degree structured the people's demands. However, these functions were increasingly undermined by the growing importance of the Army. The aftermath of the 1965 coup gave the Army an open path to dominate Indonesian politics. Of the three components of the triangular political structure during the Guided Democracy, only the Army survived in 1966. However, due to the lack of political legitimation to govern, the Army needed the parties' support.

In the two years prior to the 1971 election, the New

Order government conducted a series of political maneuvers that altered the party's functions. The most noticeable maneuvers were the introduction of the monoloyalty and the floating mass principles. Monoloyalty effectively cut the government employees from their affiliation to parties other than the GOLKAR. This concept was used to strengthen the bureaucracy and to ensure support for GOLKAR in the 1971 election. The bureaucracy was given special attention by the New Order because, since 1955, it had been dominated by the PNI, an abangan party. The monoloyalty policy was actually intended to emasculate parties of the abangan stream. The floating mass, on the other hand, was used to immunize the villagers from political activities. This principle could be understood as the government's endeavour to cut the mass support of the Islamic parties, especially the NU, which had strong bases at the village level. This principle was understood as another government attempt to depolitize the santri groups.

The two principles depicted above were the primary means to lower the importance of cultural orientations in Indonesian politics. As the findings in Chapter III suggest, these orientations were held responsible for the inability of the governments to perform their duties during the parliamentary democracy. The effect of the introduction of the monoloyalty and the floating mass principles to

the political life of Indonesians was that the people were allowed to participate only in officially recognized groups. Monoloyalty and floating mass were the tools of the BAR in Indonesia to promote limited pluralism and state corporatism. These policies directed the "floating" mass to support GOLKAR. At the same time, the implementation of these policies inhibited the PPP and the PDI from meaningfully challenging the GOLKAR in four successive elections in the New Order period. This evidence supports proposition number 4(a): "the development of a coalition formation in Indonesia politics began in 1971."

Consequently, GOLKAR emerged as the largest and most integrative party and dominated Indonesian politics. Hence, the shape of the party system had switched from a polarized pluralism to a hegemonic party system. The changing system and the formulation of a coalition formation was caused by similar factors, i.e., monoloyalty and floating mass. Thus, this evidence supports proposition number 4(c): "the changes in the party system are significantly associated with the changes in the partisan composition of the electorates."

The Bureaucratic Authoritarian Regime model suggests that the importance of political parties during the New Order era is primarily to provide political legitimation to the government and its economic development strategy.

Political participation in the New Order era has been mobilized participation rather than autonomous participation. This study supports proposition number 4(b): "governmental intervention in Indonesia continues to increase voting turn-out."

In general, the qualitative evidence provided in Chapter IV gives support to proposition number 5: "the intensification of governmental intervention in party politics in 1971 is positively associated with increasing corporatization of interest politics, decreasing levels of partisan conflict, and rising levels of economic growth."

### The Quantitative Findings

#### Provincial Level

The 1971-1977 bivariate, recursive model, showed that the government intervention in 1971 significantly influenced economic development in 1977. The multivariate, recursive model indicated that government intervention in 1977 was influenced by the result of the 1971 election, i.e., three of six independent variables significantly influenced government intervention. Those three independent variables were the votes gained by the PPP, PDI, and the formation of pro-government partisanship.

From this evidence, we can conclude that the PPP and

the PDI performed their functions of structuring the vote and conducting the government in the 1971 election. The government's effort to create a pro-government partisanship was challenged by the PPP and the PDI. For this reason, the government paid serious attention to the results of the 1971 election. In other words, evidence suggests that government intervention in 1971 was a cause of economic development in 1977 and that governmental intervention in 1977 was an effect of, or response to, the 1971 political environment.

In the 1977-1982 bivariate, recursive model, again governmental intervention in 1977 significantly influenced economic development in 1982. This indicates the government's endeavour to use its economic development program as the key means for establishing political legitimacy. Government intervention had little effect on the formation of a pro-government partisanship in the 1982 election.

In the 1977-1982 multivariate, recursive model, the government intervention in 1982 was immune from the influence of environmental variables in 1977. In other words, the results of the multivariate analysis support the results of the bivariate analysis that governmental intervention became autonomous from environmental changes. Thus, in the 1977-1982 recursive model, this study views governmental intervention more as a cause rather than an



effect. This contrasts with the finding in the 1971-1977 models, where governmental intervention was found to be an effect of the 1971 political environment.

Again in the 1982-1987 models, governmental intervention was more a cause than an effect. The bivariate analysis indicated that governmental intervention significantly influenced one of the six environmental variables, i.e., economic development. On the other hand, the multivariate analysis showed that none of the six environmental variables, as the result of the 1982 election, influenced governmental intervention in 1987.

To conclude this section, this study discovered a trend of government intervention becoming increasingly immune from economic, social and political environment changes.

#### Municipality Level

The bivariate analysis for the 1971-1977 recursive model indicates that governmental intervention in 1971 did not influence the five environmental variables in the 1977 election. The multivariate analysis for this model also produced insignificant influence of the five environmental variables in 1971 to the government intervention in 1977. However, the R-square values in the bivariate situations

are very low, while it is .2339 in the multivariate situation. For this reason this study concludes that in the 1971-1977 recursive model governmental intervention can be viewed as responding to the political environment.

As at the provincial level, the position of governmental intervention changed in the 1977-1982 recursive model. The bivariate analysis indicates that governmental intervention significantly influenced the formation of one party domination and pro-government partisanship which reflects the government's efforts to make GOLKAR a hegemonic party. Hence, the function of governmental intervention changed from being an effect in the 1971-1977 model to the cause in the 1977-1982 model. The multivariate analysis showed that none of the five environmental variables in 1977 significantly influenced government intervention in 1982.

The 1982-1987 recursive model gave more support to viewing governmental intervention as a cause than an effect. The bivariate regression coefficient between governmental intervention in 1982 and pro-government partisanship in 1987 is large but not statistically significant. In the multivariate analysis, none of the five environmental variables in 1982 influenced governmental intervention in 1987.

To conclude this section, this study found that

governmental intervention is best considered as an effect in the 1971-1977 recursive model, but then it increasingly became more of a cause in the 1977-1982 and the 1982-1987 recursive models.

#### District Level

The bivariate analysis in the 1971-1977 recursive model indicates that governmental intervention in 1971 significantly influenced the formation of pro-government partisanship in 1977. The multivariate analysis, in contrast, showed that none of the five environmental variables in the 1971 election influenced governmental intervention in 1977. Hence, in this model governmental intervention is best viewed as a cause rather than an effect of the political environment.

The 1977-1982 recursive model gives further evidence on the function of government intervention as a cause of the political environment. The bivariate analysis produced a significant coefficient between governmental intervention and pro-government partisanship. At the same time, although the coefficient is statistically insignificant, governmental intervention has a negative impact on the PDI. This gives reason to believe that in the 1982 election, the government targeted the PDI to regain GOLKAR domination

after GOLKAR was defeated by the PPP in several areas in Aceh, Jakarta, and South Kalimantan.

The function of government intervention as the cause in the recursive model is supported by the results of the multivariate analysis in the 1977-1982 period. None of the five environmental variables in 1977 significantly influence governmental intervention in 1982. Interestingly, the analysis indicates that government policy makers who are also GOLKAR leaders, are not only immune from the influence of PPP and PDI, but also from the GOLKAR supporters.

The bivariate analysis in the 1982-1987 recursive model indicates that governmental intervention significantly influences the pro-government partisanship. The continuous evidence of government intervention influencing the pro-government partisanship since 1971 indicates the formation of a hegemonic party system in Indonesia.

The multivariate analysis shows that none of the five environmental variables in 1982 influenced governmental intervention in 1987. Hence, this study concludes that in the 1982-1987 recursive model the government intervention is best viewed as a cause rather than an effect.

In general, this study concludes that governmental intervention has increasingly become the cause of the economic, social and political changes. This section gives evidence that governmental policy became autonomous of

changes in the environment.

### General Conclusions

This study attempts to answer five questions. Each question is presented below and followed by the relevant findings of this study.

The first question is, how has the organizational structure of the Indonesian political party system evolved over time? The findings indicate that the Indonesians established associational groups in the early 1900s as a response to the Ethical policy promulgated by the Dutch in 1889. Some associational groups actually began to take on the functions of political parties and started demanding political rights. The Dutch refused, and started to intervene in the parties. When the Japanese replaced the Dutch as the rulers of Indonesia, they abolished parties and forced party supporters to join mass organizations sponsored by the Japanese government. Authoritarianism toward parties was, therefore, introduced to the Indonesians. When Indonesia gained its independence in 1945, the people rejected such authoritarianism. The Indonesian government encouraged the people to establish parties in 1945 which produced a pluralistic party system. This study discovered that the pluralistic system did not work for the

Indonesians because of regionalism and parties becoming the de facto government for particular areas. This situation led to the development of regional rebellions, which in turn gave the Army an opportunity to become involved in politics. The Army condemned the parties for political instability and the government malfunctioned. Once the Army was involved in politics, they tended to dominate it. For the purpose of political legitimation, the Army developed GOLKAR. With the Army's top-down command system, they made GOLKAR into the hegemonic party in Indonesia.

The second question is, what roles or functions have the political parties performed within the Indonesian political system, and how have these roles and functions changed over time? The earlier discussion suggests that the parties aggregated the peoples' demands but were incapable of placing representatives in government during the Dutch period. Then, the parties were used as the mouthpieces of the Japanese government. During the Japanese period, the parties could not aggregate the peoples' demands, nor could they participate in government. Gradually, as President Sukarno and the Army became more anxious to participate in politics, the parties' role and functions faded away. When Sukarno was ousted from his Presidency, the Army stood as the unchallengeable political force in Indonesia. The Army made GOLKAR the hegemonic

party in Indonesia. Other parties, therefore, were forced to the periphery of the political arena. In this position, the other parties, i.e., the PPP and the PDI, became the rubber stamp for government policy.

The third question is "what factors are responsible for the changing nature of the Indonesian party system?" The qualitative evidence suggests that governmental intervention was the major factor in the evolution of the Indonesian party system. The quantitative evidence also indicated that governmental intervention was a causal factor influencing the political environment but became increasingly autonomous over time.

The fourth question is, how has the structural and functional evolution of the party system influenced the behavior of the Indonesian electorates with regard to level of participation and partisan conflict? The findings in this study suggest that as the New Order stressed political stability for economic development, the party system resembled a hegemonic type. To gain political legitimacy, the people were mobilized to participate in politics, i.e., to be given ballots in a general election, as well as to support the hegemonic party. Therefore, voting turn out was high. Since the PPP and the PDI were incapable of challenging the GOLKAR, the evidence provided in Chapter IV proved that the electorates became more

supportive of GOLKAR. In turn, this helped to develop a pro-government partisanship and to reduce partisan conflict.

The fifth question is, what effect, if any, has the structural and functional evolution of the party system had on partisan and interest conflict, and economic change in Indonesia? The evidence provided in this study indicates that the implementation of a hegemonic party system has helped the Indonesians to conduct economic development. But GOLKAR, as the hegemonic party, originated from independent functional groups. Consequently, there were many interests within GOLKAR which gradually would make political mechanisms within the hegemonic party difficult.

In general, this study strongly supports proposition number 1, that is: the political party system in Indonesia has evolved from an atomized structure in the early twentieth century, to a system of polarized pluralism in the period immediately following independence, and finally to a hegemonic system in the 1970's and 1980's.

This study has discovered that governmental intervention was the primary cause for the evolution of political party systems in Indonesia.



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